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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation is offered as a work of original scholarship in the field of 
Religion and Psychological Studies (RPS).  Through its hermeneutic preservation of 
Jacob Böhme’s The Way to Christ in “conversation” with selected works of Martin 
Heidegger, I retrieve the question of imagination’s relation to religious practice, attending 
to potentials for world transformations disclosed through this relationship, in order to 
develop a new hermeneutic option for the RPS field concerning this important question.  
This new hermeneutic option is developed in such a way as to ensure a subversive 
compatibility with psychoanalytic hermeneutics—our field’s koiné—while opening to 
certain radical possibilities of interpretation concerning imagination, desire, religious 
practice, and world transformations. 
 In the course of the dissertation’s development, issues concerning the western 
esoteric traditions—Christian theosophy in particular—repentance, guilt, death, new 
birth, resignation (Gelassenheit), contemplation, and a radical encounter with Sophia are 
brought to the fore for consideration.  In addition, this dissertation develops its 
hermeneutic out of the guiding orientation of a weakening ontology that opens a way for 
the “return of religion” in postmodern hermeneutic discourse, as articulated by Gianni 
Vattimo. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Question 
 The question that is the focus of this dissertation concerns the relationship of 
imagination to religious practice.  Specifically, what can be said of the possibility of this 
relation in a post-metaphysical discourse?  With the recent advent of the “return of 
religion” to such discourse, new avenues of inquiry to advance this question have become 
possible.1  This dissertation is intended to explore one such avenue.  The hermeneutical 
wager of this dissertation is that through opening a “conversation” between the twentieth-
century German philosopher Martin Heidegger and the seventeenth-century German 
theosophist Jacob Böhme,2 an unexpected dimension of imagination will be disclosed.  
Further, that this dimension will prove of particular importance for our question of 
imagination’s relation to religious practice. 
 Anticipating the end at the beginning, it may be stated that this dissertation will 
elaborate an understanding of the imagination as fundamentally world-disclosive and 
                                                 
 1 My specific usage of the terms “post-metaphysical” and “return of religion,” which will be 
clarified shortly, is derived from the work of Gianni Vattimo.  His short book Belief provides an excellent 
introduction, not only to what is being conveyed by these terms, but also to this dissertation as well.  See 
Gianni Vattimo, Belief, trans. Luca D’ Isanto and David Webb, with an introduction by Luca D’ Isanto 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
 
 2 For clarification of “theosophy,” see Antoine Faivre, Theosophy, Imagination, Tradition:  
Studies in Western Esotericism, Studies in Western Esoteric Traditions, trans. Christine Rhone (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2000), 7-10. 
2 
                                                
world-transformative.  That is to say, following the “speculations”3 of Jacob Böhme and 
the understanding indicated by Martin Heidegger in his work Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics,4 the imagination will be seen as the “medium” of the opening of world-
horizons to human being.  This dimension of imagination requires a more ontologically 
“primordial”5 articulation than is found in most contemporary discourse on this issue.  
The imagination here understood is not the ephemeral “imagining” of a being concerning 
other beings considered “real” or otherwise.  Rather, it concerns the first showing-forth of 
oneself and other beings as being-in-a-world.  Therefore, throughout this dissertation a 
certain striving for a more primordial articulation will be manifest. 
 The significance of the development of such an articulation and understanding of 
the imagination becomes apparent when it is viewed in light of the opening question.  
Still anticipating the end, it will be demonstrated through this dissertation that religious 
practice can work to transform imaginally a practitioner’s world-horizon.  This claim 
must be heard as radically as it is intended.  With the transformation of the world-
horizon, the world transforms.  This can include a fundamental transformation of who or 
what is encountered therein by the practitioner who has undergone such a transformation. 
 
 3 Glenn Alexander Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2001), 82, 120; Faivre, Theosophy, 137-143; and Andrew Weeks, German Mysticism from Hildegard of 
Bingen to Ludwig Wittgenstein:  A Literary and Intellectual History, Studies in Western Esoteric Traditions 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 185.  I am not using “speculation” here in the 
pejorative sense of fanciful and undisciplined conjecture.  Böhme, himself, opposed such thinking and the 
writing born of it.  See Jacob Boehme, The Way to Christ, Classics of Western Spirituality, trans., with a 
foreword and introduction by Peter Erb, and a preface by Winfried Zeller (New York: Paulist, 1978), 122. 
 
 4 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Studies in Continental Thought, trans. 
Richard Taft, 5th ed., enl. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). 
 
 5 “Primordial,” as I am using it here is intended to convey a sense of being in nearness to origin as 
source of nature.  See Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, 
trans., with an introduction by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper, 1971; New York: Perennial Classics, 
2001), 17. 
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 The intention of this dissertation is to develop and articulate this understanding of 
imagination through its relation to one specific religious practice.  The religious practice 
through which this dissertation will weave is that articulated by Jacob Böhme in his work 
The Way to Christ.6  Yet, before engaging this text and its practice, numerous issues must 
first be attended to as a way of introduction.  Beyond situating this dissertation within its 
proper arena of academic discourse, an elaboration of methodology and critical terms is 
called for.  In addition, as many today are not familiar with Jacob Böhme or his work, a 
preliminary presentation of Böhme’s life, work, and influence will needs be included. 
 
Academic Situation 
 This dissertation is intended as a work of original scholarship in the field of 
Religion and Psychological Studies (RPS).  My understanding of this field is influenced 
by Don Browning’s articulation of it as found in his essay, “The Past and Possible Future 
of Religion and Psychological Studies.”7  In this essay, Browning identifies RPS as an 
interdisciplinary and hermeneutic enterprise.  For Browning, this enterprise is 
characterized by a critical and practical interpretation of encounters between traditional 
“images of the human”8 and those of the contemporary Human Sciences that escapes the 
“gotcha”9 attitude of most contemporary scholarship.  This is to say that it does not 
content itself with merely exposing the secular within the religious, or vice versa.  Rather, 
                                                 
 6 See Boehme, Way to Christ. 
 
 7 Don S. Browning, “The Past and Possible Future of Religion and Psychological Studies,” in 
Religion and Psychology:  Mapping the Terrain, Contemporary Dialogues, Future Prospects, ed. Diane 
Jonte-Pace and William B. Parsons (London: Routledge, 2001), 168-175. 
 
 8 Ibid., 177. 
 
 9 Ibid., 174, 175. 
4 
RPS attempts to unfold a hermeneutic “conversation” between the traditional (generally 
religious) and the contemporary (generally secular) images of the human which might be 
applicable as a beneficial ethical possibility within current human problematics.  This 
understanding inspires my dissertation. 
 Although the above articulation holds true, it must also be acknowledged that it is 
perhaps less timely than it is dated.  Throughout the academy, one can witness this drift 
towards the hermeneutic.  This is a manifestation of our post-metaphysical (or 
postmodern) condition.  Specifically, within the Human Sciences, one can see a deep 
hermeneutic critique of modern objectification/subjectification, its search for causes, its 
methods, and its assumptions.  The critique of the hegemony of modern metaphysics—
the post-metaphysical critique—appears as academically ubiquitous.  In addition, we are 
beginning to witness, across contemporary hermeneutic discourses, a serious and self-
critical return of religion as a significant interpretive possibility that can be applied to 
current problematics.  We may well wonder then, how are we to distinguish the discipline 
of RPS from other hermeneutic endeavors? 
 I propose, rather undramatically, that the differentiation remain a matter of 
disciplinary focus.  This is to ask, around what or who does the problematic of one’s 
academic discourse open?  For the discipline of Religion and Psychological Studies, the 
problematic opens around the religious person, however defined.  From our discipline’s 
inception, our concern has been for the understanding and care of the religious person.  
Our ongoing discourse with pastoral counseling and the psychotherapeutic arts speaks 
directly to this point.  This focus has not altered through post-metaphysical critiques.  It 
has only been problematized.  It follows that this dissertation, as a work within the field 
5 
                                                
of RPS discourse, needs to be understood in light of its concern for the understanding of 
the religious person or practitioner. 
 The question that concerns this dissertation—the question of the relation of 
imagination to religious practice—is then one that opens its problematic around the 
practitioner.  The problematic so opened speaks intimately to certain troubling tendencies 
that I identify within the field of RPS, which I hope to address or correct through this 
dissertation.  For one, RPS discourse over-emphasizes a psychoanalytic perspective for 
its methodological support.  It must be stressed, at this point, that there are very good 
reasons for this.  Of preeminent importance is the fact that psychoanalysis has been an 
integral component of our discourse since the inception of our field.  It is our koiné.  And 
even as RPS has developed from a modernist enterprise to a post-metaphysical 
hermeneutic, so psychoanalysis has transformed with us.  This is due, in no small part, to 
the influence of Paul Ricoeur through works such as his Freud and Philosophy.10  There 
is no surprise here in that Don Browning has turned to Ricoeur as the means to help 
articulate his vision of a viable future for RPS.11 
 The problem as I see it, is not in the fact that a psychoanalytic hermeneutic is 
engaged within our field.  It is rather, the apparent dearth of other hermeneutical options, 
within our field, to be engaged in discourses concerning the imagination, desire, and the 
religious person.  This problem speaks intimately to the importance of Jacob Böhme and 
his theosophical work for this dissertation.  The retrieval of Jacob Böhme’s work here is 
 
 10 See Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy:  An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970). 
 
 11 Browning, “Past and Possible Future,” 171-172. 
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intended, among other things, to bring forward his theosophical hermeneutic12 of 
imagination and desire in the hope that through its encounter in conversation with the 
work of Martin Heidegger, a new hermeneutic option will become viable within our field.  
This necessitates that the hermeneutic of imagination unfolding here be brought into 
conversation with psychoanalysis, however brief or embedded that conversation may be, 
in order to disclose appropriately their differentiation. 
 Another troubling issue I see concerning our field is the relative absence of works 
treating, in any significant way, the religious person in practice.  This is a troubling 
curiosity in that, from my understanding, the practitioner in practice is a potentially rich 
arena for RPS, wherefrom we may begin to disclose the who of the religious person.  I 
must emphasize here that the who of the practitioner that I will be attempting to articulate 
is not merely an abstraction from a religious community of practitioners.  Rather, in my 
understanding, the practitioner is always disclosed within a historical world that calls the 
practitioner to the what of its practices.  Yet I contend that in a way at least as significant 
as one’s general cultural/historical situation or specific confessed doxology, embodied 
religious practices “gather” the practitioner into the world of community, disclosed 
through the practice, wherein the who of the practitioner unfolds. 
 It should be apparent, at this point, that I am attempting through this work to 
traverse a rather fine line between the particular and the general.  That is, I will be 
attempting to engage a specific religious practice in order to disclose and demonstrate a 
generalizable relation between imagination and religious practice.  I am aware that this 
 
 12 Antoine Faivre, in his intelligent and helpful treatment of theosophy, characterizes Böhme’s 
theosophy as a “visionary hermeneutic applied to biblical texts.”  In my characterization, as will be seen in 
Chapter Three, Böhme’s theosophical hermeneutic is more ontological in scope—dealing as it does with 
phenomenality.  See Faivre, Theosophy, 7. 
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attempt opens me to the charge of being anachronistic—of continuing the discredited 
modernist project of universalization from within post-metaphysical discourses that have 
seemingly renounced such universalizing tendencies.  As a way of offering up a defense 
for my attempt, I would like to affirm that there can be a distinction made between self-
consciously “weak” generalizations that demonstrate some explanatory power within 
specific historical arenas of discourse, and the “strong” universalizations of modernism’s 
excesses.13  Within this dissertation, I am not intending to develop the “final” word on 
imagination or its relation to religious practice applicable to all.  I am rather intending to 
open and develop a discourse within the field of Religion and Psychological Studies that I 
believe offers exciting possibilities in relation to our ongoing conversations concerning 
images of the human. 
 It must be recalled here that, according to Don Browning, the development of 
“conversations” centered on the “image of the human” is a primary concern of our 
field.14  It may be acknowledged then that we do work in generalizing discourses.  This 
“fact” does not constitute a violation of our post-metaphysical hermeneutic enterprise.  
To become forgetful of our temporal situatedness would constitute such a violation.  To 
forget the traditioned nature of our own discourse would constitute such a violation.  In 
contradistinction, to develop a meaningful narrative interpretation or weak “myth”15 of 
the religious person in practice is to respond to the historically revealed call of our own 
 
 13 Browning, “Past and Possible Future,” 169-172; and Vattimo, Belief, 43-46. 
 
 14 Browning, “The Past and Possible Future,” 169-170. 
 
 15 Gianni Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation:  The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy, trans. 
David Webb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 44-49. 
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hermeneutic enterprise.  We may also venture the wager that human being is in need of 
such weak myths at this time. 
 In line with the practical orientation of RPS, to “care”-fully16 respond to living 
human problematics, this dissertation does also hope to be so responsive.  We live in a 
time when the need for religious persons of differing traditions to understand and respect 
one another stands perilously revealed.  Discourses, among which this dissertation hopes 
to be numbered, that offer interpretive strategies that respect and help to disclose 
differences are one of the calls of our time.  Yet in generating such a discourse, one must 
be mindful of not adding fuel to the conflagration of strong positions at war—
metaphorically or otherwise.  Rather, we must explicitly admit to the weakness and 
limited appeal of our own positions—even if such admission runs counter to certain 
academic conventions.  To risk a “weak” interpretation is the primary method of this type 
of discourse.  In this spirit, my dissertation stands academically situated.  I will now 
consider more deeply its specific methodology. 
 
Methodology 
 It has been asserted repeatedly that this dissertation is a hermeneutic work.  While 
this claim does offer a general methodological orientation it does not disclose nearly 
enough academically.  Hermeneutics, whether understood methodologically or 
philosophically, does not deliver itself up to a unified articulation.  There are multiple 
hermeneutic orientations.  Therefore, the hermeneut must make specific her orientation. 
                                                 
 16 I am alluding to Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein as “care” [Sorge]. 
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 Beginning rather broadly, it can be said that one’s specific orientation is deeply 
guided by one’s own academic concerns that unfold within the world of one’s discipline.  
Using Browning as an exemplar, it can be so understood how it is that he turns to the 
hermeneutic philosophy of Paul Ricoeur to help disclose his vision of RPS.  Browning’s 
concern is to philosophically ground and so unify the varied traditional concerns of our 
field—specifically in light of our sustaining conversations with “metaphysically” 
oriented Human Sciences.  Ricoeur’s articulation of critical hermeneutics helps Browning 
achieve this goal.17 
 My concerns, which initiate the writing of this dissertation, are significantly 
different.  As has already been disclosed, my concerns center on specific problematics I 
recognize within RPS discourses that I hope to address or correct.  To do this, I take my 
guidance from different hermeneutic orientations.  Specifically, I look to Martin 
Heidegger and Gianni Vattimo for methodological inspiration. 
 The importance of the hermeneutic philosophy of Gianni Vattimo for my 
methodological considerations shows itself in how Vattimo’s philosophy helps to 
legitimize the “return” of religious “myths” as viable interpretive possibilities.  He 
historically justifies this re-legitimation via his explication of how the “destiny”18 of 
Christianity is unfolding through western discourses, up to and including our own post-
metaphysical varieties.  According to Vattimo, the ongoing secularizing and hermeneutic 
trending of western culture over the past, let us say, 400 years, discovers its ownmost 
 
 17 Browning, “Past and Possible Future,” 171-172. 
 
 18 Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation, 90-94 and 108-109.  Vattimo’s usage of the term “destiny” is 
according to Martin Heidegger’s understanding of Ge-Schick as the event of Being’s opening of our 
historical and traditioned epochs as “sending” [Schickung].  For Vattimo, this understanding is 
indispensible for post-metaphysical hermeneutics to escape a vapid relativism. 
10 
                                                
provenance in the doctrine of the incarnation of Christ understood as kenosis.19  For 
Vattimo, the “abasement” of the divine through kenotic incarnation initiates the 
ontological weakening of all strong authoritarian and absolutist constructs, whether 
religious, socio-political, or philosophical.  This includes the weakening of modern 
“metaphysical” [or scientific] secularism’s cultural hegemony.  In the post-metaphysical 
epoch, according to Vattimo, we attain a secular discourse that is tolerant, pluralistic, and 
aware of its own weakness as a sending of this religious destiny. 
 Vattimo’s interpretation re-legitimizes religion in three important ways.  First, it 
discloses our discourses—which as “secular” we judge as freed of religious 
involvement—in truth, as the destiny-laden speaking of a religious “myth” or event.  This 
is a truth from which we cannot extricate ourselves without denying our being as 
historical.  Religious involvement speaks in our contemporary secular traditions even as 
it does in their heritage.  The acknowledgement of religion, then, can be seen as an 
expression of hermeneutic integrity—rather than a violation of contemporary secular 
protocols. 
 Second, through the hermeneutic weakening of all strong positions, Vattimo 
opens the way for the viability of religious based interpretations in hermeneutic 
discourses.  This possibility is first attained with the postmodern realization that modern 
demythologization is itself a “myth.”20  That is to say that the modern secular program of 
realizing a purely rational or a “fact” based discourse—whether grounded in the certainty 
 
 19 Vattimo, Belief, 38-62. 
 
 20 Gianni Vattimo, The Transparent Society, Parallax Re-Visions of Culture and Society, trans. 
David Webb (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 39. 
 
11 
                                                
of an absolute subject or a presumed standard of objectivity—denuded of all 
mythological [narrative] elements or overtly “primitive” religious elements, has been so 
profoundly problematized concerning its very grounds as to no longer be viable.  
According to Vattimo, we arrive at the position, articulated by Nietzsche, where “there 
are no facts, only interpretations.”21 
 One must proceed carefully here.  The postmodern—that is to say post-
metaphysical—position proposed by Vattimo is not to be understood as a mere 
renunciation of modern secularism.  Considered in the light of the “return” of religion, 
the renunciation of modern secularism is always vulnerable to the regressive violence of 
religious fanaticism and fundamentalism.  Rather, the postmodern realization of the myth 
of demythologization, according to Vattimo, is to be understood primarily in the light of 
its appropriation of the historical destiny of Christianity understood as secularism.  
Postmodernism is the heir of this destiny.  Thus, any return of religious “myth” in 
postmodern hermeneutics, must be characterized by a weakened and tolerant discourse.  
One’s position is that of offering a myth among myths.22  Alluding again to Nietzsche, 
when we know that we are dreaming [and being dreamed by] the dream that is history, 
violence in any form—including that of a “strongly” proposed position—is to promote a 
nightmare for all. 
 Third, Vattimo understands the event of kenotic incarnation as a making 
significant of myths and manifestations of the divine other than those found in 
 
 21 Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation, 105-106. 
 
 22 Vattimo, Transparent Society, 41-43. 
12 
                                                
Christianity.23  The Christian event or myth of the abasement of the divine in Christ need 
not be interpreted, as it often has been, in terms of its strong justification for elevating the 
truth of Christianity over all other religions, myths, or divine manifestations.  Rather, as 
with Vattimo, it can be interpreted as heralding a historical call to ontological weakening 
that concurrently affirms the pouring of the divine into “other” embodied or created 
manifestations.  While such an interpretation may not be clearly read in relation to the 
legitimized canons of Christian scriptures, it can be read in terms of the historical 
unfolding of Christian destiny understood as secularism and through the secular 
encounter with the truth of other religions.  In that encounter, the truth of other religions 
stands, even as Christianity stands in its destiny. 
 This issue of the return of religion in the hermeneutic philosophy of Gianni 
Vattimo, outlined above, helps me to orient methodologically the intended retrieval of the 
work of Jacob Böhme within the context of this dissertation.  The theosophy of Jacob 
Böhme has presented various complications throughout the history of its theological and 
academic engagement.  Today, even the word “theosophy” can elicit a reflexive cringe in 
many academics.  There are historical reasons for this reaction.  Perhaps the most 
significant of these reasons is that theosophy and the work of Jacob Böhme specifically 
have always been surrounded by the suspicion [or judgment] of heresy in the Christian 
west.  In Jacob Böhme’s case, the charge of heresy begins in his hometown of Görlitz and 
 
 23 Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation, 52-57. 
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the “gag order” imposed on Böhme by that Lutheran town’s pastor, Gregor Richter.24  
More will be said of this in the next chapter. 
 What is relevant here is that this act initiated a struggle for legitimization that 
continues to this day.  In our contemporary context, the theological scholar Cyril 
O’Regan, has renewed the charge of heresy in relation to the work of Jacob Böhme and 
all who, knowingly or unknowingly, follow in the wake of his influence.  Briefly stated, 
O’Regan legitimizes his judgment by claiming that Böhme’s work reinstitutes the 
narrative grammar of the gnostic heretic Valentinus.  It is O’Regan’s self-assumed task to 
eradicate this heresy from our discourses once and for all.25 
 O’Regan’s charge of heresy touches explicitly the issue here of my 
methodological orientation.  Methodologically speaking, O’Regan’s work proceeds by 
claiming a core narrative grammar within “legitimate” Christian discourse that he 
subsequently mobilizes to expose and oppose all alternative narrative grammars.  That is 
certainly one way to go.  In contrast, I, following Vattimo, am attempting to heed the 
“return” of religion as a “sending” of Being within western academic discourse 
understood as a speaking of the secular destiny of Christianity.  It is my hermeneutic 
wager that the recurrent returns of Böhme into the history of our academic and cultural 
discourses insistently speaks just such a “sending,” that we have yet to fully appropriate 
or understand.  In our contemporary post-metaphysical discourse, we have, at least, an 
opportunity to hear Böhme in a new way. 
 
 24 Andrew Weeks, Boehme:  An Intellectual Biography of the Seventeenth-Century Philosopher 
and Mystic (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 2. 
 
 25 See generally his introductions, Cyril O’Regan, Gnostic Apocalypse:  Jacob Boehme’s Haunted 
Narrative (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); and idem, Gnostic Return in Modernity 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001). 
 
14 
                                                
 Still speaking methodologically, one way of hearing Böhme anew is in 
hermeneutic “conversation” with Martin Heidegger.  In this conversation, Heidegger will 
help me to be mindful of attending to the ontological difference,26 thereby hopefully, to 
“twist free”27 of onto-theological metaphysics in my discourse on imagination and 
religious practice.  In addition, Heidegger will provide me with my primary 
methodological direction. 
 Methodologically, this dissertation can be characterized as a work of hermeneutic 
“retrieval.”  Concerning retrieval, Heidegger states: 
By the retrieval of a basic problem, we understand the opening-up of its original, 
long-concealed possibilities, through the working-out of which it is transformed.  
In this way it first comes to be preserved in its capacity as a problem.  To 
preserve a problem, however, means to free and keep watch over those inner 
forces which make it possible, on the basis of its essence, as a problem. 
    Retrieval of the possible does not mean the taking-up of what is “customary,” 
“grounded overviews [of which] exist” from which “something can be done.”  
The possible in this sense is always just the all-too-real which everyone manages 
to manipulate in its prevailing mode of operation.  The possible in this sense 
directly hinders a genuine retrieval, and thereby in general it hinders a 
relationship to history.28 
 
 As I have stated, the “basic problem” that I am attempting to open up and work 
through in this dissertation is that concerning the relationship of imagination and 
religious practice.  This act needs to be understood as it is disclosed, methodologically, 
by Heidegger above.  The retrieval of this problem functions, first and foremost, as an act 
that “preserves” the problem as a problem.  That is, it is an attending to those “inner 
forces” which disclose this issue as a problem and as an issue worth pursuing.  While 
 
 26 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans., with an introduction by Joan Stambaugh 
(New York: Harper, 1969; reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 50-51.  That is “the 
difference between Being and beings.” 
 
 27 Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation, 53-54. 
 
 28 Heidegger, Kant, 143. 
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justifications for the pursuit of this issue have been offered, at this point my 
considerations must take a more concrete turn. 
 The retrieval of the relationship of imagination to religious practice, as a 
transformative opening up of its concealed possibilities, must be pursued from within 
practice itself.  It is from within practice that the concealed possibilities can show 
themselves.  And it is from within practice that the “inner forces” of the problem can be 
seen.  Yet as is readily apparent, there are so many different practices.  How can one 
justify the approach of one practice over another?  Again, one’s choice must be guided by 
the problem that one is trying to open up.  One must select that practice which helps to 
disclose the concealed possibilities of one’s own problem. 
 For the purpose of this dissertation, the practice that will be the focus of my 
inquiry, as already stated, is the practice articulated in Jacob Böhme’s The Way to Christ.  
This choice, methodologically speaking, helps me to open up not only the question of the 
imagination, but also the question of religious practice.  I have lightly touched on how the 
issue of the imagination can be opened by Böhme’s work above, and will again.  At this 
point, I would like to focus briefly on the question of practice. 
 It must first be understood that in opening up the question of religious practice, in 
this dissertation, I will not be approaching this issue from a “customary” catalogue of 
different religious practices.  Such an approach would seek to disclose how a specific 
practice functions within a complex set of practices and/or within a given social/cultural 
or personal context.  While this type of approach is certainly admirable, it has the danger 
of leading to an infinite progression into ever more refined and abstracted grounds of 
differentiation, or worse, into a reified structure, that so thoroughly obscures the question 
16 
                                                
of religious practice that it closes it to us as a problem.  The choice of Jacob Böhme’s The 
Way to Christ helps me to pursue a different approach. 
 While the practice articulated in The Way to Christ could be characterized loosely 
as a Christian practice of prayer, such a simple and immediate characterization obscures 
the profound resonances that this practice—and I argue religious practice in general—is 
meant to realize throughout the practitioner’s life and world.  The way to Christ, as a 
practice, or complex of practices, articulating a profound transformation, resists such a 
simple characterization.  It calls us, rather, to a more fundamental approach even as it 
calls me to the more generic term “practice.”  This will become apparent in those 
chapters that deal specifically with this practice. 
 The foregoing considerations help to lead to what can now be disclosed as my 
primary methodological approach.  This approach, alluded to in the above quote of 
Heidegger, is borne of my reading of Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art.”  It is 
the method of what Heidegger calls preservation.29  This approach specifically fits the 
method to this dissertation’s task of disclosing the relation of religious practice to 
imagination in light of the potential for world transformation. 
 Preservation here entails “standing within the openness of beings that happens in 
the work,”30 thereby to be brought “into affiliation with the truth happening in the 
work.”31  We must proceed somewhat delicately in order to approach what is meant in 
this.  In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger opens the question of the origin—or 
 
 29 Heidegger, “Origin,” 64. 
 
 30 Ibid., 65. 
 
 31 Ibid., 66. 
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“source of its nature”32—of the work of art.  Through the essay, he progressively unfolds 
this question by troubling our customary notions of what this source is and how our 
understanding may approach it.  Of particular importance is the claim that we cannot 
approach the work of art in its nature through any of our traditional notions of the work 
as a “thing,” whether “as a bearer of traits, as the unity of a manifold of sensations, [or] 
as formed matter.”33  Rather, we must come to understand it through its work nature as a 
work. 
 So, what is a work?  Following Heidegger’s lead, we can say that a work, as a 
work, is a setting-into-work of truth.34  Yet what does this mean?  A work—and not just a 
work of art as understood traditionally—can be understood as an event or location where 
truth happens.  The truth happens in the creation of a work through opening a clearing 
wherein beings can stand disclosed in and/or as the beings that they are.  Further, this 
happening of truth takes place in the work of art through the fixing in figure of a striving 
between world and earth in the being that the work itself is.  Thus, the showing forth of 
the truth of beings in the work, is always disclosed in a fundamental tension between the 
lighting of the world and the concealing of the earth.35  We must continue to proceed 
delicately here, lest we lose our way, since much has already been said in a little.  And 
much more will need to be said as this work proceeds. 
 
 32 Ibid., 17. 
 
 33 Ibid., 30. 
 
 34 Ibid., 35. 
 
 35 Ibid., 45-48. 
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 What concerns us at this time is specifically the issue of the methodology of 
preservation.  Following Heidegger further, on this issue, we must come to understand 
the relation of preservers to a work.  Heidegger states: 
    Just as a work cannot be without being created but is essentially in need of 
creators, so what is created cannot itself come into being without those who 
preserve it.36 
 
We can understand through this statement that a work, as a happening of truth, is in its 
work-being for preservers.  We can also take this an additional step and say that we come 
to know the truth happening in the work only as preservers. 
 The work in its work-being does not come to stand for itself or for the creator, as 
an expression of the creator’s personal experience.  Rather, the work in its work-being—
as a happening of truth—comes to stand for preservers, as a call to stand in the truth 
happening in the work.  We do not, then, know the truth happening in the work by 
treating it as an “object” for our analysis.  Neither do we come to know this truth through 
delving into the intentions of the “subjectivity” of the creator.  Of course, we may come 
to some sort of truth through these types of investigations.  But it will not be the truth that 
happens in the work itself, as disclosed by Heidegger.  Instead, we come to the truth of 
the work, or better, into the movement of its happening—as preservers, by “standing 
within the openness of beings that happens in the work.”37  That is also to say, by 
 
 36 Ibid., 64. 
 
 37 Ibid., 65. 
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standing in the striving between world and earth happening in the work and/or as the 
being of the work.38 
 This understanding of preservation speaks intimately, for Heidegger, in “The 
Origin of the Work of Art,” concerning historical destiny.39  Yet, as the quote above from 
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics indicates, it also speaks methodologically.  
Methodologically, preservation means, primarily, to let the work be a work (or a problem 
a problem).  The researcher, then, must mindfully enter into the movement of the work in 
such a way as to come to dwell within the truth happening in the work.40  Finally, the 
hermeneutically oriented researcher must render a historically sensitive interpretation, 
concerning the work, which is relevant to the concerns of the researcher’s field.  The 
concrete example of this dissertation will be helpful in clarifying what is meant here. 
 This dissertation is concerned with the problem of imagination and its relation to 
religious practice.  I am “retrieving” this problem in light of its concealed possibilities, 
specifically in relation to contemporary transformations in post-metaphysical discourses 
that admit a “return” of religion.  This retrieval, first and foremost, “preserves” the 
problem as a problem.  I, as the researcher, have had to come to dwell in this problem, as 
a problem, in order to allow its concealed possibilities to disclose themselves—not in 
 
 38 It is important to note here, for the sake of full disclosure, that the “work” of art (or practice) is 
not the only way truth happens, according to Heidegger.  In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger 
tells us that truth also occurs in: 1) the founding of a political state; 2) the nearness of the Divine; 3) the 
essential sacrifice (as in Christ’s sacrifice); and 4) the questioning of Being by the thinker.  These events of 
truth’s happening—as the opening of a clearing for the striving of world and earth in lighting/conceal-
ment—are differentiated from what occurs in science.  Science does not open a clearing for truth to happen.  
It merely cultivates an already opened clearing confirming the possible and correct within it.  See ibid., 60. 
 
 39 Ibid., 73-75. 
 
 40 Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans., with an 
introduction by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper, 1971; New York: Perennial Classics, 2001), 146-
149. 
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order to close this issue as a problem by offering up an ultimate solution to the problem, 
but rather to help develop our discourses by rendering an interpretation in light of this 
issue as a contemporarily relevant problem to the field of Religion and Psychological 
Studies. 
 In order to disclose the concealed possibilities of the relation of imagination to 
religious practice, it is not sufficient that contemporary discourses alone be engaged.  
Rather, what is essential to this task is to engage practice itself.  Specifically, to work 
with a specific practice wherein the relation can come to stand in its happening within the 
truth of the practice.  In other words, I must come to “preserve” the “work” of a practice 
itself.  Within the context of this dissertation, that work is Jacob Böhme’s The Way to 
Christ.  The method of preservation now means that I must let this text, which articulates 
a transformative process of religious practice, stand as a “work”—not as a work of art, 
but as a work of practice.  It follows that, as a preserver, I must come to dwell “within the 
openness of beings that happens in the work” of practice.  That is, I must dwell in this 
work as a practitioner. 
 This “dwelling” as a practitioner is not only the peaceful abiding in the “free 
sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature.”41  It is also the submitting of oneself to 
the fundamental striving between the lighting/clearing of the world and the concealing of 
the earth already happening in the work.42  As a practitioner, this can mean taking this 
striving into oneself as it is of the peculiar nature of many works of practice that they call 
 
 41 Ibid., 147. 
 
 42 It is also, as Heidegger discloses in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” “the fourfold preservation of 
the fourfold” in its “simple oneness.”  That is, in dwelling as preservation we “save the earth,” “receive the 
sky,” “await the divinities,” and “initiate mortals into the nature of death.”  See ibid., 148-149. 
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their preservers to be the being or place wherein the work occurs—to be the figure 
wherein it is fixed.  And that is how it stands with The Way to Christ. 
 Finally, within the context of this dissertation, as a methodological preserver, I 
must render a historically sensitive interpretation.  It should be borne in mind at this point 
that interpretation is always historical.  That is, interpretation always occurs as a speaking 
within the situated sendings of our traditioned discourses.  Yet the historically sensitive 
hermeneutic preserver must speak something more that just the bare fact of being within 
history.  To witness to the fact does not demonstrate historical sensitivity.  Neither does 
simply adopting or responding to the most popular or recent voices in a field’s current 
academic discourse because they supposedly embody the most “historically” advanced 
step in that discourse.  This is merely to fall into the “customary.”  Rather, the historical 
sensitivity of the hermeneutic preserver is disclosed as an outcome of the “retrieval”—
wherein the interpretation speaks.  It is ultimately manifest as the hermeneut’s response 
to the call of the destiny of Being through the disclosure of those concealed ontological 
possibilities, within the retrieved problem, that have the potential to transform 
fundamentally our historical discourses, and thereby our worlds. 
 Returning to the concrete example of this dissertation, the preservation that occurs 
in relation to the practice of The Way to Christ, will disclose its interpretive relevance—
and its historical sensitivity—only through the retrieved problem of imagination’s 
relation to religious practice.  Further, my interpretation will prove of significance only 
insofar as it discloses concealed ontological possibilities within this opened problematic.  
Whether or not this speaks something of our destiny is for history to tell.  Yet my wager 
is that it will—however modest my impact. 
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 Lest my wager smack of hubris, I will take a brief, “theoretical” turn, at this point, 
to help clarify the hermeneutic context of my methodological operations.  These 
theoretical considerations will also help me to transition to the deeper discussion of this 
dissertation’s key terms:  world, imagination, and religious practice. 
 It is understood here that work and preserver, as well as interpretation, occur 
within history.  I follow Heidegger in this, and in what follows.  A work, as a being 
created within history, is the historical self-opening of a clearing wherein beings come to 
stand in the truth of their being.43  This is as true for a work of art as it is for a work of 
practice.  As created, the work does stand in need of a creator or creators.  Yet, as 
Heidegger makes clear, the work, as a work, is not to be understood through its 
creator(s).  Rather, it comes more fully into its work-being the more the creator(s) 
withdraw(s) from the work.44  However, the withdrawal of the creator(s) from the work 
does not mean that the work now somehow eludes history.  The clearing opening of the 
work, wherein beings appear in their being, occurs within history in such a way that the 
clearing opening manifests through a human-like [temporal] projection45 that gathers a 
world into the striving with the earth within the clearing’s horizon even as the clearing 
and its world are gathered into the historical world of its creator, wherein it calls to its 
preservers. 
 
 43 Heidegger, “Origin,” 57-62. 
 
 44 Ibid., 63-65. 
 
 45 I am meaning here Heidegger’s “rift.”  See ibid., 61-62. 
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 Preservers, as historical human beings, respond to a work’s call from their own 
particular historical situatedness—from their thrown “ek-sistence”46 as being-in-a-world.  
When a work’s clearing opens within the historical world(s) of our thrown belonging-
together (Being-with),47 its truth-happening can disclose new possibilities of being to 
those who are gathered together, as preservers, within the striving of world and 
earth/lighting and concealing occurring as the work’s truth.  Further, even as the work 
comes to being through the specific situatedness of the provenance of its creation, the 
work’s preservers enter the disclosed world of the work through their own particular 
provenance.  That is to say, preservers do not come to stand in the truth-happening of the 
work as some sort of blank slate, dissociated from their history.  Rather, their history is 
itself gathered into the work’s truth through the being-historical of the preserver.  The 
interaction of work and preservers, then, occurs by the ongoing disclosure of concealed 
ontological possibilities in the striving of the work that come to manifestation or 
appearance in light of a preserver’s provenance as brought into relation with the work and 
its provenance. 
 As new ontological possibilities are revealed through the preservers of the work, 
these possibilities, in turn, can come to resonate through, not only the community of 
preservers, but also the worlds of our thrown belonging-together from whence the 
 
 46 Ek-sistence as “standing out into the truth of being” is to be contrasted with existentia as the 
actuality of the merely possible idea.  See Martin Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” in Pathmarks, ed. 
William McNeill, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 249.  The 
familiar Heideggerian trope of our being “thrown” (Geworfen) speaks to our being given over to ourselves 
as Dasein [there-being] into a world to which we must submit.  Our being thrown is disclosed as the “‘that-
it-is’ of its (Dasein’s) ‘there,’” by mood or state-of-mind  See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. 
John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper/SanFrancisco, 1962), 172-177; [H] 134-
137. 
 
 47 Heidegger, Being, 308; [H] 263. 
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preservers have heeded the call of the work.  In this way, it can be said, the world of the 
work is gathered into the historical worlds of the whence of its preservers—whether these 
worlds are historically contemporaneous with the creation of the work, or stand in 
chronological or cultural distance to it—leading to the potential transformation of those 
worlds.  One of the ways that the world of the work comes thus to resonate is through an 
interpretation of it offered by its preservers in light of a “retrieved” problematic.  In light 
of the foregoing, it can be seen that the retrieval and preservation of a problem that 
speaks to current issues, the heeding of the call and preservation of a work in relation to 
that problem, and the subsequent interpretation of its revealed ontological possibilities in 
an academic discipline is, at least somewhat, a matter of the destiny of Being. 
 Returning to the context of this dissertation, I, as a hermeneutic preserver, 
bringing myself into the truth-happening of Jacob Böhme’s work—in particular, the 
truth-happening of the practice of The Way to Christ—enter this work in such a way that 
my provenance—specifically here, my academic provenance—enters with me.  Thereby, 
Martin Heidegger’s work enters into conversation with Jacob Böhme’s work through my 
work of preservation, in light of my retrieved problem.  Further, considering current 
hermeneutic interest in Böhme (e.g., Cyril O’Regan),48 imagination (e.g., Richard 
 
 48 See O’Regan, Gnostic Apocalypse; idem, Gnostic Return.  These volumes are but two of 
O’Regan’s ambitious multi-volume project, as he describes it:  “Although it risks the gigantesque, the 
Baurian project of Gnostic return in modernity will be prosecuted over seven volumes.  After this 
introductory volume individual volumes will be devoted to the German mystic Jacob Boehme, English and 
German Romanticism, G.W.F. Hegel, and F.W.J. Schelling, anti-Gnostic discourses of the nineteenth 
century (e.g., Franz Anton Staudenmaier, Søren Kierkegaard, S.T. Coleridge), and Gnostic (e.g., Paul 
Tillich, Thomas Altizer, Jürgen Moltmann) and anti-Gnostic discourse (e.g., Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
Eberhard Jüngel) in twentieth-century theology” (Idem, Gnostic Return, 5). 
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Kearney),49 religious practice (e.g., Mark Flory),50 and world transformation (e.g., Gianni 
Vattimo),51 it is little surprise that a work such as this dissertation should make its 
appearance at this time.  Again, it is, at least somewhat, a matter of “destiny.” 
 
Critical Terms 
 The terms world, imagination, and religious practice have been used quite freely 
up to this point in the discourse.  In order to establish first the academic and 
methodological context of their usages, without going too far afield, this has been 
deemed appropriate.  Nevertheless, each of these terms must be addressed directly.  It 
should be understood that here it is first less an issue of providing a fixed definition than 
it is a methodological issue of further elaborating and clarifying my understanding of 
these terms in service of the retrieval of the problem of imagination’s relation to religious 
practice—in post-metaphysical discourse—in light of the potential for world 
transformation.  One should further bear in mind that a certain degree of repetition and 
recapitulation is unavoidable.  This latter is due not only to the fact that much has already 
been stated concerning these terms.  It is also due to the hermeneutic weaving and 
                                                 
 49 See Richard Kearney, Poetics of Imagining:  Modern to Post-Modern, Perspectives in 
Continental Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998); idem, Poetics of Modernity:  
Toward a Hermeneutic Imagination (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995); idem, The Wake of 
Imagination:  Toward a Postmodern Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989); idem, 
Transitions (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987); idem, Poétique du Possible (Paris: 
Beauchesne, 1984). 
 
 50 See Mark Flory, “Transforming Practices:  Hesychastic Correctives to Postmodern Apophatic 
Theology” (Ph.D. diss., University of Denver/Iliff School of Theology, 2005). 
 
 51 See Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity, Italian Academy Lectures, trans. Luca D’ Isanto (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2002); idem, Belief; idem, Beyond Interpretation; idem, Transparent 
Society. 
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reweaving of these terms through the varying contexts of this dissertation’s discourse, as 
a means to the terms’ fuller disclosure. 
 So, what is meant here by world?  Simply and directly, we may say that world is 
the wherein of human dwelling.  Human beings always already exist in a world.  We are 
first conceived and are born in a world.  Our everyday engagements occur within a world.  
Our understanding comes to articulation within a world.  It is within the open horizon of 
a world that beings, both like and unlike ourselves, disclose themselves to us.  Nothing is 
more self-apparent to us than that the world of the wherein of our dwelling is.  Yet this 
very self-apparency also makes it one of the most difficult of issues to articulate. 
 Martin Heidegger can help here.  Early in Being and Time, Heidegger articulates 
four different ways that world has been philosophically understood: 
1.   “World” is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of those 
entities which can be present-at-hand within the world. 
2.   “World” functions as an ontological term, and signifies the Being of those 
entities which we have just mentioned.  And indeed ‘world’ can become a term 
for any realm which encompasses a multiplicity of entities:  for instance, when 
one talks of the ‘world’ of a mathematician, ‘world’ signifies the realm of 
possible objects of mathematics. 
3.   “World” can be understood in another ontical sense—not, however, as those 
entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-
the-world, but rather as that ‘wherein’ a factical Dasein as such can be said to 
‘live.’  “World” has here a pre-ontological existentiell52 signification.  Here 
again there are different possibilities:  “world” may stand for the ‘public’ we-
world, or one’s ‘own’ closest (domestic) environment.1 
4.   Finally, “world” designates the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood.  
Worldhood itself may have as its modes whatever structural wholes any special 
‘worlds’ may have at the time; but it embraces in itself the a priori character of 
worldhood in general.53 
 
 52 “Existentiell” [existenziell] and “existential” [existenzial] are terms Heidegger mobilizes in 
Being and Time to distinguish the former, as one’s particular understanding of oneself on the basis of one’s 
own possibilities and choices, from the latter, as the understanding of the ontological structure of existence 
rooted in an analytic of Dasein.  See Heidegger, Being, 32-34; [H] 12-13. 
 
 53 Ibid., 93; [H] 65.  [Translator’s note 1: (German original) ‘. . . die “eigene” und nächste 
(häusliche) Umwelt.’  The word ‘Umwelt,’ which is customarily translated as ‘environment,’ means 
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While each of these understandings of world may have their own appropriate context of 
discourse, Heidegger goes on to make it clear that it is world as understood in the third 
sense above that helps to guide his inquiry.  I follow him in this. 
 Certain things should be said here concerning Heidegger’s understanding of 
world.  To begin, world is not to be understood as an entity that can be encountered as 
something that stands, as it were, alongside other entities that can be encountered.  World 
is, rather, the wherein of all one’s encounters.54  It follows that Being-in-the-world is an 
ontological characteristic of Dasein—if there is no world, there is no Dasein.  If there is 
no Dasein, there is no world.55  In addition, world speaks the meaningful being of human 
existence, in that it can be understood as the totality of relational significance.  The 
structure of which totality is what is meant by a mode of worldhood.56  Now, even as the 
possibility of the encounter with beings can occur only within a world, so our dealings 
and involvements with beings within-the-world is also guided by the significance given 
to them through the world—or the worldhood of the world—as a condition of our 
belonging-together. 
 There is then, included with this understanding of world, a sense of its already-
having-been as a condition of our human belonging together in a world.  This is also to 
 
literally the ‘world around’ or the ‘world about.’  The prefix ‘um-,’ however, not only may mean ‘around’ 
or ‘about,’ but as we shall see, can also be used in an expression such as ‘um zu . . . ,’ which is most easily 
translated as ‘in order to.’  Section 15 will be largely devoted to a study of several words in which this 
same prefix occurs, though this is by no means apparent in the words we have chosen to represent them:  
‘Umgang’ (‘dealings’); ‘das Um-zu’ (‘the “in-order-to”’); ‘Umsicht’ (‘circumspection’).] 
 
 54 Ibid., 102; [H] 72. 
 
 55 Ibid., 92; [H] 64. 
 
 56 Ibid., 117-121; [H] 85-87. 
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say, our worlds are historical.  Hence, Heidegger can develop the claim that human 
existence is that of being “thrown.”57  To claim that human being is thrown being, is to 
affirm at least two important points.  The first emphasizes this being historical of worlds.  
The second emphasizes the centrality of each one’s own situatedness in a world. 
 To claim that one is thrown into a historical world as a condition of one’s 
existence, is to convey the understanding that the world is disclosed to each one through 
the open horizon of each one’s own particular situatedness.  I discover the world, the 
beings in the world, and myself within the world through the open horizon that is my 
own.  How I conduct myself in the world—how I involve myself (or not) with beings 
either like myself or unlike myself, and what possibilities show themselves to me—is 
very much determined by how the world is disclosed, in its historical significance, to me 
within the horizon of my particular and situated being.  In turn, the freeing of my 
conduct, broadly understood, into the world entails that it becomes itself a part of the 
world’s historical significance. 
 What begins to emerge in this elusive self-apparency of world is that world and 
human historical particularity are inextricably constitutive of one another in their being.  
This insight not only guides this dissertation, it also allows its discourse to shift from 
world to human person without losing focus.  This will become all the more apparent 
when imagination comes to the foreground of consideration. 
 It will have been noticed that much of what was just stated concerning “world” 
intimately echoes what has already been stated in the context of “work” and 
“preservation.”  This is only appropriate as “work” and “preservation” are essential 
 
 57 Ibid., 172-177; [H] 134-137. 
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human engagements that occur only within a world in such a way as to help co-constitute 
that world.  One may even say that all cultural worlds are perpetuated only through 
human preservation and a way is discovered for their self-transformation primarily 
through the works of those humans who dwell therein. 
 We may carry forward more of our preceding discourse on “work” and 
“preservation” at this time by recalling that in a work, world and earth are ever entangled 
in the striving of clearing and concealing characteristic of their natures.  This condition 
holds for the worlds of our present concern as well.  All worlds are entangled in a striving 
with earth.  We now make explicit something that has been implied all along.  We live 
amongst multiple worlds—dwelling now here and now there, or attending one another in 
our separate worlds across the concealing abyss of an earth that nurtures all.  Heidegger 
suggests such a notion of multiple worlds in his guiding definition above, when he states 
that world “may stand for the ‘public’ we-world, or one’s ‘own’ closest (domestic) 
environment.”58  Not only may we say that one’s own world horizon is potentially 
subject to a sort of fluctuation from near (domestic) to far (public).  We may also 
“speculate” or propose that where one must move between multiple divergent public 
contexts in one’s everyday dealings, one is in actuality moving between multiple 
worlds—specifically as an outcome of modernist hyper-specialization and multi-cultural 
globalization. 
 The complexity of world, as historical-meaning-bestowing-clearing-of-our-
encounters-and-engagements-in-dwelling, is only just beginning to emerge with the 
inclusion of multiple worlds and fluctuating human horizons.  Beyond questions of the 
 
 58 Ibid., 93; [H] 65. 
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potential for a sort of “higher” integration of worlds in a “new” structure of worldhood, 
or questions concerning how we may include in this discourse not only the “striving” of 
world with earth but also how we stand beneath heaven and “before the divinities” in the 
“simple oneness” of the fourfold,59 other issues linger.  Foremost among these is the 
question:  If one accepts this understanding of multiple worlds, how is it that we seem to 
move from one world to another without noticing?  Our existence in-the-world seems to 
be seamless.  I propose that the alterations of human horizons that constitute our being in 
different worlds are shrouded in forgetting. 
 The condition of forgetting, according to Heidegger, is intimately linked to our 
being as “thrown” and “fallen.”  As thrown, we discover ourselves, in each case, in a 
historical world of our belonging-together, first manifest in a particular situatedness by 
no apparent means of our own.  We simply are “there-being.”  As fallen, we seize upon 
the world of our specific situatedness and lose ourselves in that world of our 
involvements with beings.60  Each case is rooted in forgetting.  As thrown, we forget our 
ownmost self-projection of the horizon of the world’s disclosure.  We forget our 
projection and so encounter beings-in-a-world.  As fallen, we forget our ownmost 
throwness in-a-world in light of our involvements with beings as understood by what is 
“said” customarily concerning those involvements. 
 Heidegger further states: 
This forgetting is not nothing, nor is it just a failure to remember; it is rather a 
‘positive’ ecstatical mode of one’s having been—a mode with a character of its 
own.  The ecstasis (rapture) of forgetting has the character of backing away in 
the face of one’s ownmost “been,” and of doing so in a manner which is closed 
 
 59 Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” 147-149. 
 
 60 Heidegger, Being, 219-224; [H] 175-180. 
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off from itself—in such a manner, indeed, that this backing-away closes off 
ecstatically that in the face of which one is backing away, and thereby closes 
itself off too.1 61 
 
Therefore, in our forgetting, we close ourselves off from that in the face of which we 
back away.  Perhaps one could say we relegate it to the unconscious.  And the more 
primordial the event from which we back away, the more difficult it is to disclose.  Being 
itself is “forgotten” in such a primordiality.  This is not merely an issue of fleeing from 
some trauma.  Primordial forgetting is an ongoing eventing that frees us to our 
engagements in the world.  In our present context, it is that which frees us to our 
involvements with beings of divergent worlds in a seamless manner. 
 The vision of worlds developing here is a dynamic one.  It is to be understood that 
this dynamism holds sway throughout all of our engagements, including the most 
everyday variety.  It follows that even according to the most mundane of interpretations, 
our worlds are transformative in character.  The potential benefit, then, of the present 
inquiry will be seen in how my hermeneutic investigation into Jacob Böhme’s religious 
practice brings dynamics—and perhaps a certain radicality—of world transformation to 
the foreground.  Yet first, I have still to disclose how I will be using the terms 
imagination and religious practice. 
 Imagination, as it is to be understood in the context of this dissertation, signifies 
primarily, the whereby of the “wherein” of our dwelling in-a-world.  This is to say, 
imagination is the projective opening of each human being’s particular and situated 
 
 61 Ibid., 388-389; [H] 339.  [Translator’s note 1: (German original) ‘Die Ekstase (Entrückung) des 
Vergessens hat den Charakter des sich selbst verschlossenen Ausrückens vor dem eigensten Gewesen, so 
zwar, dass dieses Ausrücken vor . . . ekstatisch das Wover verschliesst und in eins damit sich selbst.’  
Heidegger is here connecting the word ‘Entrückung’ (our ‘rapture’) with the cognate verb ‘ausrücken’ 
(‘back away’), which may be used intransitively in the military sense of ‘decamping,’ but may also be used 
transitively in the sense of ‘disconnecting.’  Both ‘entrücken’ and ‘ausrücken’ mean originally ‘to move 
away,’ but they have taken on very different connotations in ordinary German usage.] 
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world-horizon that gathers beings, in their being, and world within its clearing.  
Imagination, thus understood, is ontological and concealed by a primordial mode of 
forgetting.62 
 This understanding of the imagination can be developed from Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Kant’s First Critique as elaborated in Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics.  According to Heidegger, Kant’s First Critique should be understood as an 
attempted laying the ground for metaphysics, being general metaphysics or ontology,63 
through a retrieval of the problem of human finitude.64  While for Kant, what is 
ultimately aimed for may be a secure and unassailable ground as reason.  What is actually 
struck in the First Edition of this Critique, according to Heidegger, is the abyss of the 
imagination as the root of human finitude and being.  Whereas Kant retreated from this 
disclosure in the Second Edition of this work, we, on the other hand, may advance its 
implications.65 
 The problem of human finitude, as retrieved by Kant, can be said to find its focus 
in relation to a model of human experience as constituted by perceptual intuition and 
conceptual synthesis within the human subject.  While the intuition passively receives 
perceptual impressions, conceptualization spontaneously synthesizes the perceptual 
manifold into representational unities.  Yet, in order for this model to open to a laying of 
a foundation for metaphysics, a more complex and complete elaboration is called for—
 
 62 Heidegger, Kant, 163-164. 
 
 63 Ibid., 6-9. 
 
 64 Ibid., 15. 
 
 65 Ibid., 112-113. 
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Kant attempted to provide this elaboration as his contribution to the historically situated 
philosophical discourse of his time. 
 The imagination emerges in this working out of Kant’s First Critique as an 
indispensible human faculty.  For Kant, it is that which mediates intuition and 
conceptualization—receptivity and spontaneity—thus making human experience, as it is, 
possible.  Yet this is not all.  Following Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s First 
Critique, the “transcendental” imagination stands itself disclosed by Kant as the common 
root of both perceptual intuition and conceptual synthesis.66  In terms of intuition, it is the 
imagination that opens [makes possible] the reception of our first pure look, as a pure or 
a priori “intuition,”67 by disclosing the horizon of time, as temporality. 68  Thus, it makes 
possible the meaningful actuality of all of our experiential encounters. 
 In terms of conceptual synthesis, the imagination shows itself as essentially 
synthetic, not only through mediating a synthesis of intuitions and concepts, but more 
primordially, by gathering the originary synthesis of the temporally constituted 
apperceptive “I” as locus of subjective experience.69  In each instance, the imagination 
demonstrates that which can be considered the essential characteristics of intuition and 
conceptualization in a more primordial manifestation—thus disclosing itself as the 
 
 66 Ibid., 94-97. 
 
 67 Ibid., 99-102. 
 
 68 Ibid., 169-170. 
 
 69 Ibid., 133-136. 
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common root of both.  Furthermore, imagination discloses itself in Heidegger’s 
interpretation as primordial temporality.70 
 Bearing in mind what Heidegger stresses we should bear in mind, that this is a 
general metaphysical or ontological thinking, it becomes a short step to a position that 
attempts to develop a language of imagination that is itself more ontological in its 
expression.  This is also to say that such a development is itself historically legitimized as 
a consequence of our secularizing philosophical discourses.  Heidegger himself intimates 
that this is what he has been up to in his own works such as Being and Time.71  The 
language of Dasein and the language of Heidegger’s later works, as a post-metaphysical 
discourse, can then be understood in this light. 
 Abyssal imagination (primordial temporality) is hereby understood, in this 
dissertation, as the whereby of the “wherein” of our dwelling in-a-world.  This is to say 
that the imagination is whereby the horizon of one’s own particular historical situatedness 
opens in such a way that beings and their worlds—as well as one’s ownmost self—are 
gathered therein.  It opens the clearing/concealing of Being wherein world and earth are 
striving.  It is the whereby of all our encountering of beings as beings and as “things” to 
be understood and responded to.  Shrouded in forgetting, it reveals itself as dynamic.  It 
also follows that it is our ownmost most intimate bestowal of Being. 
 We are here seen as primordially beings of imagination—thrown and fallen into 
worlds that are themselves imaginative.  This is not the same as to say that our worlds or 
we are not “real.”  The reality/imagination opposition breaks down here at its root.  As 
 
 70 Ibid., 137-139. 
 
 71 Martin Heidegger, “A Dialogue on Language,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. 
Hertz (San Francisco: Harper SanFrancisco, 1982), 40-48. 
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Being bestows the authority of “reality,” it bestows it as of imagination.  For this reason, 
it becomes prudent, in my estimation, to reclaim the old differentiation between 
“imagination” and “fantasy,” attributed to Paracelsus72—whose work, incidentally, 
certainly had a significant influence on Jacob Böhme.  Fantasy then, it could be said, 
entails the formation of wish-fulfilling subjective constructs that as objectifying 
representations may titillate or attenuate desire (and may even seem reasonable), yet 
nevertheless, are stripped of any “real” being as they divorce themselves from a “truly” 
lived world.73  Imagination, on the other hand, whether ontologically or ontically, ever 
desirefully opens clearings for the striving of world and earth wherein it gathers beings in 
the disclosure of their being into a “living” dwelling together in a world.  Fantasy, in this 
sense, cannot “be” without imagination—in that imagination is always prior to any 
fantasy and is the root in which fantasy itself is rooted.  However, desire is implicated in 
both.  More will be said of this later.  Suffice it to say, at this time, that desire is here 
understood less in terms of lack, than it is in terms of the overflowing or excessive 
striving of our belonging-together.74 
 
 72 Faivre, Theosophy, 102-103.  By suggesting that we reclaim this differentiation, I am not 
thereby intimating that I will also begin a preservation of Paracelsus’ work on this issue within my 
preservation of Böhme’s theosophy and his practice of the way to Christ.  However, it is also to be noted 
that Böhme himself, in his own way, does carry forward this differentiation in his work.  That said, it yet 
must be acknowledged that the characterization of the differentiation of fantasy and imagination that begins 
its development here is one that I, as a preserver, bring to this work. 
 
 73 It is important to note that this initial characterization of “fantasy”—which is intended only for 
orienting purposes—is not meant to limit fantasy to “conscious” constructs.  Rather, it is specifically meant 
to include “unconscious” constructs, as well, including those that in “disguised” form may trouble or 
fascinate consciousness.  My differentiation of fantasy and imagination here is further intended to help 
distinguish my discourse on imagination from psychoanalytic discourses without problematizing or 
obscuring their valuable contributions. 
 
 74 It is also important to note here that my hermeneutic of imagination and excessing desire, as it 
will be developed in this dissertation, is born “exclusively” from my preservation of Jacob Böhme’s 
theosophy.  This will become clearer in Chapter Three.  However, with that being the case, I believe it is 
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 It is through the foregoing interpretations of world and imagination that the issue 
of religious practice is now to be approached.  It has been proposed that religious practice 
can work in such a way as to transform a practitioner’s world-horizon.  By this time, my 
proposal should not be heard as anything outside the ordinary.  Our world horizons can 
be understood as transforming or fluctuating as a matter of course.  The importance of 
this issue of transforming world horizons—whence transforming worlds—in relation to 
religious practice can be seen in how religious practice, as an intentional engagement of 
the practitioner, helps to disclose the event of transformation through a focused approach.  
This is specifically the case when the practice under investigation itself intends a certain 
transformation as is the case with Jacob Böhme’s The Way to Christ. 
 In The Way to Christ, the process of transformation occurs through the stages or 
“movements” of repentance, resignation, and contemplation.75  Traditionally, these or 
similar such stages, have been understood primarily in terms of a fundamental change 
within the individual practitioner—whether in terms of spiritual or psychological 
dynamics.  While this dissertation itself will focus on the individual practitioner, 
nevertheless, here this focus will ultimately be in the service of disclosing a fundamental 
transformation of the practitioner’s world. 
 
nonetheless of critical importance to acknowledge the potentially “troubling” resonances that my 
characterization of excessing desire can have with certain psychoanalytically oriented characterizations of 
desire extant in contemporary academic hermeneutics.  I have specifically in mind those hermeneutic 
discourses that engage the works of Jacques Lacan or Gilles Deleuze.  The differentiation of my 
characterization of desire, as excessing, from Lacan’s, as lack, is self-apparent.  It is the same as that 
between Lacan and Deleuze.  What differentiates my characterization from Deleuze’s excessing 
schizophrenic desire of the subjectless machine, however, is not so readily apparent at this stage of my 
dissertation’s discourse.  I am confident, though, that the differences between our separate characterizations 
will become clear as this dissertation develops my hermeneutic alternative. 
 
 75 Peter Erb, introduction to The Way to Christ, by Jacob Boehme, Classics of Western 
Spirituality, trans., with a foreword by Peter Erb, and a preface by Winfried Zeller (New York: Paulist, 
1978), 2. 
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 It has already been intimated that this dissertation will approach religious practice 
in terms of practice as work.  The work of practice, in this case, calls to its preservers as 
practitioners who fix themselves as the figures wherein the striving between world and 
earth happening in the work occurs.  The practitioner is able to so fix herself through the 
discipline that the practice discloses—through its injunction of what one does and how 
one does it.  It may also be said that through the injunction one can come to stand beneath 
heaven and before the divinities, in Heidegger’s simple unity of the fourfold,76 in such a 
manner as is disclosed by the discipline demanded of the practice. 
 “Normally,” one is initiated into a religious world through one’s own early 
development.  From one’s infancy on, one assimilates the practices that disclose a 
religious world as a matter of taking on its traditioned historical sendings, which is the 
provenance of one’s own thrown being-in-a-world.  In such a way, we rather seamlessly 
awaken in a given religious world.  Yet there can be practices that emerge, as historical 
sendings within a given tradition, which call practitioners further.  That is, practices 
which disclose to practitioners new or specialized possibilities of being-in-a-world, from 
within the tradition.  These sendings are often initially troubling to the tradition of origin.  
Nevertheless, it is through such practices—not to speak of conversions—that we can 
come to view the event of transformation—even if only by a glimpse or a moment’s 
revelation. 
 I propose that religious practices, in this latter sense, can help the practitioner 
imaginally regather her ownmost projected world-horizon towards a rethrowing of that 
very horizon as the opening into the world intended by the practice as work.  This event, 
 
 76 Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” 147-149. 
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at least in some cases, would entail the “death/resurrection” of the practitioner herself.  
This can be seen, among other things, as an outcome of the understanding of imagination 
already articulated.  It will be recalled that imagination, as articulated, opens the world 
horizon—gathering beings in their being and worlds, within its clearing—even as it 
gathers one’s ownmost self as ek-sistential locus of experience.  This is to say, world and 
self imaginally arise together.  If the horizon comes to collapse, my world and my self are 
extinguished.  If a horizon is rethrown, a world and a “resurrected” self will be regathered 
therein.77  One must note that this understanding deeply problematizes notions of the self.  
Yet more significantly, it heralds the radical possibility of opening to different disclosive 
worlds that may gather within their horizons fundamentally different beings.  Which is to 
say, between one world and the next, beyond the rather straightforward difference of 
significance given to the same beings within a world, we may even encounter very 
different beings altogether. 
 To say that the above may be accomplished, is not to say that it is easy.  The 
regathering of one’s projected ek-sistential horizon necessitates that practice engages 
one’s complete being.  It must engage and regather one’s body and actions, one’s 
emotions and energy, as well as one’s mind, discourses and speech.  It must regather 
one’s history.  Then one must give oneself to its discipline completely—thereby allowing 
the practice to work and so become a work of transformation.  While one must engage 
the practice hopefully, still there is no surety of success.  Even if success is attained, that 
attainment may take years.  Yet ease of execution may be accomplished—and with that, 
 
 77 One can witness an interesting and resonant type of dynamic being articulated in Hajime 
Tanabe’s Philosophy as Metanoetics, with his death and resurrected being of the philosopher as thinker.  
See Tanabe Hajime, Philosophy as Metanoetics, Nazan Studies in Religion and Culture, trans. Takeuchi 
Yoshinori, Valdo Viglielmo, and James W. Heisig (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). 
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revelatory flashes of the goal.  Still, one must strive and wait.  This is to fix oneself as the 
figure wherein the striving between world and earth, clearing and concealing, occurs as 
the work of practice—unto awakening in a new world. 
 My desire in the writing of this dissertation is to help disclose this process through 
my preservation of Jacob Böhme’s The Way to Christ.  By tracking each of its three 
primary stages or movements of transformation—repentance, resignation, and 
contemplation—I hope to demonstrate how this practice works to imaginally regather the 
practitioner in her world, leading to a fundamental transformation of that world—or the 
transformation of the possibilities of encounter therein, such as Böhme’s encounter with 
Sophia.  As acknowledged earlier, Jacob Böhme offers much to this discourse—not only 
in terms of offering a transformative practice, but also in terms of his own theosophical 
hermeneutic concerning the imagination, desire, and the Divine.  This will be disclosed in 
the chapters that follow. 
 
Synopsis of Chapters 
 Before beginning the hermeneutic preservation of Jacob Böhme’s practice as it is 
articulated in The Way to Christ, certain preparatory tasks, as I have stated in this 
Introduction, must first be accomplished.  Chapter Two, therefore, will constitute a 
synoptic historical introduction to Jacob Böhme.  This will include a presentation of 
certain key influences understood as formative for Böhme’s life and work.  Then, after a 
consideration of significant events and issues from his life and time, a brief introductory 
sketch of his own historical influence will be presented. 
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 Chapter Three will consist of an introductory preservation of Böhme’s theosophy, 
and the beginning of the “conversation” between Jacob Böhme and Martin Heidegger.  
This will include a more in-depth articulation of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, as 
presented in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics—focused on the imagination. 
 The preservation of the practice proper begins with Chapter Four.  Here, through 
a consideration of Böhme’s meaning of the way to Christ, I will demonstrate how the 
practitioner is gathered into Böhme’s world, as her indispensable entry to the practice.  
Then what follows in Chapter Four is an interpretation of the practitioner’s own self-
gathering within that world, as the movement of “repentance,” leading to her death and 
“new birth.” 
 Chapter Five continues and ultimately concludes the preservation.  This chapter 
includes the soul’s encounter with Sophia, as it is presented by Böhme.  It then enters the 
hermeneutic preservation of the movement of “resignation.”  The chapter draws to a close 
with the problem of the movement of “contemplation.” 
 The Conclusion in Chapter Six recaps in broad strokes how the task of retrieving 
the question of imagination and its relation to religious practice and the practitioner have 
been pursued in this dissertation.  It also briefly touches on various wider issues at 
stake—including those brought to bear in the field of Religion and Psychological Studies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
JACOB BÖHME AND WESTERN ESOTERICISM 
 
 Jacob Böhme (1575-1624 C.E.) was born the fourth of five children to a free 
peasant family in the Lusatian countryside just outside of Görlitz in what is now eastern 
Germany.  With only a rudimentary education, the young Böhme apprenticed as a 
cobbler in order to secure for himself a livelihood.  Having completed his training as 
apprentice and then journeyman, Böhme moved to Görlitz and became a burgher.  He 
married, bought a house, and set up shop as a master cobbler shortly before the turning of 
the century.  In 1600, Böhme experienced a profound and personally transforming 
illumination.  These are the bare facts of the first half of his life, as we know them. 
 At least one facet of the fascination with Böhme’s life and work through the 
centuries is expressed in the question:  How could a person of such humble origin, void 
of academic training, come to exert such profound intellectual influence—not only in his 
own time, but through the centuries following as well?  In answer, many have invoked 
“genius.”  Indeed, Böhme is the historical prototype of the Romantic genius.78  Böhme’s 
own answer to this question certainly would have been that the speaking of the Holy 
Spirit, through the illumination of 1600 and in all subsequent explicating writings, 
 
 78 Paola Mayer, “Reinventing the Sacred:  The Romantic Myth of Jacob Böhme,” The German 
Quarterly 69.3 (Summer 1996): 256.  See also Marjorie Garber, “Our Genius Problem,” The Atlantic 
Monthly, December 2002, 65-72. 
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accounts for whatever power and influence is to be found in his work.  While there could 
well be something to this claim, another explanation may also offer some clarification. 
 When one considers Jacob Böhme’s life and work, it can also be said that one 
way of explaining his ongoing influence is through how Böhme creatively regathers and 
carries forward the western esoteric traditions at a critical historical juncture for the 
western traditions as a whole.  It will be recalled that the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries knew the workings of Galileo, Descartes, Bacon, Kepler, 
Shakespeare, and Cervantes.  Each, in his own way, was helping to transform western 
traditions—so much so that this period can be characterized as the birth of modernity.  
Böhme, in his own way, also profoundly contributes to this transformation with 
unexpected and “troubling”79 ramifications. 
 It is the intention of this chapter to help clarify how it is that Jacob Böhme gathers 
forward western esotericism in “modern” and now post-metaphysical discourse.  This 
will characterize my introduction of Böhme to the contemporary reader.  To accomplish 
this, I will be outlining selective exemplary influences flowing both to and from 
Böhme—highlighting how it is that Böhme creatively rearticulates western esoteric 
traditions from within the context of his own historical situatedness, thereby making them 
germane to, and subversive for modern discourses.  Yet first, it is prudent to emphasize, 
even somewhat superficially, the relevance of questions concerning the western esoteric 
tradition to contemporary academic discourse. 
 Until only relatively recently, the western esoteric tradition has long been an 
arena neglected by serious academics.  Yet, as of the end of the twentieth century, 
 
 79 In this context, by “troubling,” I am intending to convey a sense of the influence that Böhme’s 
work has exerted in modern discourse to subvert that very discourse. 
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beginning in France and then Holland, legitimate departments and doctoral degree 
programs specializing in western esoteric studies have been established in continental 
universities.  Even in the United States, the American Academy of Religion (AAR) has 
begun organizing ongoing seminars entitled “Western Esotericism from the Early 
Modern Period.”80  There is no risk in wagering that advancing research in western 
esotericism will profoundly alter our narratives and understanding of modernity itself—
specifically, as we include western esotericism’s more subversive discourses in the light 
of how it is that we are still shaped by their influence.  This is to say that the significance 
of research in this field is disclosed through its potential to transform our discourses 
concerning our own assumed self-understanding. 
 To help illuminate the relevance of this research, I would like to turn briefly to 
how our contemporary discourse may be altered by even a minimal familiarity with the 
western esoteric tradition.  In his lecture Of Spirit, Jacques Derrida subtly “questions”81 
what he sees as Martin Heidegger’s insistence in the essay “Language in the Poem,” that 
the poetry of Georg Trackl—and Heidegger’s own interpretation of it—speaks something 
that “ought not to be Christian.”82  In his self-constructed dialogue between a Christian 
theologian and Heidegger,83 Derrida implies that, in his opinion, as much as Heidegger 
 
 80 Faivre, Theosophy, xix-xx. 
 
 81 Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit:  Heidegger and the Question, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and 
Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 129-136. 
 
 82 Ibid., 93-99. 
 
 83 Ibid., 109-113. 
 
44 
                                                
might protest, the path of Heidegger’s discourse and Trackl’s poetry can be understood as 
essentially “Christian,” and thereby, in Derrida’s view, metaphysical.84 
 While what Derrida implies is certainly plausible from a broad and rather fuzzy 
perspective, it does not actually strike the historical heart of what, in my opinion, is at 
stake in Heidegger’s essay.  That is that it appeals to furthering an ongoing historical 
struggle for legitimization within western discourse, which intimately concerns the 
western esoteric tradition.  To understand this claim, it is helpful to ask what Christianity 
is it that may be speaking in this and other of Heidegger’s works.  In approaching an 
answer, we may initially concur with the Heidegger of Derrida’s text that it surely is not a 
“metaphysically” laden scholastic or modern Christianity—which Derrida, it seems, all 
too quickly identifies with any Christianity or perhaps with Christianity as a whole.  
Rather, I contend, the traditioned Christianity speaking in its silence through this and 
other of Heidegger’s works can be identified through a listing of resonant themes 
identified in “Language in the Poem,” and by highlighting two other exemplary poets 
who one discovers as illuminating voices in another of Heidegger’s works. 
 The resonant themes in “Language in the Poem” short-listed are Spirit, flame, the 
intimate transforming proximity of gentleness to destruction, the origin of evil in Spirit, 
the “strange” nature of death, the morning’s twilight, the Sister, and the mirror 
[speculum].85  For those with ears to hear—that is, for those with even an introductory 
understanding of the western esoteric tradition—these resonant themes shout out the 
 
 84 It is most interesting, in the context of this dissertation, that Derrida identifies the ghost of Hegel 
in Heidegger.  See ibid., 99. 
 
 85 See Martin Heidegger, “Language in the Poem:  A Discussion on Georg Trakl’s Poetic Work,” 
in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1982). 
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abiding influence of Jacob Böhme.  In fact, as will be witnessed through reading this 
dissertation, this list could very well have been offered as an introduction of themes to be 
touched upon through this dissertation.  Yet so ubiquitous are they in Böhme’s work that 
the same could be said of nearly any treatment of Böhme. 
 If we turn now to Heidegger’s work, The Principle of Reason, we see the very 
same influence at work.  In the process of preparing the reader for the “leap” into “the 
other tonality” of Leibniz’s principle of reason,86 Heidegger calls upon two specific 
poets—along with Eduard Mörike, Goethe, and Mozart—to help on the way.  These 
poets are Angelus Silesius (Johannes Scheffler, 1624-1677 C.E.) and Friedrich Hölderlin 
(1770-1843 C.E.).87  In each case, Heidegger hears something in the poet that speaks to 
and troubles the modern metaphysical discourse.  What is important in the present 
context is not how it is, according to Heidegger, that they trouble or challenge, but rather 
the fact that both Silesius and Hölderlin were influenced early and primarily by Jacob 
Böhme.  They were both Böhmists.88 
 How this information can affect our understanding—and our narrative sense of 
ourselves—can be seen in how it highlights that there is an alternate or even suppressed 
undercurrent in modern discourses themselves that reaches into postmodernity.  This 
alternate current can be said to speak already—and subversively—in a different tonality 
than that of modern metaphysics.  Further, we must recognize that Jacob Böhme is a 
powerful voice of influence in this current.  Finally, insofar as Jacob Böhme can be 
 
 86 Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, Studies in Continental Thought, trans. Reginald 
Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 56-60. 
 
 87 Ibid., 35, 68, 82-83. 
 
 88 Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition, 62, 72, 75-78; and Weeks, German Mysticism, 185. 
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understood as regathering and carrying forward the western esoteric tradition, we may 
speculate that if a Christianity speaks in Heidegger’s essay, “Language in the Poem” (and 
other works), it is primarily that of the western esoteric tradition—a tradition long in 
deadly struggle with more “mainstream” expressions of legitimized Christianity.  To 
recognize or accept this is to have to rethink our own provenance.  It also demands 
greater precision in any charges, such as Derrida’s, concerning Christianity, Heidegger, 
or others who might have been influenced—knowingly or unknowingly—by the western 
esoteric tradition.89  Even maintaining a suspicion that I state my case hyperbolically, the 
consequences still stand. 
 
 
 89 Concerning this issue of precision, it must be noted that in his book Gnostic Apocalypse Cyril 
O’Regan claims that Heidegger dismisses Böhme in Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human 
Freedom “as a real influence on Schelling precisely because of the presence of the theological element in 
his [Böhme’s] thought . . . .”  O’Regan goes on to imply that Heidegger here espouses an interpretation of 
philosophy which holds philosophy as authentic only to the extent that it is “theologically sanitized.”  
Thereby, according to O’Regan, Heidegger can further dismiss Böhme’s work as “ontotheological” while 
holding Schelling free of the taint of such “sin.”  O’Regan then can argue that Heidegger’s reading is 
“objectionable” in that it poses a “binary opposition between philosophy and theology” and, in addition, 
does not recognize that Schelling’s discourse is itself “ontotheological.”  (See O’Regan, Gnostic 
Apocalypse, 5-6.)  However, when one actually looks to Heidegger’s “Schelling book,” this is what one 
discovers:  “The whole boldness of Schelling’s thinking comes into play here.  But it is not the vacuous 
play of thoughts of a manic hermit, it is only the continuation of an attitude of thinking which begins with 
Meister Eckhart and is uniquely developed in Jacob Boehme.  But when this historical context is cited, one 
is immediately ready again with jargon, one speaks of ‘mysticism’ and ‘theosophy.’  Certainly, one  
can call it that, but nothing is said by that with regard to the spiritual occurrence and the true creation of 
thought . . . ” (Martin Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Joan 
Stambaugh [Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1985], 117).  “With this, however, a ‘theological’ turn 
seems to enter the idea of system. . . .  But when we speak here of ‘theological’ and ‘theology’ we must 
remember that the word and concept ‘theology’ did not first grow in the framework and service of an 
ecclesiastical system of faith, but within philosophy. . . .  Every philosophy is theology in the primordial 
and essential sense that comprehension (logos) of beings as a whole asks about the ground of Being, and 
this ground is called theos, God. . . .  Philosophy’s questioning is always and in itself both onto-logical and 
theo-logical in the very broad sense.  Philosophy is Ontotheology.  The more originally it is both in one, the 
more truly it is philosophy.  And Schelling’s treatise is thus one of the most profound works of philosophy 
because it is in a unique sense ontological and theological at the same time” (ibid., 50-51).  One must 
question then, what is O’Regan thinking?  One must also wonder concerning the very different meaning of 
ontotheology that apparently is being communicated by Heidegger in his Schelling book—which difference 
seems to be reminiscent of the varying meanings he employs for “metaphysics” in different texts. 
 
47 
Western Esotericism 
 Western esotericism has a long and colorful history.  Spanning millennia, it is a 
story that includes the weaving together of divergent traditions—of particular importance 
those of Hermeticism, Kabbalism, and alchemy.  Each one of these traditions speaks a 
profound orienting facet of the synergy that is western esotericism.  As a rather simplistic 
clarification, one may say that the Hermetic axiom “that which is above is as that which 
is below, and that which is below is as that which is above” of Hermes Trismegistus’ 
Emerald Tablet speaks a homology of, and correspondence between, heaven and earth.90  
Theosophical Kabbalah provides a vision into the hidden workings of the divine, along 
with methods for achieving such vision.91  Finally, alchemy investigates and mobilizes 
these insights towards the transmutation of the practitioner’s psyche, as well as materials 
within her world.92  After western esotericism acquires a characteristically Christian 
voice, particularly through the Renaissance, these varied strands become, as it were, more 
and more inextricably melded one to the other.  These traditions merged so much so that 
we may speak of a western esoteric tradition today. 
 The importance of the Italian Renaissance for the development, dissemination, 
and “popularization” of western esotericism cannot be overstated.  Certainly, the creation 
of the movable type printing press had more than just a little to do with this state of 
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affairs.  Yet it is through Marcilio Ficino’s Platonic Academy in Florence that western 
esotericism receives the strength of voice and support necessary to reach a broad 
audience.  The story begins with Marcilio Ficino (1433-1499 C.E.) enjoying the 
patronage of Cosimo de Medici, working on translations of Plato for his patron.  His 
work is interrupted when Cosimo, having just received a rare and all but complete copy 
of the Corpus Hermeticum, requests that Ficino discontinue his work on Plato until the 
Corpus Hermeticum itself is translated.  Ficino, profoundly inspired by the work, further 
develops and communicates his own humanist thought as a synergy of Hermeticism and 
Neoplatonism.  Shortly thereafter, his student Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494 C.E.), 
having acquired Jewish Kabbalist texts in the aftermath of the Jewish Diaspora from 
Spain in 1492, began to articulate and promulgate a Christian Kabbalism which 
integrated the influence of Ficino’s Hermeticism.93 
 Of equal importance, and perhaps more directly responsible for the popularization 
of western esotericism, the German Johannes Reuchlin (1455-1522 C.E.), inspired by 
Pico, began his own “Christianification” of Kabbalah, even likening it to “an alchemy.”  
Having read Reuchlin, the humanist Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486-
1535 C.E.) went on to write De Occulta Philosophia as an attempted complete 
systematization and integration of Hermeticism, Kabbalism, and alchemy.94  Thus it 
continued. 
 It is impossible to calculate how popular western esotericism actually was through 
this critical period of its development, yet we can get some indication by the fact that 
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between its original publication in 1471 and the end of the sixteenth century, Ficino’s 
Latin translation of the Corpus Hermeticum, entitled Pimander, alone realized sixteen 
editions with wide circulation.95  Reuchlin and Agrippa as well attained far-flung and 
lasting influence through their publications—even in the wake of Luther’s Reformation, 
which was taking place as they were working on or publishing their more significant 
works.96 
 It is one of the great ironies of history that Martin Luther, who proclaimed a deep 
and abiding antipathy towards mystics, may have contributed to the mystical 
development and popularization of the western esoteric tradition in Protestant Germany.  
Martin Luther edited and published the Theologia Deutsch in 1518—the year after 
posting his Ninety-Five Theses—later declaring that this work anticipated the 
Reformation and his theology.97  However, the Theologia Deutsch, as a collection of 
sermons by Meister Eckhart and Johannes Tauler, is a tribute to the German mystical 
tradition.  In the German milieu of the early Reformation with its anticipation of 
theological and social freedom—where every man is king and priest unto God98—this 
work exerted a broad popular influence.  In fact, many of Luther’s early co-Reformers 
had a strong mystical bent to begin with.  The developing tension between Luther and his 
mystical or Spiritualist co-Reformers helped lead to Luther’s increasingly more 
tyrannical dogmatism, which led in its turn, to the progressive “occulting” of the popular 
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mystical or Spiritualist current within Luther’s Reformation.  As a result, many 
Spiritualist Protestants, in their turn, entered into sympathetic and mutually supportive 
association with western esotericists. 
 Indeed, as significant to this chapter’s thesis as the popularization of the German 
mystical tradition via the Theologia Deutsch, Luther also expressed his enthusiastic 
approval of alchemical study and research.  He found it pleasing for its “allegory and 
secret signification.”99  This rather curious—to our eyes—enthusiasm for alchemy was 
not limited to Luther alone.  Today we seem to forget selectively how far the interest in 
alchemy, and thereby the western esoteric tradition, spread—weaving itself into German 
popular culture.  As a point of fact, in Mannheim Germany, at the time of Goethe’s birth 
in 1749, the practice of alchemy was so popular that the city was “obliged to suppress it 
by law,” as the many alchemical laboratories there posed a considerable fire hazard for 
the city.100 
 Another personage significant to the spread, development, and popularization of 
alchemy and the esoteric tradition was Luther’s contemporary Philippus Theophrastus 
Aureolus Bombastus von Hohenheim (1493-1541 C.E.), commonly known as Paracelsus.  
This wandering physician’s name is virtually synonymous with German alchemy, and he 
figures as important to preliminary transformations in medical understanding paving the 
way for the early developments of modern empirical medicine.  The Paracelsian 
“reformation” in medicine begins, as did the Lutheran Reformation, with a public act of 
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dissent.  Paracelsus burned his scholastically oriented medical text in Basel in 1527.101  
His practice, at that point, turned to the more “empirical” reading of alchemical 
correspondences in nature as the effective discipline for the cure of disease.  His fame 
and teachings spread, even as did Luther’s. 
 Via these rather broad and selective strokes, I am attempting to communicate two 
critical issues.  First is the very practical issue of disclosing those influences that flow 
into the Görlitz of Böhme’s lifetime.  Second is the rather difficult matter of disclosing 
the complexity of, and popular resonance with, the synergy that is the western esoteric 
tradition.  This tradition, through its centerless history, can be said to gather progressively 
within itself multiple traditions and multiple themes, even as it brings itself more clearly 
into focus.  As we approach the Görlitz of Böhme’s time, we must admit to the western 
esoteric tradition as a loose accommodation of Hermeticism, humanism, Jewish 
Kabbalah, Christianity, German mysticism, alchemy, a liberal spirit of inquiry, and an 
early Reformation spirit of hopeful independence.  Through the synergy of these varied 
traditions, the multiple themes speak. 
 One of the foremost of these themes concerns a radical shift in the locus of 
authority.  This can be characterized as a shift from ecclesial or political bodies (and their 
representatives) to the illuminated or accomplished Magus,102 as locus of authority, that 
each practitioner, through discipline and grace, has the potential to become.  This is a 
variation on the familiar historical keynote that shifts authority to the individual.  This 
theme is further grounded in an additional theme.  That is that the individual can read the 
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divine, not only in the book of scripture, but in the books of nature and self as well—
another familiar historical trope.  As these themes developed together within the western 
esoteric tradition, they lead to a transformed relation to authoritative sources.  The Magi, 
as legitimate loci and sources of authority, can speak from anywhere, anytime, and in any 
language.  His or her own illumination or accomplishment is self-legitimizing—as is the 
progressive development of each practitioner.  They need appeal to no other authority.  
Yet they constitute together, in an occulted manner, an ongoing body of transmission—an 
“inner church,” as some like Böhme would have called it. 
 This notion can be understood further as an appreciation or application of 
Hermetic correspondences.  In Hermetic correspondences, “like” always resonates with 
“like.”  While respective external realms of influence are significant, this fact does not 
detract, according to this view, from the primary interior co-resonances.  So it is for the 
body of the “inner church.”  Separated by time and place—even language and religion—
the body of the inner church can recognize and influence one another.  This emergent 
theme of the inner church, in contradistinction to the “churches of stone,” figures 
prominently in the work of Jacob Böhme and, to a lesser degree, in the Görlitz of his day. 
 
Görlitz 
 Görlitz in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries realized a rather 
unique combination of politics, persons, and traditions.  While predominantly Lutheran, 
as an acquisition of the Catholic Bohemian crown lands, Görlitz and its sister members of 
the Lusatian League of Six Cities founded in 1346103 experienced relative freedom from 
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the centralized Protestant ecclesiastical authority of Wittenberg, and even Electoral 
Saxony’s Dresden.  The crown-appointed ecclesiastical authority for Lusatia was a 
Catholic layperson, and tolerance between Catholics and Protestants was the norm—each 
often sharing a common church with separate altars.104  In Görlitz then, the local 
Protestant church was somewhat forced into a collaborative relation with the city 
council—a situation becoming progressively more the exception rather than the rule in 
Protestant Germany where the church could exert considerable local authority, especially 
in ecclesiastical matters. 
 The tolerant atmosphere of Görlitz and its surrounding environs was not simply 
an issue concerning Protestants vis-à-vis Catholics.  It concerned much more.  Near the 
outer edge of the Reformation’s reach, Görlitz was something of a safe haven for 
unorthodox Protestants of many stripes.  The mayor of Görlitz, Bartholomäus Scultetus, a 
humanist of some renown is a case in point.105  During this period of the orthodox 
Lutheran community’s violent turn, particularly in Germany, away from any 
accommodation of humanism (referred to as Philippism or even Crypto-Calvinism),106 
Mayor Scultetus organized a humanist club comprised of the city elite called the 
Convivium Musicum.  Even Görlitz’s Lutheran Pastor Gregor Richter, Böhme’s primary 
antagonist, was a member of this Convivium.107 
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 Before the humanist Richter was appointed pastor, the mystically oriented Pastor 
Martin Moller had spiritually guided Protestants in Görlitz.  While Pastor Moller did have 
to defend himself against charges coming from outside of Görlitz that he was himself a 
Philippist, this did not prevent him from continuing to minister to his congregation in 
Görlitz until his death in 1606.108  It is further quite likely that Pastor Moller was familiar 
with and sympathetic to the work of the “heretical” mystic and Hermeticist Valentin 
Weigel (1533-1588 C.E.).  Although it was not commonly known that Weigel was a 
Hermetic mystic until his work was published after his (and Moller’s) death, it was, 
indeed, known beforehand by Görlitz resident and brother-in-law of Mayor Scultetus, 
Abraham Behem who had been in correspondence with the mystic Weigel.109  It is 
certainly within the realm of probability, then, that the sympathetic mystic Moller knew 
the mystic Weigel’s work as well. 
 The mystic or Spiritualist influence extended beyond the city walls of Görlitz.  In 
the surrounding countryside, several wealthy burgher families who had recently turned 
landed gentry were known to be Schwenckfeldians.110  The Silesian Caspar von Ossig 
Schwenckfeld (1490-1561 C.E.) was a significant regional figure of the early 
Reformation.  Yet he became critical of what he perceived as residual “fleshy” elements 
in Luther’s faith, such as the Eucharist, liturgical ceremony, and the primacy of the 
written scriptural word.  The “inner Word” and “inner church” held more importance for 
Schwenckfeld—that, and the early Reformation spirit of tolerance for divergent 
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viewpoints.  After his meeting with Luther in 1525 to discuss these issues, Luther turned 
against Schwenckfeld, leading to Schwenckfeld’s eventual exile from Silesia in 1529.111  
Nevertheless, Schwenckfeldian conveticals remained—such as those near Görlitz.  And 
if, as was often the case, the Lutheran ecclesiastical establishment of Görlitz wasn’t 
sympathetic to the influential Schwenckfeldian new nobility, the city council, for the 
greater public good, could at least ensure that they were tolerated.112 
 Returning to within the city walls of Görlitz, mention must also be made of the 
city’s physicians.  Paracelsus exerted a profound influence in the Görlitz medical 
community.  In fact, so profound was his sway that Paracelsus’ collected works were 
edited in Görlitz during Böhme’s lifetime.  Moreover, while some among the city’s 
residents may have suspected the physicians of heretical beliefs—reflected in a complaint 
against them brought before the city council—nevertheless, the city council could 
orchestrate a tolerant rapprochement, yet again.  Illustrative of such tolerance is the fact 
that upon the death of the physician Conrad Scheer in 1615, a city chronicler noted that in 
the forty years of Scheer’s residence in Görlitz, he had never been seen in church, nor did 
anyone even know in what he believed.113 
 Finally, mention must be made of Jacob Böhme’s rather remarkable friend, Dr. 
Balthasar Walter.  Walter was known for taking extensive journeys in his pursuit of 
esoteric knowledge.  On one such journey, he traveled to the Middle East—reputedly to 
gain knowledge in Kabbalah, alchemy, and magic.  While one might be tempted to make 
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much of Walter’s influence on Böhme, it must be noted that this relationship seemed not 
to blossom until rather late in their lives.114 
 What is of importance though, is how Walter reflects the esoteric interest within 
the milieu of Böhme’s life.  While most of Germany was suffering the horrors of the 
witch-hunts, the city elite of Görlitz were rather openly pursuing interests in humanism, 
mysticism, and the esoteric.115  It is my claim that with Jacob Böhme, these traditions are 
melded into a self-sustaining whole, which resonates through what was then the future. 
 
Jacob Böhme 
 The illumination of 1600 figured prominently in Jacob Böhme’s life.  Not only 
did it resolve questions that plagued Böhme before the event, but it also proved itself the 
inspirational source of his work thereafter.  His illumination, as reported, occurred 
suddenly.  While working in his shop, the brilliant flash of sunlight reflected from a 
pewter (or tin) vessel is said to have brought his spirit to an intelligible clarity.  For a 
mere quarter of an hour, Böhme is said to have seen into the inner workings of the divine 
in nature.116 
 For the next twelve years, Böhme worked and studied in an attempt to make his 
illumination explicable—primarily to himself.  The fruit of his effort is the unfinished 
Morgenröthe im Aufgang or The Aurora.117  Had Böhme kept his work to himself, it is 
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possible that we never would have heard of this Lusatian shoemaker.  Yet, at the urging 
of a friend or friends, he shared his work.  Shortly thereafter, copies of The Aurora began 
to circulate.  One should not overlook the significance of this event.  The Aurora, as a 
work in progress, was upwards of four hundred handwritten pages.  Further, this rather 
massive work was initially copied and recopied by hand.  Only an enthusiastic 
appreciation of The Aurora, to say the least, would have led others to such an 
undertaking.  It is speculated that the patron of this effort was the Schwenckfeldian noble 
Carl von Ender, who later became Böhme’s most significant patron.118 
 Böhme’s local troubles began at this time.  Within about one year of The Aurora’s 
original circulation, Böhme was criticized for this work by both the Görlitz city council 
and Pastor Richter in July 1613.  Böhme claimed that the work was strictly personal and 
that its copy and circulation had occurred without his knowledge or consent.  Be that as it 
may, the city council ordered Böhme to cease writing speculative compositions.119 
 The city council’s order may seem understandable in its straightforwardness, yet 
it actually poses numerous interesting curiosities.  In a period of generally increasing 
dogmatic expression and enforcement, a simple gag order should strike one as rather light 
punishment for one suspected of blasphemy.  Further, there is no mention made in the 
order concerning the books already in circulation or those who copied and circulated 
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them.120  Therefore, one may readily suspect that the order was actually an attempt to 
maintain the status quo in a context where everyone could be suspect for one reason or 
another.  Böhme’s gag order then, can be seen as a diplomatic attempt to safeguard the 
city from external scrutiny should Böhme become more widely popular through 
additional works. 
 However, the issue did not rest so easily.  Pastor Richter remained vocal, at least 
locally, with his extreme criticism of Böhme.  Historically, the trend seems to have been 
for interpreters of Böhme’s life and work to characterize this fact in terms of Böhme’s 
struggle against orthodox Lutheran Christianity.  Yet, as Andrew Weeks makes plain—
recalling Richter’s Philippist sympathies—the issue of Richter’s animosity towards 
Böhme is a different matter altogether.  It was not as much about orthodox dogmatics as 
it was personal.121 
 While Böhme considered himself a good Lutheran, and certainly adhered to much 
conservative Lutheran doctrine, he nevertheless was harshly critical of the “learned men” 
of the Church.  Böhme held the learned, with their escalating doctrinal disputes, as 
responsible for much of the violence of his time.  Further, he viewed their strict 
adherence to “churches of stone” as alienating them from participation in the “true” or 
“inner church.”122  According to Weeks, Richter’s extreme and ongoing reproach of 
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Böhme and his works flowed from Richter’s taking Böhme’s charges as a personal 
effront, since Richter himself was Görlitz’s own learned authority of the Church.123 
 After the imposition of the order to cease writing, Böhme complied with this 
order for the next four and a half years.  Then, in response to the repeated encouragement 
of his supporters, he once again began to write.  From this point until Böhme’s death in 
1624, a flood of material ensued.124  At first, Böhme’s new works were copied and 
circulated somewhat secretly.  Yet as his notoriety grew beyond Lusatia and Silesia, 
Böhme became bolder.  He would encourage the reading of his works and their 
broadening reach.  He would defend his works in written responses against polemic 
attack.125  In addition, he agreed to the printing of two of his essays together as the 
earliest compilation of what we know now—in an expanded version—as The Way to 
Christ.126  He even came to accept Philosophus Teutonicus as a nom de plume given him 
by his supporters.127 
 It is clear that in 1624, with the publishing of the short The Way to Christ, Böhme 
had staged himself to reach a broad readership.  As part of a thrust for a “new 
reformation,” Böhme then turned his attention to Leipzig and Dresden.  He sent several 
copies of different manuscripts, including his newly printed work, to Balthasar Walter in 
order to make them available at the Leipzig book fair.  He also courted an invitation to 
 
 123 Ibid., 94-95. 
 
 124 Ibid., 2. 
 
 125 Ibid., 161-163, 184. 
 
 126 Ibid., 205-206. 
 
 127 Ibid., 129. 
 
60 
                                                
the Dresden court of Electoral Saxony as part of this effort.  Böhme’s new reformation 
was meant to issue in a world of tolerance and free thinking; a world where the escalating 
charges of blasphemy had ceased; a world where people no longer fought wars over a 
difference in doctrinal position;128 a world where even “Jews, Turks, and heathens” were 
welcome and respected as congregants of the inner church.129  This would be the 
beginning of an age of the Holy Spirit.130  Or, so was the hope.131 
 That Jacob Böhme might indeed extend his sphere of influence was evidently 
altogether too much for Pastor Richter to accept.  He intensified his criticism of Böhme 
both in writings and from the pulpit characterizing Böhme as a drunk, an Oedipus, and an 
Antichrist.  Finally, Richter enlisted the help of a Pastor Frisius in Silesia.  Frisius wrote 
to the Görlitz city council claiming that Böhme’s works were exerting a disruptive 
influence in Silesia.  The Görlitz city council was forced to act.  Böhme was once again 
called before the council.  Yet tellingly, knowing that Böhme’s attempt to be received by 
the court in Dresden had proven successful, the council suggested that Böhme simply 
leave town for the time being.  In effect, the council acted by not really acting.132 
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 As before, it could be said that the city council was acting in the interest of the 
status quo.  Böhme had many powerful friends among the nobility and certainly on the 
council itself.  Apparently, no one’s interests, except Richter’s, would be served by 
punishing Böhme—especially for blasphemy.  Further, whereas the council surely would 
have resented Richter for drawing Silesia into this issue—and thereby forcing the 
council’s hand—they couldn’t very well take Richter to task either.  Undoubtedly, 
Richter had his own supporters on the council and in the community.  After all, he was a 
member of the mayor’s Convivium.  Yet certainly the council was aware that as a 
Philippist, Richter himself would ultimately be vulnerable should this controversy with 
Böhme spread more significantly beyond the city and its regional environs.133 
 Therefore, by asking Böhme simply to leave town for the time being, the council 
was making an informed gamble that without Böhme’s presence in town, Richter would 
quiet down.  Or, that while in Dresden, Böhme might somehow incriminate himself, thus 
ending the matter.  In any event, certainly it would be better not to censure Böhme 
officially in the wake of his personal invitation to the Elector’s court.  The Thirty Years’ 
War was underway, and there had been a formal alliance made between Protestant Prince 
Johann Georg of Electoral Saxony and the Emperor Ferdinand whereby Lusatia was 
brought into Electoral Saxony’s sphere of influence.134  Therefore, to censure Böhme 
might be to provoke the Elector’s wrath with potentially tragic consequences for Görlitz.  
For Böhme though, his interpretation of the council’s judgment was as a personal victory.  
So, leaving his wife and children in Görlitz, Böhme journeyed to Dresden, stopping along 
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the way to meet with certain influential supporters from whom he no doubt received 
advice concerning the court in Dresden.135 
 It is to be recalled that the autodidact Böhme was of peasant origin.  While he had 
rather scandalously changed careers in Görlitz from cobbler to merchant—perhaps 
elevating his status in that way—one still must understand that for a man of such humble 
origins and means to be invited to the Dresden court was quite remarkable.  Böhme’s 
invitation was probably realized, then, only through the influence of his friends among 
the nobility.  Without such an explanation, it is hard to comprehend how it otherwise 
could have happened or what followed once he was there.  Böhme was graciously 
received at court, and the court alchemist attended to his needs.  Though he did not meet 
with the Elector himself, Böhme did meet with virtually everyone at the court with 
political or ecclesiastical power and position.  It appears that wherever Böhme went he 
was favorably received and assured of support.136 
 In questioning how such magnanimity towards Böhme could have been possible, 
several orientations present themselves for speculation.  For instance, having only 
recently acquired Lusatia as a territory within its political sphere of authority, the court in 
Dresden may have wooed Böhme as a means to ensuring and furthering amiable relations 
with his friends among the Lusatian nobility.  It surely would have helped that Böhme 
advocated tolerance and nonviolence among all parties.  For another, Böhme had always 
maintained a conservative Lutheran position vis-à-vis the Eucharist, which was a hot 
button issue of the time, and he had been critical of any Crypto-Calvinist compromise 
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with the doctrine of Real Presence.  This certainly would have reassured the ecclesial 
authorities of the court who were concerned by a rising Calvinist influence, particularly 
in Lusatia’s neighbor Silesia.  An influential Böhme could help safeguard this critical 
point of orthodox Lutheran doctrine.  Moreover, in light of this single important issue, 
perhaps Böhme could even be forgiven for some of his more problematic points of 
interpretation.  Finally, one should not ignore or underestimate the possibility that 
Böhme’s esoteric reading of Christianity itself was well received in this center of 
orthodox Lutheran authority.  This then would be to say that the western esoteric tradition 
had indeed, by this time and/or in other locales than just Görlitz, set deeper roots than is 
commonly acknowledged.137 
 Böhme was away in Dresden for approximately two months, during which time 
Pastor Richter died.  Böhme returned to Görlitz in July, but by August he had fallen 
seriously ill himself from exhaustion.  Nevertheless, in early autumn he traveled to 
Silesia to meet with supporters.  There, he again became deathly ill and was conveyed 
back to Görlitz.  Then in November 1624, Böhme died.  As he lay dying, the Lutheran 
ecclesiastical authorities who remained in Görlitz after Pastor Richter’s death put 
questions to Böhme in order to determine and ensure his doctrinal conformity before 
offering him the sacrament of Communion upon his deathbed.  Even after his death, they 
resisted performing his funeral rite until the city council tellingly ordered them to do so.  
Böhme, in the end, was buried in the Görlitz churchyard—a final triumph over Richter 
and Richter’s charges against him.138 
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Jacob Böhme’s Synergy 
 In the early seventeenth century, near the outer edge of the Reformation’s reach, 
Görlitz proved an ideal environment for Jacob Böhme as an autodidact to blossom 
intellectually.  In his ongoing struggle to bring his illumination to expression, he drew 
upon the diverse sources—many of them esoteric—available to him in Görlitz.  This also 
included engaging pressing religious questions of his day.  Seen in this light, it would not 
be accurate to presume that Böhme set out specifically to regather and carry forward the 
western esoteric tradition.  He was no Agrippa.  Yet regather and carry forward the 
tradition he did.139 
 The late sixteenth through the early seventeenth century was indeed a period of 
violently competing views.  Many sensitive issues were at stake, and people lost their 
lives over these issues.  It has been suggested that after Martin Luther nailed his Ninety-
Five Theses to the castle church door in Wittenberg, many in Germany became hopeful 
that what later became the Reformation would herald an age of greater ecclesiastic, 
social, and intellectual freedom.  Yet, as divergent views proliferated, Luther himself 
(and to a great degree his church) became increasingly more adamant (and one could say 
violent) in the enforcement of what was to be understood as doctrinal correctness.  
Nevertheless, the genie, so to speak, was out of the bottle. 
 One such sensitive issue, at that time, concerned the very structure of the cosmos.  
This is a familiar story.  Individuals such as Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543 C.E.), 
Galileo Galilei (1564-1642 C.E.), Tycho Brahe (1546-1601 C.E.), and Johann Kepler 
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(1571-1630 C.E.) were progressively gathering empirical evidence, supported by 
mathematical calculation, that revolutionized European understanding of the physical 
cosmos.  Our understanding was shifting from an earth-centered to a sun-centered cosmic 
conception.  It needs to be remembered though that in the early seventeenth century the 
sun-centered viewpoint was far from universal acceptance.  The epistemological 
hegemony of modern science was not yet attained.  Competing orientations of 
epistemological certainty—or uncertainty—were still very much in play and usually 
brought to articulation in the context of a doctrinal or spiritual Christian discourse. 
 Luther’s position on this matter, popular in many ecclesial circles, was that given 
the decrepitude of fallen human nature, only the scriptural Word of the Bible guaranteed 
certainty.  Luther therefore denounced the notion of a sun-centered cosmos.140  For 
Luther and others, it was not a question of accurate empirical evidence.  If empirical 
evidence, subject to human uncertainty, countered scripture (or their interpretation of it), 
the evidence was simply wrong.  The one and only source of true certainty just could not 
be countered.  If countered in any way, according to this position, then we were cut adrift 
above a satanic abyss. 
 Before developing this review further, I believe it is important to emphasize the 
resonance of the foregoing position in contemporary discourse.  While many may believe 
that this epistemological position was overcome in or by modernity, or that it belongs to a 
way of thinking no longer available to us, we should not be so quick to judge it as so.  
The recent proliferation of Christian evangelical fundamentalism alone should cause one 
pause.  It demonstrates that we may not be so far removed from this position, and as the 
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certainties of modernity have fallen before question, many people have come under 
fundamentalism’s sway.  Surely, the same can also be said for other epistemological 
positions of this earlier period—including those of western esotericism.  The point is that 
my rather simplistic review here is not intended to speak only of the past, but also to 
direct attention to trends of thinking that still live within us.  This is simply to say that we 
are in our history, not beyond it. 
 Returning to the review, the epistemological position of most esotericism differed 
considerably from Luther and those who held a like position.  As has been stated, many 
esotericists of this period, including Jacob Böhme, while still holding the Bible in highest 
esteem, believed that the Word of God could also be read or heard in nature and the self.  
They, along with like-minded humanists and mystics, could Biblically justify this 
position through emphasizing a reading of the Book of Genesis through the 
Prolegomenon of John’s Gospel—a well-known trend in German mystical interpretation 
going back at least as far as Meister Eckhart.141  According to this construal, God’s 
Word—the Son of God, the Logos—speaks the cosmos into play—or existence—and so 
resonates in or as creation even while “transcending” it.  This same Word, the Son of 
God, is further identified as God’s image and likeness (Gen. 1:26 NRSV) in human 
being, which is human life as light (John 1:1-5 NRSV)—the knowing/understanding 
feelingful living of our embodied being.  The “true” source of our certainty then is 
disclosed as the shining/resonating Son/inner Word that speaks throughout creation.  The 
Biblical Fall complicates, but does not change this source of certainty.  Surely, to invest 
the Fall with such power to change would be to invest the Fall with power over God. 
 
 141 Weeks, German Mysticism, 73-74; and Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition, 24-25, 107n. 
79. 
67 
                                                
 Bearing in mind that the non-centered and diverse phenomenon that is the western 
esoteric tradition never has claimed a unifying doctrine or creed, the epistemological 
position articulated above was appealing in seventeenth century Germany and beyond for 
numerous reasons.  As example, for Christian esotericists, it Biblically validated their 
investigations into Hermetic correspondences and alchemical transformation.  It further 
provided grounds for theosophical illumination.  In addition, it justified their high esteem 
for non-Christian sources since the divine within anyone’s self and nature provided the 
ground for all human knowledge and striving for truth, be it mundane or profound.  
Finally, it offered means whereby esotericists could, on the one hand, ally themselves 
with humanists in defense against attacks coming from a rigidly doctrinal orthodoxy or, 
on the other hand, shift alliances to stand together with the orthodox against attacks from 
an overly rational humanism. 
 The latter shift of alliance became a necessity as humanists and esotericists began 
progressively to hear Logos in different “tonalities.”  To be sure, a significant number of 
early humanists were esotericists as well, and as has been suggested, were responsible in 
part for the creation and popularization of the esoteric tradition, as we know it.  Yet 
increasingly, humanism’s discourse “proper” was influenced by Greek philosophy, and 
its interests became that of nascent science.  Logos, as inner Word, came to mean 
“reason” as expression of cause—Leibnitz’s rendering reason.142  Thereby, we ultimately 
became “modern.” 
 Böhme and other esotericists of his day heard Logos differently.  One way of 
expressing this difference is to say that for them, Logos remained closer to the spirit of 
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creation as opposed to the logic of cause.  That is, the esoteric position remained closer to 
Magia.  This position, it also should be acknowledged, developed in close proximity to 
those profoundly influential discourses concerning imagination—with their attending 
practices—expounded by such esoteric luminaries as Ramón Lull (1235-1316 C.E.), 
Marcilio Ficino, Paracelsus, and Giordano Bruno (1548-1600 C.E.). 
 Cause and creation, in this context, are better not confounded.  The logic of cause, 
it may be said, pursues a sequence of events, and driven by its own necessity, leads to a 
first cause in this sequence.  In contradistinction to the necessity of sequence, the spirit of 
creation or Magia, as Böhme and others understood it, concerned an ongoing “process” 
of manifestation or appearance.143  We would say it dealt with phenomenality.  More will 
be said of this in the next chapter. 
 The epistemological position of the western esoteric tradition and those of like 
mind (as articulated above), allowed a critical and timely development to occur within the 
tradition through the work of Jacob Böhme.  As stated, in the years that Böhme worked 
on The Aurora, struggling to give voice to his illumination, he engaged numerous 
contemporary issues to help with this task.  These included the violently contended issue 
of real versus symbolic presence in the Eucharist—which drew in its wake the question 
of the ubiquity of God.  Certainly, to his political advantage, Böhme maintained a 
conservative Lutheran stance on these issues even as he rearticulated them in line with his 
theosophical illumination.144  Böhme also took into consideration the claims of those who 
supported the sun-centered cosmos.  Contrary to Luther and his followers, Böhme 
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accepted the new cosmology.145  However, it must be understood that for Böhme, his 
acceptance of the contested cosmology was not simply a matter of acquiescence in the 
face of irrefutable empirical evidence. 
 Böhme did believe that the divine and truth could be read in the world, and that 
any “literal” understanding of scripture needed to be relinquished in the light of what the 
world revealed.  But what the world revealed was never that which was strictly 
“empirical.”  What truth the world, scripture, or the self might reveal was due to the 
illumination of the ubiquitous Word alone.  Human certainty was rooted in the 
transformative illumination of this shining Word at the center of our being.  In turn, the 
Hermetic rule, “that which is above is as that which is below,” continues as “that which is 
below is as that which is above.”146  Thereby, the shining light of the Son within the 
center of our being below, could find its correspondence in the created heavens’ above as 
the Sun-center of the cosmos.  Thus the world might be read.147 
 What Böhme came to articulate, first in The Aurora and then more profoundly in 
his later writings, was a transformed esoteric vision.  What Böhme offered in his 
transformed vision was not only a Son/sun-centered cosmos with no fixed above or 
below, but also a world whose ongoing creation or appearance is rooted in dynamic co-
arising invisible forces—Quellgeist or Source Spirits,148 in contradistinction to pure 
forms—which find expression through nature as well as human experience.  Böhme thus 
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kept the developing esoteric tradition in step with developing science.  Thereby, it may be 
said that Böhme accomplished for esotericism what science (in its own way) would 
accomplish for humanism.  Böhme transformed esoteric discourse in such a way that it 
could continue to speak through “modern” discourse.  Böhme’s acquired nom de plume, 
Philosophus Teutonicus, was indeed merited. 
 Therefore, Böhme’s cosmos was not a mechanical system of fixed spheres.  It was 
dynamic and driven by ubiquitous occult forces.  And so, one could say, was his God.  In 
fact, his cosmos and his God are not readily divided.  This is due in part to another issue 
with which Böhme wrestled:  creatio ex nihilo.149  For Böhme and others, God’s creating 
out of nothing was problematic.  The notion was that God, in order to maintain “His” 
status as first and one (or three) alone, could not co-exist with some type of eternal 
“matter” that then was formed during creation.  If such were the case, then a dualist rather 
than a monist theological position would needs be articulated.  Therefore, God must 
create formless matter out of nothing, which then is the non-eternal stuff out of which 
creation is formed.  Yet for the cobbler Böhme, formed stuff does not reconcile itself 
easily with living freedom.  Rather, it reconciles itself more readily with a view 
advocating predeterminism or predestination.  Therefore, being averse to these notions, 
Böhme came to articulate a position of creatio ex deo.150 
 According to Böhme, God (or Godhead) “before” creation is Nothing (Nichts)—
not a being, not Being, not even an absence of such.  Godhead, as such, “is” 
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incomprehensible.151  This was a stance familiar to German mysticism, going back to 
Eckhart,152 and was also well articulated in Jewish Kabbalah.153  For Böhme, this eternal 
Nothing “is” eternally desiring Something, which generates the will of beginningless 
creation.154  More will be said of this in the next chapter.  Let it be said for the time being 
that the Trinity, the Word, the Source Spirits, Being, beings, and their “substantiality” all 
proceed from this source.  Every being is of God, and “is” dynamic living God stuff—a 
“free” appearing as the Something of Godhead’s desire and will.  Each particularity also 
reflects, participates in, and “is” the whole.  Yet as manifest beings, dwelling in and as 
the free-play of the Something of God, beings can be differentiated from—which is not to 
say divided from—God.  Nothing can be outside of God; and so nothing can be divided 
from God.155 
 As part of this introductory review, this leads to a final issue with which Böhme 
struggled.  That is the question of evil.156  Böhme understood that if the above was 
“true,” evil must be rooted in God.  Yet it could not be so rooted as to be a necessary 
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appearance.  For as a necessary appearance, evil would be predestined, and Böhme would 
not abide such a position.157  Evil could appear then only as a possibility integral to the 
“will” of manifestation itself.  For Böhme, as for Jewish Kabbalists—although Böhme 
often couched this in alchemical terms—God’s “wrath” or “fierceness” was understood 
as an integral “aspect” of coming to manifestation or appearance.158  Böhme came to 
understand the first appearance of evil as Lucifer’s freely attempted regressive possession 
of God’s wrath-fire.  This attempt constituted his Fall, and the consequences ensued.159  
Again, the above will be made clearer in the next chapter. 
 Through his struggle to bring his own illumination to expression, Jacob Böhme 
ultimately wrestled with the question of how God brought God to expression through the 
phenomenality of creation.160  He worked with that diversity of resources available to 
him, including Kabbalah, alchemy, Hermeticism, mysticism, humanism, nascent science, 
and those contentious issues of Protestant Christianity that plagued the society of his day.  
Thus, Böhme regathered the western esoteric tradition—impressing upon it his own 
unifying voice and force of vision.  In this struggle, Böhme also rearticulated his 
illumination repeatedly emphasizing now one facet or medium of interpretive discourse, 
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and now another.  While for many readers of his work, this plurality of voices generates 
little more than confusion.  For others, it has been a perpetual source of profound 
inspiration.  It is in this light of Böhme’s capacity to inspire that I will now attempt to 
communicate how Böhme’s regathered esotericism was then carried forward. 
 
Jacob Böhme’s Legacy 
 When Böhme died in 1624, both his renown and his influence had already begun 
to spread beyond the regions of Lusatia and Silesia, despite his original gag order.  After 
his death, his international popularity grew rapidly.  It is telling that within only a decade 
or two of his death, the work of translating and/or publishing Böhme’s complete works 
had begun in both the Netherlands and England.161 
 During the latter part of the seventeenth century, Böhme’s works appealed to a 
wide variety of people.  Not only did the likes of Isaac Newton read Böhme,162 but also 
perhaps more significantly, Böhme became a lasting influence in German Pietism.163  
The roots of Pietism, it is interesting to note, reflected numerous issues with which 
Böhme himself had struggled.  In the aftermath of the Thirty Years’ War, many 
Lutherans came to experience a deep dissatisfaction with the rigid orthodoxy of the 
church.  They, as Böhme before them, began to see the church and its doctrinaire priests 
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as responsible for much of the violence they had recently experienced.  Further, Pietism 
emerged in this context as a call for the “completion” of the Reformation.164 
 It is to be borne in mind that Pietism itself, like the western esoteric tradition, was 
never a centralized or cohesive movement per se.  Nevertheless, certain generalizations 
can be acknowledged concerning those tendencies that help to characterize it.  As a 
movement to “complete” the Reformation, Pietists looked to return to one of Luther’s 
originary principles.  That is that each believer could be priest and king unto God.  
Pietists then, professed a tolerant reliance on individual conscience in matters religious in 
reaction to the violence of their recent history with its church and state imposed doctrinal 
correctness.  This affirmation of the individual within Pietism also entailed a shift in 
focus from forensic justification to the sanctification of the believer.  This latter tack 
drew in its wake the familiar devotional characterization of Pietism with its emphasis on 
personal conversion, rebirth, and a feelingful relationship with Christ.165 
 As with humanism before, Pietism was not foreign to the esoteric tradition.  
Accented by the elevation of living religious relationships, Pietism has been portrayed as 
promoting a point of view cast as “Better a live heresy than a dead orthodoxy.”166  
Pietism then, proved to be a fertile and relatively safe context within which western 
esotericism could abide.  Further, this compatibility between Pietism and western 
esotericism was most surely facilitated by the work of Jacob Böhme.  As recalled from 
the previous section, Böhme’s “regathering” of western esotericism brought the issues 
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and language of the Lutheran Reformation into his esoteric discourse—making 
esotericism certainly both more popularly accessible as well as palatable.  In addition, 
Böhme’s The Way to Christ, as a compilation of essays on prayer, spiritual 
transformation, and new birth, spoke directly to and perhaps even prompted formulation 
of Pietist views on devotion.167 
 It is through Pietism specifically—though not exclusively—that Böhme and the 
western esoteric tradition spread popularly in Germany and beyond.  Thereby, 
esotericism’s overarching themes and characteristic understanding of cosmos, human 
nature, and God integrated themselves into what was developing as modern western 
culture.  This is not to claim that Pietism in toto spoke the language of western 
esotericism.  Yet in what may be called the radical wing of Pietism, Böhme and 
esotericism flourished through the eighteenth century.168 
 The end of the eighteenth century through the first half of the nineteenth century 
witnesses the depth and degree of Böhme’s influence and how it was further carried 
forward, for it was during this time that Böhme was thoroughly integrated into German 
philosophical discourse.  This story begins with the fathers of German Romanticism 
Friedrich von Hardenberg, or Novalis (1772-1801 C.E.) and Ludwig Teick (1773-1853 
C.E.).  Historically, it appears Teick was first to encounter Böhme’s work.  He then 
introduced Novalis to the theosophical shoemaker.169  Profoundly inspired by what they 
had read, Novalis and Tieck began to develop the notion of poet as prophetic “genius,” 
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envisioning Böhme as their prototype.  Thereby, as is widely recognized, they 
bequeathed to us, via Böhme’s inspiration, the source of our contemporary notions of 
genius.170  What is critical in this development is that it secularized and popularized the 
esoteric ideal of the Magus.  The “genius,” much like the Magus, transcends religious, 
cultural, economic, academic, and temporal limitations.  Further, as with the Magus, the 
genius’ achievement, in whatever arena, could be said to be self-legitimizing. 
 Not long after Novalis and Tieck had made their pivotal discovery of Böhme, 
three young Swabians, who had been roommates during their tenure as students in 
Tubingen, would then engage their separate professional careers in such a way as to fix 
Böhme inextricably into the history of German philosophy and culture.  They were 
Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843 C.E.), F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854 C.E.), and G.W.F. 
Hegel (1770-1831 C.E.).  As Swabians, these three had grown up in that region of 
Germany that has been recognized as a center of the radical Pietism which thoroughly 
embraced Böhme and the esoteric tradition.  This was that region that claimed the likes of 
the eighteenth century theologian Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702-1782 C.E.) who 
was a Böhmist of considerable renown and is known to have been a profound source of 
influence upon the two philosophers Schelling and Hegel and the poet Hölderlin.171 
 The philosophical project of Hegel and Schelling—although poetically something 
parallel would hold true of the poet Hölderlin as well—can be characterized as a Swabian 
Böhmist reaction to the conservative rational Pietism of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804 
C.E.).  One may recall that Kant had desired to limit reason in order to make way for 
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faith.172  In contradistinction to this, these Swabian Böhmists adhered to an ideal of 
divine wisdom (Sophia) that outstripped Kantian dualist limitations, further rendering the 
unconscious conscious or the pre-ontological ontological.  This is also to say that, for 
them, the Kantian “thing-in-itself,” then, is disclosed Speculatively (dialectically) to 
Reason in and as the Unconditioned Absolute that we ourselves also are.173  In addition, 
for these Swabian Böhmists, the magic Speculum or mirror of this disclosure is none 
other than the recollective imagination, thus thoroughly revealing their own provenance 
within the western esoteric tradition of Ramón Lull, Paracelsus, Giordano Bruno, Böhme, 
and Oetinger.174  Thus, Böhme and his regathered western esoteric tradition were 
inextricably fixed into modern discourse and culture as a subversive voice within that 
discourse and culture, inasmuch as Kant became one of the dominant figures of 
modernism. 
 While it is true that Hegel, Schelling, and others rarely, if ever, referenced Böhme 
in their published works, the fact of Böhme’s direct influence was known and 
acknowledged by everyone—as revealed in personal correspondences of the time.  For 
instance, when Schopenhauer wrote that Schelling was stealing ideas from Böhme, it was 
countered by J. B. Rätze that Schopenhauer’s philosophy of Will was itself stolen from 
Böhme.175  Be that as it may, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel does 
 
 172 Ibid., 120. 
 
 173 Ibid., 151-154. 
 
 174 Ibid., 120-123. 
 
 175 Weeks, Boehme:  Intellectual Biography, 129; idem, German Mysticism, 184.  It is important to 
note here Böhme’s link to psychoanalysis itself, which manifests specifically through Schopenhauer.  See 
Michel Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, trans. Douglas Brick (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1993), Chapters 5 and 6.  It is further suggested by Weeks that Böhme “seems to anticipate 
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identify Böhme as an important modern philosopher stating further that Böhme’s is the 
first characteristically German voice in philosophy.176  However, Hegel does go on to 
criticize Böhme for his “barbaric” use of sensually-laden language—Hegel seeing his 
own abstract and conceptual discourse as more appropriate to the task of truth.177  
Whether Hegel is correct in this opinion concerning appropriate discourse, is to be 
questioned seriously.  And indeed, he was questioned at the time (although without 
reference to Böhme or Böhme’s preferred style of discourse) by Hegel’s great Danish 
critic Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855 C.E.).  And while it is to be acknowledged that 
Kierkegaard certainly had his own reasons for criticizing Hegel’s philosophy, it 
nonetheless is curious to note, that Kierkegaard’s one-time friend Hans Martensen (1808-
1884 C.E.), who became a bishop of the Lutheran church in Denmark, was himself a 
staunch supporter of Böhme, having written a sympathetic introduction to and theological 
affirmation of the theosophist’s life and work.178 
 The image that emerges from this brief historical sketch—and indeed a similar 
type of depiction focusing on the likes of William Blake, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and 
William Law could have been generated from English history, or we could have 
discussed the French and Freemasonry—is one in which Jacob Böhme’s regathered 
esotericism is woven intimately into early modern culture and discourse in such a way 
 
psychoanalysis.”  See Weeks, Boehme:  Intellectual Biography, 181.  See also Gordon E. Pruett, “Will and 
Freedom:  Psychoanalytic Themes in the Work of Jacob Boehme,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 
6, no. 3 (1976-1977): 241-251. 
 
 176 Georg W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E.S. Haldane and 
Frances H. Simson, vol. 3 (New York: Humanities, 1955), 188. 
 
 177 Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition, 49-50, 133, 144. 
 
 178 See Hans L. Martensen, Jacob Boehme:  Studies in His Life and Teachings, trans. T. Rhys 
Evans, rev. ed. (New York: Harper, 1949). 
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that it resonates subversively through modern theology and philosophy or poetically in a 
different (perhaps even prophetic) “tonality” from the mainstream modern 
“metaphysical” discourse.  The fact that, from the end of the nineteenth throughout much 
of the twentieth century, intellectual concerns became progressively dominated by 
science and scientism and human concerns by the horrors of world wars and holocaust 
does not eradicate Böhme or his influence from our culture or our history—although it 
has relegated him to our “forgetting.” 
 Insofar as we are still shaped by Pietism, we are still shaped by Böhme.  And 
insofar as German Idealism and Romanticism have woven themselves through our 
collective psyches and discourse, we are still shaped by Böhme.  Further, with the advent 
in the twentieth century of phenomenology and then post-metaphysical hermeneutics 
open to the return of religion, it could be said that Böhme has now found that appropriate 
home wherefrom he may speak to us meaningfully again. 
 As Antoine Faivre has characterized it, theosophy is a hermeneutic or historically 
meaningful interpretive discourse.179  The issues of theosophical hermeneutics directly 
concern issues of phenomenality, or the meaningful appearance of beings among beings 
to beings as beings—the classic arena of phenomenology.180  Additionally, inasmuch as 
 
 179 Faivre, Theosophy, 7 and 137. 
 
 180 In his work, Incarnation:  Une philosophie de la chair (Incarnation:  A philosophy of the 
flesh), Michel Henry states:  “When, at the dawn of modern thought, of which it determines the essential 
themes, the cobbler Jacob Böhme formulated the immense question, theological in appearance1:  Why has 
God created the world?—the extraordinary response advanced belongs to phenomenology:  God has 
created the world in order to manifest himself.  The phenomenological structure of such a manifestation is 
clearly indicated” (Michel Henry, Incarnation:  Une philosophie de la chair [Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 
2000], 65-66).  [Henry’s note 1:  A theological question, but one it is easy to give a purely philosophical 
formulation:  “Why is there such a thing as a world?”]  Though his short interpretation of Böhme, which 
follows, is over-simplified, somewhat confused, and so in my opinion, mischaracterizing of Böhme’s work, 
he does here, nonetheless, clearly situate Böhme in the phenomenological tradition.  [I thank Dr. Frank 
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phenomenology and hermeneutics continue to challenge and subvert the dominant 
“metaphysically” laden discourses of our day, they themselves are continuing the work of 
Jacob Böhme and the western esoteric tradition—which have always challenged and 
subverted the dominant discourse, of whatever day, in the ongoing struggle for 
legitimization. 
 As stated in the previous chapter, this notion of Böhme’s abiding influence (and 
thereby of the western esoteric tradition), in spite of our “forgetting,” is one that deeply 
concerns contemporary scholar Cyril O’Regan.  As example, among other arenas, 
O’Regan reads Böhme’s influence in late modern theology.  That is, O’Regan witnesses 
to the continuation and propagation of the “heretical” Böhmist “gnostic return” in the 
works of the theologians Paul Tillich (1886-1965 C.E.), Jürgen Moltmann (1926 C.E.- ), 
and Thomas J.J. Altizer (1927 C.E.- ).181  Wherever one might fall out in relation to these 
specific theologians, the fact of O’Regan’s specific identification of a Böhmist influence 
in their work demonstrates the very point I am attempting to make, vis-à-vis the 
continuation of a Böhmist and thereby an esoteric legacy in contemporary discourse.  It is 
indeed identifiable. 
 As O’Regan’s work illustrates further, we are still locked in the struggle for 
legitimization.  Beyond the contention between the scientific “metaphysical” and 
hermeneutic post-metaphysical discourses, there is the developing struggle in post-
metaphysical discourse between the likes of O’Regan (who continues to characterize 
 
Seeburger for bringing this work to my attention, and then providing me with his translation of the relevant 
section.] 
 
 181 O’Regan, Gnostic Return, 5. 
 
81 
                                                
Böhme and western esotericism as heretical and dangerous, or just naïvely wrong-
headed)182 and those who would take these traditions seriously for their long-neglected 
potential to transform beneficially our discourse, our culture, and perhaps even our 
worlds.  What this means for western esotericists today is not that we must necessarily 
become champions for the work of Hegel or Schelling, for example.  Rather, it does 
entail preserving works of our tradition in such a way that they “work as works,” and 
therefore are meaningful today and for the future.  This may also involve developing new 
synergies within the tradition as part of the work of the tradition.  In any event, although 
it is unlikely that western esotericism will ever be overtly unified or mainstream, its work 
as a subversive force in our ongoing discourses is still a work unfinished.183 
 To conclude this chapter, for those interested in more in-depth historical 
treatments of Jacob Böhme and the western esoteric tradition, I enthusiastically refer 
them to the works cited of Andrew Weeks and Glenn Magee as invaluable starting 
points.184  The research and opinions of these scholars are woven throughout this chapter.  
These sources and the authors’ influence were integral to its writing.  Further, for those 
interested in western esotericism as a field of contemporary academic study, I refer them 
to the works of Antoine Faivre.185 
  
 
 182 See generally his introductions, O’Regan, Gnostic Apocalypse; and idem, Gnostic Return. 
 
 183 Certainly, the irony of the situation should not be lost, that were the esoteric tradition to 
become mainstream, it would not then be esoteric at all. 
 
 184 See Weeks, Boehme:  Intellectual Biography; idem, German Mysticism; and Magee, Hegel and 
the Hermetic Tradition. 
 
 185 See especially Antoine Faivre, Access to Western Esotericism (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1996); and idem, Theosophy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
BÖHMIST THEOSOPHY AND IMAGINATION 
 
Martin Heidegger: 
J: In what sense? 
I: Hermeneutically—that is to say, with respect to bringing tidings, with 
respect to preserving a message. 
J: Man stands “in relation” then says the same as:  Man is really as man 
when needed and used by . . .  
I: . . . what calls on man to preserve the two-fold . . .  
J: . . . which, as far as I can see, cannot be explained in terms of presence, 
nor in terms of present beings, nor in terms of the relation of the two. 
I: Because it is only the two-fold itself which unfolds the clarity, that is, 
the clearing in which present beings as such, and presence, can be 
discerned by man . . . 
J: . . . by man who by nature stands in relation to, that is, is being used by, 
the two-fold. 
I: This is also why we may no longer say:  relation to the two-fold, 
for the two-fold is not an object of mental representation, but is the 
sway of usage. 
J: Which we never experience directly, however, as long as we think of the 
two-fold only as the difference which becomes apparent in a comparison 
that tries to contrast present beings and their presence.186 
 
Jacob Böhme: 
1. Magic is the mother of eternity, of the being of all beings; for it creates 
itself, and is understood in desire. 
2. It is in itself nothing but a will, and this will is the great mystery of all 
wonders and secrets, but brings itself by the imagination of the desireful 
 
 186 Excerpt from a dialogue between a Japanese friend “J” and an Inquirer “I.”  See Heidegger, 
“Dialogue on Language,” 32-33. 
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hunger into being. 
3. It is the original state of Nature.  Its desire makes an imagination 
(Einbildung), and imagination or figuration is only the will of desire. 
But desire makes in the will such a being as the will in itself is. 
4. True Magic is not a being, but the desiring spirit of the being.  It is a 
matrix without substance, but manifests itself in the substantial being. 
5. Magic is spirit, and being is its body; and yet the two are but one, as body 
and soul is but one person. 
6. Magic is the greatest secrecy, for it is above Nature, and makes Nature 
after the form of its will.  It is the mystery of the Ternary, viz. it is in 
desire the will striving towards the heart of God. 
7. It is the formative power in the eternal wisdom, as a desire in the Ternary, 
in which the eternal wonder of the Ternary desires to manifest itself in 
co-operation with Nature.  It is the desire which introduces itself into the 
dark Nature, and through Nature into fire, and through fire, through death 
or fierceness, into the light of Majesty. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
20. It is impossible to express its depth, for it is from eternity a ground and 
support of all things.  It is a master of philosophy, and likewise a mother 
thereof.187 
 Böhmist theosophy can be portrayed as a hermeneutic that persistently folds back 
in on itself even as it unfolds its meaning.  This fact has been a source of great frustration 
for many of the shoemaker’s readers.  It makes him hard to grasp.  Further, his discourse 
often defies rational conventions—most notably that of the excluded middle.188  It should 
also be recalled that even his great admirer Hegel was inclined to characterize Böhme’s 
theosophical hermeneutic as “barbaric.”189  Yet Böhme’s confounding of reasonable 
discourse can be understood as less a matter of barbaric naïveté, than it is a matter of 
 
 187 Jacob Boehme, “Six Mystical Points,” in Six Theosophic Points and Other Writings, trans. John 
Rolleston Earle, with an introduction by Nicholas Berdyaev (New York: Knopf, 1920; reprint, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1958), 131-132 and 134. 
 
 188 Faivre, Theosophy, xxi-xxii. 
 
 189 Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition, 144. 
 
84 
                                                
frustrating a reason that in Böhme’s judgment leads human beings astray, so that the 
message of his originary theosophical disclosure might find a more fitting or appropriate 
voice. 
 It will be recalled from the previous chapter that humanists and esotericists 
progressively began to hear Logos in different tonalities.190  These were the tonalities of 
cause and creation.  For humanists, Logos was developing into that logic of cause which 
characterizes modern metaphysics with its reliance on a reason that must render a cause.  
But for many esotericists, and certainly for Böhme, Logos was speaking rather through 
the “relations” or “sway” of the phenomenality of an ongoing creation.  This is not the 
creation of an “in the beginning” happening once upon a time in the past as a first cause.  
It is however, the creation of perpetual “beginning” that shows forth its own occurring 
even as it shows forth beings given to their being in and as the showing-forth.191 
 In the call to hear and preserve this other tonality in western discourse, one must 
be mindful to enter into the work of its own disclosure.  In the present context, I may be 
aided in this task in at least two ways.  First, whereas in the previous chapter the balance 
of its focus was on demonstrating how it was that Böhme historically regathered and 
carried forward the esoteric traditions in western discourse and culture, in this chapter 
and those that follow, the balance shifts to an approach to Böhme which understands him 
as origin, or better wellspring, of the theosophical disclosure that gripped him.  This is to 
say that we may heed the disclosure originarily in Böhme’s work, as his mode of writing 
was such that Böhme himself heeded the disclosure welling up through him as he wrote 
 
 190 For a review of the “other tonality,” see pages 66-70 above. 
 
 191 Weeks, German Mysticism, 177-184; Faivre, Theosophy, xxi-xxv.  See also Boehme, “First 
Point” in “Six Theosophic Points,” 5-37. 
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“in the Holy Spirit.”192  Certainly, Böhme may be subject to “a hermeneutic of 
suspicion,”193 but that is not the task at hand.  Again, my task is hermeneutic 
preservation194 and retrieval, and approaching Böhme as wellspring facilitates this 
enterprise. 
 Second, my task is aided by drawing Martin Heidegger into the discourse—
allowing him to converse with Böhme, in a manner of speaking, through this 
preservation.  Chapter One has already suggested that Heidegger’s discourse will assist in 
avoiding the habituated tendency to speak automatically in a modern metaphysical voice, 
even when hearing in a different tonality.  This includes remaining mindful of the 
ontological difference.  Further, as the quotation that opened this chapter from 
Heidegger’s “Dialogue on Language” indicates, the unfolding discourse will also need to 
resist a reflection on difference generated on the basis of a simple comparison between 
Being [“presence”] and beings.  I must rather speak of the twofold—a position not 
necessarily antagonistic (and one could even say sympathetic) to Böhme’s discourse with 
its disregard of the law of the excluded middle.  Following Heidegger’s lead, I must 
continue to work towards a new way of speaking in the “other tonality.” 
 Chapter Two further suggested early on that it is highly likely that Heidegger 
himself may not have been exempt (despite his silence on the issue) from being affected 
by the western esoteric tradition as it had developed in Germany through Böhme’s 
influence.  Again, I am not claiming that Heidegger was a closet Böhmist.  However, 
 
 192 Boehme, Aurora, 9.90-91 (pg. 206); idem, Three Principles, 24.1-3 (pg. 658-659); Erb, 
Introduction, Way to Christ, 8; Berdyaev, “Unground and Freedom,” vii. 
 
 193 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 32-36. 
 
 194 For a review of the methodology of preservation, see pages 16-25 above. 
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unavoidable resonances with Böhme can be found in Heidegger.  This is certainly 
understandable, specifically considering Heidegger’s Swabian origins, and his admiration 
of Hölderlin, as well as other German Böhmists.  Acknowledging this state of affairs is 
critical to considering how it is that Heidegger may help develop my thesis on the 
imagination and its relation to religious practice, or even how we are to understand 
imagination in Böhmist discourse.  The discourses of Böhme and Heidegger, in my 
opinion, are not incommensurable. 
 As the quotation from Böhme’s “Six Mystical Points” which helped to initiate this 
chapter demonstrates, imagination is central to Böhme’s understanding of phenomenality.  
It should also be clear from the passage that when Böhme uses the related term Magic or 
Magia, he is speaking of an issue quite other than what one might think upon first 
encountering the term.  It follows then that in order to approach appropriately the 
meaning of these and other Böhmist notions, we must of necessity enter the labyrinth of 
Böhme’s theosophy. 
 Jacob Böhme continuously cautions—as I must also now—that one must not hear 
his discourse too linearly or literally.  Although his presentation of phenomenality 
proceeds as if there were a first stage, a second, and so forth, for Böhme such is not the 
case.  All “stages” occur perennially and simultaneously and are ultimately non-
differentiated—each abiding within the other.  This is readily witnessed in any of his 
many discussions of the polysemic Source Spirits [Quellgeister].  Böhme further cautions 
in The Incarnation of Jesus Christ that whereas “the Spirit of God is often subject to the 
spirits of men, if they exercise good-willing,” and “everyone receives according to his 
endowment,” “not even anyone” (emphasis mine) should expect to understand Böhme 
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exactly in his sense.195  And I submit, nor should one want to.  This is not to say that we 
should abandon any attempt to come to an understanding or that one has been given carte 
blanche in one’s attempt to approach Böhme.  No.  Rather, we would do well to approach 
Böhme’s discourse as itself a work of “weak” narrative or myth.196 
 One must not then, in an attempt to be “true” to Böhme, reify his discourse.  This 
is also to say that the reader must not hear my presentation of Böhme with the habituated 
ears of modern academic conceptual reification with its discourse of rational critique.197  
Rather, the reader should hear Böhme even as a forerunner of Gianni Vattimo’s call for a 
self-aware “weakened” narrative that was already writing outside the confines of a 
discourse of reified categories or fixed concepts with its “strong” narrative.198  Hence, 
Böhme’s calls for tolerance in a historical period fraught with the excessive extremes of 
religious violence rooted in the adherence to “strong” doctrinal positions.  Of course, 
Böhme had very strong beliefs concerning many issues such as the ubiquitous presence 
of God, the real presence of the Eucharist, and the errors of his detractors.  Yet his 
theosophical disclosure can be seen as already speaking as a “weakening myth.”  In any 
event, that is my claim, and I further encourage hearing in this light even Böhme’s good 
faith claim to be writing “in the Holy Spirit.”199 
 
 
 195 Boehme, Incarnation, 2.7.5. 
 
 196 Ibid., 2.7.12-13; Vattimo, Belief, 38-43, 91-93. 
 
 197 I have in mind here Michel Henry’s critique of Böhme found in Henry’s Incarnation:  Une 
philosophie de la chair. 
 
 198 Vattimo, Belief, 43-46. 
 
 199 Boehme, Incarnation, 2.7.4; idem, Aurora, 2.15-21 (pg. 53-56). 
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Böhme’s Theosophical Hermeneutic 
 Theosophical discourse, according to Gershom Scholem, “seeks to reveal the 
mysteries of the hidden life of God and the relationships between the divine life on the 
one hand and the life of man and creation on the other.”200  While this is a workable 
orienting definition, in Jacob Böhme’s case one may say more specifically that his 
discourse concerning the phenomenality of creation and human transformation unfolds in 
such a way as to disclose the participation of divine life in human life/creation and vice 
versa.  This is to say that Scholem’s two hands become significantly blurred in Böhme’s 
narrative such that, as participants in divine life, human lives and creation have intimate 
and immediate “access” to the hidden workings of the divine.  We are these workings, 
even as we are given over to ourselves.  As indicated in Chapter Two, this understanding 
can be seen as a consistent extension of Böhme’s Lutheran belief in divine ubiquity—that 
God is all in all. 
 My preservation of Böhme’s theosophical hermeneutic, drawn primarily albeit not 
exclusively from The Incarnation of Jesus Christ begins with his disclosure of divine 
“Ungrund”—the ungrounded Nothingness of God.201  This “ungrounded deep” is the 
hidden source of Böhmist phenomenality and speaks somewhat of the “essential” Liberty 
                                                 
 200 Scholem, Kabbalah, 4. 
 
 201 The synopsis that follows is gleaned from numerous sources, both primary and secondary, most 
of which—including the relevant passages—have already been cited.  To avoid a confusing chaos of 
repetition, I will be keeping my citations in my synopsis to a minimum.  I follow a multitude of Böhme 
scholars by choosing such a protocol.  For an exemplary alternate and independent academic synopsis, 
please see Faivre, Theosophy, 138-143.  I also strongly encourage the reader to refer to Böhme’s 
Incarnation, Part II, Chapters 1-4 in their entirety.  [An on-line version of The Incarnation of Jesus Christ 
can be found at http://www.heiligeteksten.nl/THE%20INCARNATION%20OF%20CHRIST-
%20BOHME.htm.  (Accessed 18 October 2009)] 
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of Divine and human life.202  This most curious term Ungrund—unground, or perhaps 
better, nongroundedness [Ungrundlichkeit]—already places one ahead of the unfolding 
discourse beyond or outside of the arena of modern metaphysical theology.  In Böhmist 
discourses, one cannot speak or think Divine Ungrund as a Supreme being among other 
beings or as the first “cause” in a broadening web of concatenating causes.  Nor can one 
say or think Ungrund in terms of some sort of nihilistic void divorced or divided, in any 
absolute sense, from the phenomenality of beings and their causal interdependence.  
Böhmist discourse must already, ahead of itself, abide in the nothingness of a twofold 
that says the “sway” of phenomenality.  It must speak of Magia as its ownmost 
theosophical disclosure. 
 Although of Ungrund nothing, properly speaking, may be said, Böhme does 
nonetheless, in his hermeneutic, speak of stirrings.  Ungrund primordially stirs as 
desireful longing for Something as source or wellspring of phenomenality.  For Jacob 
Böhme, Desire perennially stirs as “contraction” of Ungrund.  The desireful hunger of 
Nothing for Something draws “into” Nothing as a seeking of Something, which seeking 
“is” also a Will to Something as a finding.  Will, as spirit, gathered in the contracting 
anguish of Desire “finds itself” in its seeking as a Will to being in and as 
phenomenality—as a Will to being Something and finding that Something in its seeking 
as a being.  Will here is not a being, nor can it be said that it “is” Being.  Rather, one 
perhaps may say that it engenders Being as Ungrund’s desireful longing for Grund 
[Ground] of Something. 
 
 202 Boehme, Incarnation, 1.5.2.-1.5.4. 
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 Still following Böhme’s hermeneutic, Ungrund’s willing, as desireful seeking of 
Ungrund and as “wakened” Will of Desire’s anguished contraction, engenders through its 
“finding” Sophia as mirroring awareness of Ungrund’s wakefulness to Being.  Hereby, I 
am hopeful that one may begin to hear Böhme’s characterizations of Sophia as mirror 
[speculum], wisdom, virgin, and not a being “herself.”203  Sophia “is” Nothing and yet of 
Ungrund’s wakefulness as “Other” of will’s seeking, through whom we may 
appropriately begin to speak of Something.  She does not create, yet Sophia shows and 
ultimately gives beings to their own being as Ungrund’s phenomenality.  Hence 
appropriately, she also may be called Being.  Magia, however, creates.  As the sway of 
phenomenality, in one way of speaking, Magia concerns Will and Sophia.  In another 
way, it concerns Being and beings.  And in yet another way, it concerns Spirit and 
Nature.  One could also say Magia concerns Grund or Logos. 
 Thereby, the saying would be that the sway of the twofold—Magia as the sway of 
phenomenality—ultimately says the twofold of Ungrund and Grund.  This translates, in 
the silence of a more appropriate way of saying, into the opening and gathering of beings 
as the spontaneous play of manifestation through Sophia.  Though, to assert this is 
perhaps to run ahead of myself.  Yet having run ahead, let us hear as preparation:  Magia, 
in the saying (Logos) of the twofold, speaks already in Heidegger’s philosophical 
discourse of opening and gathering. 
 Coming back to my narrative preservation of Böhme’s hermeneutic, it now may 
be said that Magia/Sophia gives Grund.  Further, as Böhme’s initiating quotation to this 
chapter discloses, Magia gives ground as “nature,” and this it does as Desire’s 
 
 203 Erb, Introduction, Way to Christ, 9-10. 
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Imagination.  Whereas Sophia as Being and first “Other” gives beings to their own being, 
Magia, by imagination, gives them a natural ground.  Whereby, beings come to stand as 
the Something of Ungrund’s desire and as “something” vis-à-vis one another.  One can 
understand then, that this “by imagination” says something of ultimate importance to 
human being and beings in general.  It should also be understood that imagination in 
Böhmist theosophical discourse means something very different from what we have 
come to expect in other discourses.  Imagination for Böhme is primordial and 
ontological.  Imagination in this sense, although rooted with Desire, is never mere fancy 
or fantasy.  I will return to this later. 
 We have arrived at that point in the narrative where beings first come to stand as 
beings.  However, Böhme’s recirculating hermeneutic is far from concluded.  What has 
been disclosed thus far reveals only a foundational first pass through the complexities of 
Böhme’s theosophical discourse.  It also needs to be noted now that the world of beings 
thus arrived at is not that or those of our earthly lives.  Rather, it is a prelapsarian world 
of angels.  We must follow Böhme into another narrative pass through the hidden 
workings of phenomenality.  In this pass, I will introduce Böhme’s “Principles” of Fire 
and Light. 
 We enter again the labyrinth.  In coming to ground, ungrounded will imaginates 
in desire into Sophia’s mirroring awareness whereby her “lustre” enters the will, so 
bestowing a heart to the will as “Other” will.  This Heart is the Son of the Father and 
Word of God.  The originary will of Ungrund thus impregnates itself with the “Other” 
will overshadowed by imagination.204  This imagination—not yet being—is a darkness.  
 
 204 Boehme, Incarnation, 2.3.3-2.3.5. 
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Yet this “is” a darkness replete with the wonders of “powers, colors, and virtues” striving 
to being as disclosed through Wisdom’s lustre.205  Through the Heart, the impregnated 
will in its ongoing imaginating into Sophia “is” thereby also a sounding forth or speaking 
of the Word whereby beings come to their being in the Holy Spirit as the showing forth 
of the manifold wonders to manifestation in the sway of the twofold.  That is, as Fire and 
Light as into the freedom of the Air. 
 Following Böhme, we can now proceed a step deeper into the mysterium.  We 
have thus far been given to see how Böhme approaches an understanding of the Trinity—
whereby, according to Böhme, one may properly say God.  Father “is” the will of 
Ungrund.  Son “is” the Heart of the Father and Word of creating.  Holy Spirit “is” 
disclosed in the outflowing free-play of beings in manifestation.  Nevertheless, each is 
also understood as Person—not a being—in the Wisdom awareness of Sophia, even in 
Desire, Love, and Delight, respectively.  Further, through Magia—as the giving of Grund 
as Nature—they can be understood in Fire, Light, and Air—that is as Flame. 
 We must now enter into the workings of the Word.  The Word as “Other” will 
overshadowed in the lustrous darkness in imagination, discloses from His darkness the 
seven Mothers or Source Spirits in the striving to and attainment of phenomenality.  
These seven—resonating for Böhme with the seven days of creation and the Seven 
Spirits before the throne of God—following one redaction are:  1) the Sour, 2) the Bitter, 
3) Anguish, 4) the Fire-flash, 5) Love, 6) Sound, and 7) Rest.  By the Sour, one is given 
to understand the by now familiar contraction of desire, only now in the “Other” will of 
the Word.  Which Spirit engenders—as each Spirit engenders the others in imagination—
 
 205 Ibid., 2.3.8-2.3.9. 
93 
                                                
the Bitter as a stinging drawing of the will further into itself as the only finding of its 
seeking, which in the contraction of desire becomes, as it were, a painful oppression and 
differentiation.  Through this oppression, Anguish arises as a turning separating within 
the darkness of the “Other” will.  This is the anguishful wheel of Essences, which 
essences are to be understood ultimately as the coming to nature and senses.206  Yet, in 
the Spirit of Anguish—desiring to manifesting and longing for the freedom of the 
Ungrund—we are also first to understand the wheel as a dying in the “Other” will.  
Through which dying—that is also a coming to life—is revealed the Fire-flash.  Thusly 
arise the Principles of Fire and Light as life from death into the giving of beings to their 
being through the imaginating of the separating essences, via the Fire-flash, out of the 
Word and into the mirror of Sophia. 
 Two Principles, Fire and Light, thus arise through the Fire-flash.  Böhme gives us 
to comprehend by a Principle a source that springs from Nothing whereby true lives, with 
understanding and senses, can come to being.207  We are given further to recognize that 
these two co-eternally belong together even as the Trinity abides in their belonging 
together.  In addition, whereas both Principles arise in the “dying” of the Word in 
Ungrund, the Fire properly belongs to the Father and the Light to the Son.  Father’s 
Fierce Fire releasing the Son’s Light, and Light’s gentleness feeding and so soothing the 
fierceness of the Fire, thereby also quenching the Anguish.  Hence arises the fifth Spirit, 
Love.  Sound, the sixth, is whereby innumerable beings are gathered in their being in the 
Clearing of the Light through the saying of the dying/living Word as into the Air. 
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 Understand, in the Fire Principle, the Anguish, so quenched by the Gentle Light, 
can now be seen as a giving of the wonders—powers, colors, and virtues disclosed by the 
lustre of Sophia in the darkness of imagination—back to Sophia, and thereby to their 
ownmost living being, as the wheel of “essences” perennially fixes them through Magia 
as imaginating centers in themselves of Grund or nature in the sway of the twofold.  
Who, through the dying of the Word in Ungrund, lovingly sound in the Grund of Light as 
innumerable differentiated and unique free-living beings, given to their own Being as 
Ungrund’s manifest Desire of desiring to phenomenality.  Here, in the Light, the Holy 
Spirit moves, as Air, with and in beings.  Thus Rest, the seventh Spirit, is attained.  
Again, this is to be understood as the prelapsarian world of Angels. 
 We have not yet reached the end of complexities in Böhme’s theosophical 
narrative, for we have yet to arrive at that point whereby we can pose the question:  And 
what of human beings?  To ask this question we must first consider the Fall of Angels 
and the arising of a Third Principle.  Angelic beings, given to their being, stand free in the 
clearing of the Light through the sway of the twofold heard in Grund and Ungrund.  It is 
only as a free being that one can come to understand Lucifer’s Fall in Böhmist theosophy.  
Moreover, to understand freedom, one must hearken to Ungrund in the sway of the 
twofold.  Earlier in this chapter, it was stated that Ungrund concerned somewhat of 
Divine and human liberty.  We must hear this again.  According to Böhmist theosophy, 
nongroundedness abides in the sway.  Phenomenality then is understood here not only in 
coming to ground, but also equally in its primordial groundlessness.  Ungrund, it may be 
said, gives the clearing of the sway wherein beings stand, move, think, and determine 
their own course even as they abide upon the ground.  It also may be said that Ungrund 
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gives liberty even as it gives beings desire, will, and imagination in “nature” as a coming 
to senses and particularity.  It bears reminding here that this discourse of liberty was 
critical to Böhme in order to counter the deterministic theological doctrines extant in his 
day—a situation not too distant from facing the challenges presented by the material and 
cultural determinisms of our own.  This is to say, there still remains something of 
importance in considering such discourse.208  It also bears reminding that for Böhme the 
discourse of Liberty concerned the question of evil. 
 At this juncture in Böhme’s hermeneutic, there is no Evil.  Neither is there any 
law beyond abiding in the freedom of the Light.  We come to the Fall.209  According to 
Böhme, however it may have occurred, Lucifer came up with the notion that he with his 
angels would rather abide in and thereby possess the Fire Principle, and so hold sway 
“before” the Light.  Lucifer and his angels thereby entered into the Fire by imaginating 
into it.  Yet, as previously disclosed, the Fire is appropriate to the Father.  They could not 
abide in nor possess it.  What their act accomplished was rather a reawakening of the 
fierceness of the Fire, now as Wrath.  Whereby, they discovered themselves in a 
darkness.  This constituted the emergence of a new Principle.  One may rightly say then 
that Evil, as the awakening of Wrath, was the result of a regression.  Further, that the 
Principle so quickened is the one wherein we abide. 
 
 208 One can witness the relevance of such discourse by viewing Slavoj Žižeck’s 2007 seminar at 
the European Graduate School, “Materialism and Theology.”  In this seminar, Žižeck gestures to 
groundlessness, Badiouean multiplicities, and unfinished materiality as ontologically fundamental to 
freedom.  Or, see the EGS video of Jacques Derrida’s 2004 Paris seminar, “A Critique of Psychoanalysis,” 
in which—through a discussion of a text of Gilles Deleuze—he also links groundlessness to freedom.  See 
both at European Graduate School EGS; from (egsvideo); [website]; available from http://www.youtube 
.com/egsvideo or http://www.egs.edu/; Internet; accessed 14 October 2009. 
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 Böhme understood the creation story of Genesis as that concerning this “Third 
Principle.”  The sun and stars here generated were to bring light to the darkness and so 
redeem it.  Now we may ask the question:  And what of human beings?  For Böhme, 
human beings are a singular creation in the Third Principle.  Created in the “image and 
likeness” of God, we contain and participate in all three Principles.  We were also given 
ultimately to bear the Heart of God and to abide in union with Sophia.  Thus, humans 
were to be and so manifest the fullness of God. 
 In Böhme’s hermeneutic, Adam, in the Biblical Paradise of the Third Principle, 
was originally androgynous210—a familiar theosophical interpretation of the Genesis 
account of Adam’s creation.  “He” was man and woman.  His soul was fire and his spirit 
light.  His being was constituted in one supreme element alone so that he had dominion 
over the traditionally recognized elements of fire, air, water, and earth, as well as the sun, 
the planets, and the stars.  Adam’s being was such that he could see truly into all beings 
as well as freely show forth the divine wonders disclosed in Sophia.  He also had the 
power to generate magically another being of himself.  The only law of Paradise was 
simply not to mix the Principles. 
 Adam, destined to be the fullness of God in the Third Principle, was understood 
by Böhme as a free being of desire, will, and imagination.  Bearing the Fire of the First 
Principle within himself and abiding in the Third Principle, he was nonetheless to keep 
his desire—via imagination—in the Light of the Second Principle.  Thus, the Principles 
would remain “unmixed.”  However, all the Principles desired Adam’s imagination—that 
he might imaginate into them—that their desire might carry over into him and so have 
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strength and ascendency in his will.  Böhme’s Fall of Adam then consisted in Adam’s 
bringing his desire—via imagination—out of the Second Principle and into the Third 
Principle.  He imaginated himself into the desiring of the external “world” showing forth 
in and as the Third Principle.211 
 Many consequences followed this mixing.  For one, the Tree of Good and Evil 
manifested as a product of Adam’s own imagination.  For another, he became heavy with 
external desire and so fell to sleep.  He fell from his primordial wakefulness.  Thereby, 
Sophia “withdrew” from him and he separated into a man and a woman.  Ultimately, as 
the story then unfolds in the more familiar vein, Adam, Eve, and their progeny—meaning 
us—became subject to the stars, planets, and the elements in the darkness of the Third 
Principle.  We became as we (in the west) imagine ourselves to be—even following the 
modernist narrative.  Hence, according to Böhme, while we have not fallen in the manner 
of Lucifer’s angels, we have fallen in our own all too human way. 
 Human beings—and our destiny—require then restoration.  And while this is a 
common Christian motif, in Böhme’s hermeneutic one may hear it in a more radically 
transformative sense.  For Böhme, fallen humanity is lost in the darkness and desire of 
the Third Principle.  We have become subject to—through our imagination—the external 
“world” and its elements.  While we do possess the understanding of our reason, our 
reason cannot rise beyond the sway of the stars.  Reason even helps to keep us subject to 
them in our fallen condition.  According to Böhme, we cannot restore ourselves.  Nor can 
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our reason alone help to restore us.  Rather, our restoration is dependent upon the “Other 
power” of God.212 
 The incarnation of Jesus Christ is then our restoration in operation.  In Böhmist 
theosophy, the Word, as the Heart of God, is fixated into human being by the incarnation 
of Jesus as the Second Adam.  Thereby, it is made universally accessible to all humans—
past, present, and future—who follow the way He has opened to the Light in death, 
resurrection, and ultimately ascension.  One must hear this aright, that the way is opened 
to anyone—even among “Jews, Turks, and heathens”—who re-imaginates into the 
Second Principle through a death and resurrection, even while continuing to abide in the 
Third Principle.  That is, through the New Birth.213  We are approaching here the 
“strange” nature of death alluded to in the previous chapter.  We are also approaching the 
critical issue of the centrality of practice and its relation to imagination.  But we have first 
to finish this introduction to Böhmist theosophy, and then proceed to a hermeneutic of an 
ontologically understood imagination. 
 It must be noted that the “way” of our restoration—the way of Christ—according 
to Böhme, itself follows somewhat the way of phenomenality even as it gives to human 
beings again our originary state while bestowing fulfillment of our destiny to bear the 
Heart of God, and so manifest God’s fullness in union with Sophia even in the Third 
Principle.  To understand this one must return to the heart of phenomenality in the 
Divine.  It was previously disclosed that for the showing forth of living beings in 
 
 212 I am alluding here to the “Other Power” position of Hajime Tanabe, which is to be contrasted 
to the “Self Power” position of Kitaro Nishida, in the Kyoto School Other Power/Self Power philosophical 
debate.  See Tanabe, Philosophy as Metanoetics. 
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manifestation a dying occurs primordially in the Divine.  Recall that out of Ungrund’s 
anguishful seeking to manifestation, the Word is a dying to Ungrund’s darkness whereby 
arise the Principles of Fire and Light and the sounding of the Word as the showing forth 
of phenomenality.  The gentleness of the Light then soothes the anguish and quenches the 
Fire’s fierceness.  Fallen humanity, lost in the anguishful darkness of the Third Principle 
must similarly die in this darkness to be born anew in the Light of Divine phenomenality.  
Jesus Christ—the Second Adam and forerunner of our bearing of the Heart of God—
opens the way to this restoration by being the dying/living Word, who “unmixes” the 
Principles and whose Gentle Light quenches the Father’s awakened Wrath, at least as it 
relates to human beings. 
 Yet according to Böhme, human beings must also be free-willing participants in 
this way of our restoration.  Further, such participation is not accomplished through 
doctrinal confession or affiliation with any established “church of stone.”  Nor is it 
accomplished by our reason.  Rather, we must freely follow the way of Christ—even if 
ignorant of Him—and so re-imaginate into the Light.  That is, we must die to the desiring 
of the Third Principle which has claimed us through our Fall.  We must die to our 
subjection to the elements and stars.  We must die to the arrogance of an unillumined 
reason.  One thereby dies to the world of our fallen condition in order to be reborn and 
reawakened in the originary world of our restoration.  Again, this does not demand any 
specific confession of faith.  But it does entail a radical transformation rooted in Grace 
and one’s own faithful striving (or working) towards the Liberty of Ungrund disclosed in 
the Light of Love.  This according to Böhme is a transformation accomplished on our 
part via imagination. 
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 One becomes thereby the equivalent of Christ—which is the fullness of God.  One 
is then even one’s own God.214  As Böhme makes clear however, this transformation 
initiated by one’s New Birth also occurs as a development in time.  One must mature 
through practice into this Divine Sonship or Daughtership while still living in the Third 
Principle.  One must grow strong here, through practice, in wisdom and in love.  Further, 
one must develop, again through practice, one’s own particular gifts.  Thus we are also 
given to recognize that each Son or Daughter of God is unique—each speaking or acting 
according to each one’s particular gifts and understanding, as well as in accordance with 
each one’s own specific temporal context and degree of development.  This is also to say 
that one discovers a vast and far-reaching variety in Böhme’s rendition of the “inner 
church.”  His is indeed a radical, transformative diversity. 
 We are far from having exhausted what can be said as introduction to Böhme’s 
theosophy.  This is specifically the case considering the existence of Böhme’s more 
alchemically inspired discourses not discussed here—the language of which can seem 
even stranger to our ears.  Yet at this point, I do have enough of that introductory 
narrative in place to begin the development of my thesis.  This development begins with 
imagination and the unfolding of the “conversation” between Böhme and Heidegger in 
greater earnest. 
 
Heidegger and Imagination 
 The ontological priority that Böhme gives to imagination in his theosophy has 
itself been a recurring source of inspiration in the ongoing development of western 
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discourses.  To confirm this claim, one needs simply to consider, as examples, the likes 
and influence of Samuel Taylor Coleridge and his Biographia Literaria or Schelling and 
his Transcendental Idealism.  One may even say that it has called—and still calls—many 
in our cultural heritage who hear in the “other tonality.”  However, it must also be 
acknowledged that as inspiring as Böhme may be on this point, he is at the same time 
quite disappointing when it comes to actually clarifying how it is that we are to 
understand this imagination.  This is the importance of turning to Heidegger for direction 
in developing such clarification in our post-metaphysical discourse. 
 As has already been stressed, there is in my view, little to no incommensurability 
between the discourses of Jacob Böhme and Martin Heidegger.  Heidegger’s 
phenomenological hermeneutic—and his “thinking”—developed in a cultural and 
philosophical context deeply stamped by the influence of Böhmist theosophy.  I repeat, 
evidence for which claim was provided in the previous chapter.  Therefore, in turning to 
Heidegger for clarification concerning imagination, as initiated through his work Kant 
and the Problem of Metaphysics, I believe that I remain in the stream of the “other 
tonality.” 
 There is not just a little irony in my preliminary reliance on this work of 
Heidegger’s.  It is, after all, one of his more “metaphysical” works.  Yet this should not 
throw one off the track.  The metaphysics at stake in this relatively early work, and how 
metaphysics comes to be characterized in Heidegger’s later works, are not necessarily 
equivalent.  As example, the metaphysics that is the concern of the work The Principle of 
Reason is that of historically “destined” modernity.  This meaning, as previously 
disclosed, resonates in my repeated use of the term “post-metaphysical” and its variants.  
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This meaning can be contrasted with how metaphysics is to be heard in Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics, wherein metaphysics (and Kant) is understood within the 
context of a specific retrieval.  In Heidegger’s “Kant book,” the metaphysics at issue 
concerns the originary philosophical questioning of “beings as such and as a whole.”  
That is, it ultimately regards the question of Being—Heidegger’s guiding problematic.215 
 As acknowledged in my first chapter, Heidegger interprets Kant’s First Critique 
as an attempted “laying the ground for metaphysics.”216  In his Kant book, Heidegger 
credits Kant for his (Kant’s) originary approach to the foundation laying through his 
placing the finitude of the questioning being—human being—at the center of his 
Critique.217  That is, according to Heidegger, Kant begins to articulate a “fundamental 
ontology.”  In Heidegger’s words, “Fundamental Ontology means that ontological 
analytic of the finite essence of human beings which is to prepare the foundation for the 
metaphysics which ‘belongs to human nature.’  Fundamental Ontology is the metaphysics 
of human Dasein which is required for metaphysics to be made possible.”218 
 According to Heidegger, the way to approach an understanding of what is at stake 
in Kant’s First Critique is to acknowledge that metaphysics as “the fundamental 
knowledge of beings as such and as a whole,” itself announces the problem of the 
knowledge of Being by the finite being who questions beings.219  That is to say, that in 
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questioning a being that somehow is before me, I already must understand that this being 
is.  I must have an understanding of Being even before encountering any being as such in 
experience.  The task then is to approach such a priori understanding of Being through 
that human being which already knows Being and questions beings in finitude.  The issue 
ultimately becomes what the relation is between Being and finitude.  Further, what is it to 
be finite in the way that human Dasein is?220 
 It can be said that Kant’s approach to the ground laying begins with the 
acknowledgment that we always already comport ourselves towards beings.  Yet one 
must then ask how such comportment is possible.  Particularly, how is it possible in such 
a way that one may have [ontic] knowledge of those beings that one comports oneself 
towards?  Which is also to ask, how are beings made manifest to me, as an inner 
possibility, in such a way that I might “reasonably” comport myself towards them?  
These guiding questions orient Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in his Kant book.221  
They also help provide the ontological key to understanding Kant’s primary question:  
How are a priori synthetic judgments possible as the disclosure of the “essence” of Pure 
Reason?  As Heidegger states it, “Laying the ground for metaphysics as a whole means 
 
 220 It is to be noted that there is some controversy concerning Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929).  Kant’s Critique, as 
Heidegger himself makes clear, is generally understood to be a theory of knowledge for the making 
possible of science (as Kant’s response to Hume’s terror-evoking questioning of the validity of causality), 
rather than a laying of the ground for metaphysics as a fundamental ontology.  The more generally accepted 
or common understanding of Kant is certainly rooted in Kant’s own characterization of Pure Reason as 
“that which supplies the principles to know something entirely a priori,” and more primordially, in his 
guiding question, “How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?”  However, it must be recalled that what 
Heidegger is attempting in his Kant book is to retrieve the question of Being as the originary problem of 
metaphysics through his preservation of Kant’s First Critique—hence, Heidegger’s objection to the 
“customary” understanding of Kant, which in Heidegger’s view “directly hinders a genuine retrieval.”  (See 
Heidegger’s Kant book, pgs. 9-12 and 143.)  However, one might also question here to what degree is 
Heidegger continuing the Swabian assault on Kant’s limitation of “Reason” begun by Hegel and Schelling. 
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unveiling the inner possibility of ontology.”222  The laying of the ground concerns what 
“is brought forward a priori in ontological knowledge prior to all ontic experience, 
although it is precisely for this [ontic experience].”  This “knowledge which unveils the 
being itself, Kant calls ‘synthetic.’”223 
 It is to be acknowledged at this point that such investigation into synthetic a priori 
judgments does not entail only what “is ‘brought forth’ (synthesis) from the being itself 
with which the judgment is concerned.”  Rather, it also concerns a determination of 
Being as “a preliminary self-relating to the being.”  Which “pure ‘relation-to . . .’ 
(synthesis) forms first and foremost the that-upon-which [das Worauf] and the horizon 
within which the being in itself becomes experienceable.”  Following Kant, such 
investigation is called “transcendental.”224  That which concerns Heidegger in his Kant 
book, and me in this dissertation, is the possibility of such transcendence as a pure a 
priori synthesis of the preliminary understanding of Being which discloses beings. 
 Having established what according to Heidegger is at stake in Kant’s First 
Critique, I may now begin to disclose how it is that the “transcendental” imagination 
claims priority in Heidegger’s interpretation of this work.  To accomplish this it must first 
be understood that for Kant, finite human knowledge is first and foremost a knowing “in 
the service of intuition.”  Kant states:  “In whatever manner and by whatever means a 
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knowing [eine Erkenntnis] may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it relates 
itself immediately to them, and upon which all thought as a means is directed.”225 
 That the finite intuiting/thinking human being is “biased” for Kant towards 
intuition in a preliminary way—that intuition claims priority in knowledge—speaks 
directly to the notion put forward previously that humans are always already predisposed 
to comport themselves towards beings which in their turn offer of themselves to intuition 
as a taking-in-stride of what is there.  Thinking, as that which is secondary, occurs in 
service to such intuition, and therefore must also have an “inherent relationship” to it.226  
Further, this inherent relationship is specific to our finitude.  It arises only in relation to it.  
Infinite intuition does not require thinking, which being conceptual imposes limits.  In 
addition, infinite intuition, as understood in this context, cannot even be dependent upon 
an already existing being.  Rather, it is the creating of beings themselves that gives these 
beings to their Being.227  Hence, we must come to question the finitude of our own 
intuition, specifically through its relation to thinking and the inner possibility of 
“transcendence.” 
 Heidegger states the case thus: 
    If the essence of a priori synthetic knowledge is to be brought to light, then a 
clarification is first required of the standing of its necessary elements.  As 
knowing, the transcendental synthesis must be an intuition and, as a priori 
knowing, it must be a pure intuition.  As pure knowing which belongs to human 
 
 225 Ibid., 15, quoting Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reiner Vernunft:  Nach der Ersten und Zweite 
Auflage (Critique of Pure Reason:  First and Second Edition), ed. Raymund Schmidt (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner, 1926).  See B 306.  The First Edition (A) and the Second Edition (B) are juxtaposed to one another 
in Schmidt’s edition.  This work is cited here and henceforth according to A and/or B.  These same page 
references are retained in Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. 
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finitude, pure intuition must necessarily be determined through a pure 
thinking.228 
 
That the Kantian transcendental analytic presents human knowledge as comprised of the 
“necessary elements” of intuition and conceptual thinking—as that determining which 
applies to many—is commonly acknowledged.  Yet here in Heidegger’s interpretation of 
the First Edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, imagination as disclosed by Kant, 
and as the additional necessary element, comes fully into play. 
 The clarification of the elements begins with intuition as a representing which 
“takes things in stride.”229  Empirically speaking, this characterization of intuition is 
easily grasped.  Intuition must be a taking of beings in stride as the receptive medium of 
immediate encounter of beings as phenomena—the showing appearance of themselves.  
Yet, when considering a pure intuition, what is it that is “encountered” in the taking-in-
stride?  It cannot be a being.  Also, it must be “something” given of itself as the inner 
possibility of encountering beings in the first place.  Pure intuition therefore must 
disclose the horizon of encounter, which is “creatively” given where no “thing” as yet is.  
Nevertheless, Kant provides an answer.  Space and time are pure intuitions as the 
interdependent horizons of outer and inner sense respectively wherein encounters 
occur.230  Kant further states, “Time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances 
whatsoever.”231  Hence, for Kant, time, as the horizon of inner sense, gains priority in his 
transcendental analytic.  It must be acknowledged that such prioritization should not be 
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surprising in the striving towards a fundamental ontology.  Bluntly stated, the horizon of 
inner sense, as the making possible of affectivity that allows the announcement of beings 
to the “subject” as well as states of being in the “subject,” is the sine qua non of Dasein.  
This is the horizon of representing as such.232 
 Thinking, on the other hand, as the conceptual representing of ones that apply to 
many, spontaneously determines what shows as a manifold in receptive intuition.  
Thinking, in the service of this showing is the very determination of beings through the 
unification of the one or ones that apply/applies to many.  Yet in the representing of such 
unities [concepts] which “can be embodied in various [things],” which “things” in turn 
belong together in the unity that gathers them, what does not apply must be discarded—
or “abstracted,” in the Kantian sense.233  Of course, such unification and abstraction is 
something that can be empirically learned.  And I contend it follows that through the 
discipline of this “learning,” the gathering together of such representational unities—
which carries with it the forgetting of abstractions—as the gathering together of beings 
that thereby belong together in their Being constitutes, or better helps to constitute, the 
worldhood of the world wherein one “finds” oneself.  Be that as it may, these 
representing unities that are empirical concepts must, according to Kant, hold in view in a 
preliminary way unification as such in order to be unifying.  Further, this holding in view 
is related to—or rather grounded in—that holding of the many in view before the one that 
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is consciousness itself as the apperceptive being or “subject.”234  This holding in view is 
called by Kant, rather significantly, “Reflection.”235 
 Pure thinking (notions) then, following Kant’s transcendental analytic, as the 
spontaneous a priori synthesis of the unifying which has as yet no object, and in its 
“essence” is unifying itself,236 can be understood originarily in the gathering of an “I” 
that comports itself towards beings which show themselves to that pure intuition which 
announces their appearance through the affectivity of a self sense which in turn gathers 
such beings a priori through unifying concepts [notions] into a “world” of ontic beings in 
view before the “I.”237  As elegant, or as convoluted, as such a position might be, it yet 
announces a problematic—which is how do these two “necessary elements” fit together?  
And then, through pursuing the foregoing question, do they perhaps have a common 
root? 
 The Kantian transcendental analytic, in presenting an answer to the question of 
how intuition and thinking fit together, proposes imagination as the solution to the 
problematic.238  Hereby, imagination becomes an additional “necessary element” in 
human knowing.  It is further to be understood that in bringing together [synthesizing] 
intuition and thinking, imagination must bear within itself the qualities of both.  That is, it 
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must be both spontaneous and receptive at the same time.  Now, this understanding—that 
imagination bears the qualities of both intuition and thinking—coupled with the insight 
that intuition and thinking must, of necessity, already belong together for any fit to be 
accomplished as human knowing in the encounter of beings,239 points towards 
imagination as the common root of both.240  Thus is opened the question of the 
transcendental power of imagination that concerns “the essential unity of pure 
knowledge.”241  This pure knowledge, according to Heidegger, is the “knowing” of Being 
as pure synthesis.242 
 According to Heidegger, Kant opens and develops this question of the essential 
synthetic unity of finite knowledge through his Transcendental Deduction.243  In the 
Deduction, Kant relates both pure thinking and pure intuition to the transcendental power 
of the imagination.  In relation to pure thinking, Kant discloses that Transcendental 
Apperception “‘presupposes’ a synthesis”244 as an originary unifying of the unity that is 
the “I.”245  Moreover, as “all synthesis is brought about from the power of imagination,” 
Transcendental Apperception is thus “related essentially to the pure power of 
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 243 Again, Heidegger’s interpretation is according to the First Edition of the First Critique. 
 
 244 Heidegger, Kant, 59; and 56, quoting A 118. 
 
 245 It must be understood that it does not follow that we are speaking of a reified or fixed “I” or 
“subject” here.  The unity of the “I” rather becomes hereby an ongoing finite construction. 
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imagination.”246  Concerning pure intuition, it is disclosed that whereas the pure intuition 
cannot give connection of itself, it is itself dependent on the pure power of imagination as 
that which offers all connections as the “‘affinity’ of appearances” within the manifold of 
intuition through the pure forming of relations.247  Further, in either instance, whether in 
terms of thinking as a modification of the mind or a given intuition wherein connections 
occur,248 the transcendental power of the imagination is here disclosed as essentially 
“relative to time.”249  It also needs to be reiterated that for Heidegger, what is being 
disclosed here is nothing less than the ontological “space for play necessary for a finite 
creature and in which ‘all relation of Being or Not-Being takes place.’”250  That is, the 
“inner possibility of ontological knowledge” now understood as held together by the pure 
power of imagination.251 
 The analytic deepens, according to Heidegger, when Kant discusses schematism 
as the bringing to sense of concepts.252  Empirically speaking, the issue of schematism is 
relatively straightforward.  Concepts, in order to determine intuitions, must be made 
sensible by being imaged.  Imagination gives concepts a “look” as a schema-image—
such as that of “house” or “dog” in general.  It offers the look according to the rule of 
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making sensible that is the schema of the concept.253  The schema-image then can be 
synthesized with intuition through the image of perception, itself given by imagination as 
the offering of the look of what is there. 
 Transcendental Schematism, on the other hand, is ontological.  It concerns the a 
priori possibility of encounter as such.  This is also to say, as Heidegger following Kant 
characterizes it, what is of concern here is the issue of forming the horizon of a pure 
letting-stand-against (possibility of objectification) as a free possibility of turning-toward 
(subject).  So being, when considering pure intuition as time, it can now be understood 
that the transcendental power of imagination “creates” the pure look of the horizon of 
encounter as temporality.254  Further, through the transcendental schematism, the pure 
concepts or notions—as a priori rules regulating a look, “thought in the pure ‘I think,’” 
which before any encounter determine the possible experienceabilty of beings—must be 
themselves formed in the image of temporality by the transcendental power of the 
imagination in order for the pure synthesis as ontological knowing to be.255  Indeed, one 
should begin hearing resonances with Being and Time here. 
 Kant thus established the structural centrality of transcendental imagination as 
pure synthesis.  This centrality, again, leads one to question the possibility of the 
transcendental imagination being the common root of both intuition and thinking.  
Indeed, Kant himself opens the possibility of this question.  Whereas, as has already been 
established, Kant had characterized time as a pure intuition, in his analytic of 
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transcendental Schematism, time now is to be understood as “the pure image” (emphasis 
mine).  Thus, it is not only the pure image of sensibility or pure intuition as the taking-in-
stride of the horizon as possibility of encounter.  It is also the pure schema-image of pure 
thinking or a priori concepts that regulate or gather the possible look of the 
experienceable as such.256  Kant now also understands further, pure concepts “thought in 
the pure ‘I think’” as themselves “grounded in pure schemata which procure an image for 
them.”257  They are thus for the image.  This is to say, intuition and thinking are both 
ultimately grounded in time as pure ontological image formation.  This is temporality as 
pure creative product of the transcendental imagination and as pure ontological synthesis 
that, it can be said, ultimately, opens “this or that particular, revealed, indeed ontic 
horizon”258 of encounter, and “at the same time” gathers beings by their particular look 
within it.259  The ground of metaphysics as fundamental ontology is thus laid.  This is the 
understanding of Being as the formation of transcendence. 
 It will be recalled from my first chapter that according to Heidegger, it was this 
very disclosure—the fruit of the Kantian transcendental analytic—that Kant retreated 
from as from an abyss.260  Hence, Kant significantly altered the Second Edition of his 
First Critique by obfuscating this centrality of the transcendental power of the 
imagination.  Although many competing interpretations addressing this fact are certainly 
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justified, I contend, following Heidegger’s lead, that Kant’s retreat can be seen as that 
away from the abyss of the Nothing of Being.261  Which Nothing (Sophia), it also may be 
said following Böhme’s lead here, “is” rooted more primordially in the “infinite” Desire 
and Magia of Ungrund—the “Pure” Person of the Divine. 
 Imagination then can be said to be primordially productive—“infinitely” of 
Divine Magia and “finitely” of Dasein.  Therefore to say, as many have, that these two—
the human and the Divine—are separated by an Abyss, in this context, speaks something 
very different from out of the “other tonality.”  The Abyss here is the Nothing of Being 
(Sophia).  It is “at the same time” the understanding of Being as the transcendental power 
of the imagination.  Again, one should be hearing resonances—this time with later 
Heidegger’s “sway of the twofold.” 
 Certainly, that imagination is creatively productive is commonly acknowledged.  
We readily recognize its influence in works of art, wit, “superstitions,” or flights of fancy.  
Psychoanalytic hermeneutics considered alone have made much of this self-evident fact.  
However, virtually all of such psychoanalytically oriented interpretations of imagination 
ultimately stress the unreality of its products.  Yet, as can be witnessed from what has 
preceded, Heidegger’s ontologically oriented interpretation of Kant’s First Edition of The 
Critique of Pure Reason radically challenges any judgment of imagination that views it 
as merely or always expressing that which is fundamentally unreal.  The understanding 
that imagination, among other things, is able to bring to image or “make present” that 
which is not or cannot be present-to-hand “empirically” is at least in part responsible for 
such common views of the imaginal that stress this unreality.  However, following 
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Heidegger’s interpretation, we can now understand that this fundamental power of 
“making present” also itself makes possible the “real” as encounter with beings. 
 I return to imagination as the root of both intuition and thinking—or, rather that 
root in which they both are rooted.262  As Heidegger himself develops the Kantian 
ground-laying further through his more originary interpretation, he is able to disclose that 
the transcendental power of imagination gives—or better, “is”—time itself as what is 
purely intuited.263  The transcendental power of imagination spontaneously shows forth 
or opens out of “itself” that horizon of receptive intuition that is not and cannot be 
present-to-hand in the manner of ontic beings.  Finitely, it does not create beings.  Yet it 
does create the ontological horizon of encounter with beings.264  Further, as horizon of 
inner sense and the pure image of the schemata of concepts, it also spontaneously forms 
the receptive “law” to which the concepts of the pure “I think” must submit.265  
Ultimately then, as disclosed by Heidegger, it can be understood that the transcendental 
power of imagination/time gives—or better, “is”—itself the pure “I” of self-affectivity 
that is the feelingful free “turning-towards” of a “letting-stand-against.”266  Again, as that 
which—or better, who—cannot be present-to-hand to oneself as just another ontic being.  
 The transcendental power of imagination/time then, gives the horizon of “real” 
encounter with beings and “at the same time” gives the being (who) of the person who 
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encounters the “real” spontaneously gathered beings in that receptive horizon of 
encounter.  Which who then also gives these beings their look as they show of 
themselves.  We can witness the pure temporality of the “I,” according to Heidegger, 
through Kant’s “modes of synthesis” that constitute the subject.  These are apprehension, 
reproduction, and recognition—each of which is ultimately determined temporally—
which is also to say, imaginally.267 
 Hence, it can justifiably be said that for Heidegger in his Kant book “time,” “the 
transcendental power of imagination,” and “self affectivity” are all synonymous terms.  
Further, I suggest that acknowledging this equivalence will be helpful to understanding 
my application of certain of Heidegger’s other works in this dissertation.  That such 
applicability is possible with Being and Time Heidegger himself makes clear in the final 
section of his Kant book.  In the final section, Heidegger continues to develop his 
interpretation of Kant, only now in the direction of a “metaphysics of Dasein” that firmly 
links Heidegger’s Kant book to the work previously accomplished in Being and Time.268  
Turning now to later Heidegger, in the 1953/54 “A Dialogue on Language”—within the 
context of that essay’s conversation—the Kant book and the imagination as “wellspring” 
are both explicitly acknowledged as relevant to the unfolding dialogue, thereby affirming 
that this view abides throughout Heidegger’s work.269 
 The Heideggerian question of Being is thus never far from the question of 
imagination.  As the foregoing hopefully has made clear, they can be said to be 
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inextricably linked.  Therefore, when developing my discourse on imagination and its 
relation to religious practice, this discourse will be enhanced profoundly and deepened 
through drawing aspects of Heidegger’s other works into the conversation with Böhme. 
 It is also to be acknowledged that the question of Being is not something foreign 
to Böhme’s discourse as well.  This has been established.  Yet I further contend that it is 
at this specific point that Böhme’s theosophical and Heidegger’s philosophical discourses 
meet—in the Nothing of Sophia.  In fact, at the close of his Kant book, Heidegger 
himself names Being Sophia.270  And as we see in both Heidegger and Böhme, Sophia 
and imagination abide together. 
 
Looking Forward 
 When we bring Böhme and Heidegger into “conversation,” as we are only just 
beginning to do, the possibility of a radically new understanding of the imagination is 
disclosed.  This begins with the acknowledgement that all human ek-sistence is 
imaginally rooted.  That includes then such familiar Heideggerian tropes as:  We are 
thrown; we are fallen; our most fundamental mood is anxiety as a holding of ourselves 
into the Nothing; and that being-towards-death recalls our ownmost authentic being, etc.  
It also includes the understanding of our ek-sistence as fundamentally characterized by 
forgetting, concealment, and “abstraction.”  These very notions are then only enhanced 
by Böhme’s more primordial disclosure of the Desire of Ungrund and the radically 
transformative possibility of human being and world. 
                                                 
 270 Heidegger, Kant, 173. 
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 I state again, in the hermeneutic that I am developing, imagination opens and 
gathers.  Imagination desirefully throws open a horizon of encounter and “at the same 
time” gathers beings as well as the self of the “subject” together into a world of encounter 
into which we fall.  This world—or better, these worlds—in which we are as thrown-
fallen-Dasein are not only characterized by ontological forgetting of our thrown-
falleness, and fundamental concealment through the striving of world and earth, but also 
by the very construction of an “abstraction” which it can be said, discards one possible 
world of belonging-together for another—even one possible being of encounter for 
another. 
 To say that imagination desirefully opens and gathers or “is” opening and 
gathering as sway of the twofold fundamentally applies to human dreaming and fantasy 
construction as well.  I return now to the interpretation initiated in my first chapter that 
desire is better characterized here by excess than by lack.  Simplistically stated, desire 
understood in terms of lack is fundamentally dependent upon that object which is outside 
itself to herald and potentially assuage the inescapable craving of lack’s void.  Desire as 
excess, following Böhme, ever overflows from out of itself to open that horizon wherein 
can be gathered the being or beings of its ownmost longing. 
 In a fantasy state then, one can be said to be opening [or “projecting”] a “play 
space” wherein one can gather beings—in disguised or undisguised form—that are not or 
cannot be ontically present-to-hand in accordance with one’s conscious or unconscious 
“wishes.”  It follows that what characterizes fantasy as an imaginal event is that it thereby 
strips such beings of any living encounter as “other” by subordinating them to those 
subjective wishes as “wish fulfillment”.  Fantasy, it can be said further, renders beings, as 
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well as oneself, vacuous—particularly when occurring in a context of regression.  The 
event of dreaming, on the other hand, is a far more complex issue with certain radical 
possibilities which will have to wait for a separate discussion altogether.  Be that as it 
may, one can readily witness that dreams of all events clearly embody the paradigm of 
imagination being disclosed by the forgoing interpretation. 
 I am hopeful it can be recognized clearly now that the hermeneutic of imagination 
being developed here is not necessarily at odds with psychoanalytically oriented 
hermeneutics.271  It simply means to open new and I believe critical possibilities of 
interpretation.  I am confident that these possibilities will become ever more apparent as 
we work through the practice of Böhme’s The Way to Christ. 
 I consider it prudent to remind the reader that the task, and so the tone of the 
dissertation alters, yet again, rather dramatically at this point.  Of necessity, this is 
unavoidable.  To arrive where the relationship between imagination and religious practice 
can be investigated directly as I now hope to do—with an eye towards the event of world 
transformation—has required substantial preparation that has included methodological, 
historical, theosophical, and philosophical engagement, each with its own style of 
discourse.  This ground had to be covered rather carefully, albeit quickly, since the 
hermeneutic being developed here is somewhat novel.  That being the case, I strongly 
encourage the reader to hold ahead of one’s view that which has gone before—although 
the tone is to change now that we come to practice.  This will indeed facilitate one’s 
 
 271 Again, as examples, I believe the deep resonances and counter resonances with the discourses 
of Deleuze and Lacan concerning desire are apparent and open important avenues of investigation.  And 
while Böhme’s characterization of Ungrund’s excessing Desire may appear remote from Deleuze’s 
subjectless machine, nevertheless, I believe that they can quite readily be brought together into a working 
conversation in light of human beings’ “fallen” condition. 
119 
ability to track my hermeneutic preservation through the movements of personal 
transformation as they unfold in the work to come, leading to that looked-for event, world 
transformation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE WAY TO CHRIST AND REPENTANCE 
 
 The Way to Christ, as a guide or manual for the Christian practitioner, has an 
interesting provenance.  It was previously disclosed that this work was composed of two 
separate treatises written by Böhme, originally selected and subsequently published 
together by Böhme’s supporters—to his delight—near the end of his life in 1624 C.E.  
However, after Böhme’s death, this work was then expanded through several 
publications—from its original two treatises, until acquiring its “final” form of nine 
treatises with the Böhme popularizer Johann Georg Gichtel’s printing of the work in 
1682.  Yet even then, the order of presentation of its treatises could be subject to slight 
alteration dependent upon the desire or judgment of any given editor.272  It may be rightly 
claimed that The Way to Christ is and always has been a work for preservers by 
preservers. 
 It was also previously disclosed that The Way to Christ—as a guide for the 
practitioner—illuminates three “stages,” or better, “movements” in the transforming life 
of the Christian practitioner who takes up this path.  These movements are repentance, 
resignation, and contemplation.  It is with this work and these movements that I will 
concern myself through the hermeneutic preservation of the chapters that follow. 
 
 
 272 Erb, Introduction, Way to Christ, 1-2. 
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The Way to Christ 
 The Way to Christ, as I will be characterizing it here, begins with gatherings.273  
That is, even as early as Böhme’s preface to the First Treatise, the sincere practitioner can 
be seen to be called in the work to interrelated series of considerations, through which the 
practitioner can gather herself and her world into the world of the work—so ultimately, to 
be fixed as the very site of striving/transformation.274  To illustrate this point, I will begin 
with the Fifth Treatise, “On the New Birth.”  It must be understood here that by 
beginning with the Fifth Treatise, I am in no way violating any rigid and necessary order 
of passage through the work—as a reading of the Fifth Treatise will attest.  The Fifth 
Treatise was first introduced into the work in a 1628 edition, well after the author’s 
death.275  It was included, as were all the treatises, to aid preservers in their practice.  
Whether one reads it—or the Ninth Treatise for that matter—earlier or later, is dependent 
on the needs of the practitioner.  I choose it now as a place of beginning, since it of all the 
treatises most clearly illumines the world of the work. 
                                                 
 273 I strongly encourage the reader to review the approach to practice that I will be engaging in this 
preservation as it is presented in my introduction.  I so encourage since without such review, the reader 
may experience some confusion due to what could be called the uncustomary nature of my approach.  
However, with the review, the reader will recall how my approach to practice as “work” is specifically 
fitted to my method of preservation and the tack of the retrieval.  See pages 14-16, and 36-39 above. 
 
 274 In the preservation of the practice of the way to Christ that unfolds in this and the following 
chapter, I will be continuing to refer to the practitioner via the feminine case throughout—except in those 
rare instances where it would be awkward or potentially confusing when used with the masculine case of 
quotations from Erb’s translation.  My use of the feminine case here is not intended to express any gender 
bias I may be reading into this specific practice.  Nor do I believe does the masculine case of the original—
in translation—reflect any originary intention of Böhme’s concerning the appropriate “who” of the 
practitioner.  Be that as it may, for my part, I am simply continuing hereby a consistency of case that was 
initiated in my introduction. 
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 For most of us in our contemporary world, we need this illumination as 
introduction.  This is so, since for many even a “traditional” Christian world of practice 
can seem foreign and rather incomprehensible—let alone a Böhmist Theosophical one.  
We now need the introductory gathering of the Fifth Treatise to approach the gathering of 
the First Treatise. 
 In the Fifth Treatise, we are called early in its series of considerations “to consider 
man, what and how he is,”276 specifically as a Christian—a consideration incidentally 
that touches the heart of Religion and Psychological Studies concerns.  I will begin with 
the latter half of this consideration, as it is certainly the easier, and it will lead us towards 
the former.  Yet as I begin, two points should be borne in mind.  The first is that to hear 
this work as a preserver, one must open to its gathering.  This is an act of imagination set 
in motion by one’s desire to enter the world of this work—or heed its call. 
 The question and analysis then, as an example, of the “rightness” or “wrongness” 
of Böhme’s interpretation of what makes a Christian is not the task of this dissertation.  
My task is to work with his interpretation—even as I, were I preserving a different 
practice, would need then to work with the interpretation given through that practice.  To 
be mindful of this point will aid in not being distracted by secondary concerns—as 
interesting and critical as they may be—thereby missing the primary issue of the 
retrieval. 
 The second point is a reminder that with Böhme we enter the “other tonality.”277  
One is gathered into this tonality via Böhme’s “considerations” that reveal not a system 
 
 276 Boehme, Way to Christ, 139. 
 
 277 For a review of the “other tonality,” see pages 66-70 above. 
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of precise propositions, but rather, a story.  This story discloses the world of this practice 
and the “what and how” of the practitioner.  It is a story that is clearly Christian.  Yet it is 
also a story that “at the same time” resonates in and outside of—with and away from—
most of our ordinary or traditional notions of Christianity and its stories.  One has already 
witnessed this somewhat through my preservation of Böhme’s Theosophy given in 
Chapter Three.  To be gathered into this “other tonality” with Böhme, is not a simple 
thing.  One should bear this in mind. 
 According to Böhme, neither is it “a simple thing” to be a Christian, as he states at 
the beginning of the Fifth Treatise: 
[1.]4.   However, since it remains true that a true Christian is born of Christ, and 
that the new birth is a temple of the Holy Spirit who dwells in us, and that only 
the new man born of Christ enjoys the flesh and blood of Christ, it is not a 
simple thing to be a Christian.  Christianity [moreover] does not [simply] stand 
in the history that we only know and which knowledge we take to ourselves so 
that we say “Christ died for us and has broken death in us and made it into life.  
He has paid the debt for us.  We need only to comfort ourselves with this and 
firmly believe that it has happened.”278 
 
The “true” Christian rather must be born of Christ.  This is the issue for Böhme, and not 
only for this Treatise, or this practice.  This is also the issue for the Böhmist Christian:  
That one is born of Christ, and how this occurs.  The question of how this occurs will 
lead us to the consideration of “man, what and how he is.”  First, however, we will linger 
with this notion of the Christian and her Christianity.  Böhme “defines” the Christian 
religion for us in Chapter Eight of the Fifth Treatise: 
[8.]1.   The whole Christian religion consists in this:  [firstly] that we learn to 
know ourselves, what we are, whence we have come, how we have gone from 
unity into disunity, evil and unrighteousness that we have awakened in 
ourselves; secondly, where we were in unity when we were the children of God; 
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thirdly, how we now are in disunity, in strife and antagonism; fourthly, where 
we are to go out of this fragile life (being); where we wish to go both with the 
immortal and with the mortal. 
[8.]2.   In these four points consists our whole religion:  to come out of disunity 
and vanity, and to go again into the one tree from which all of us, in Adam, 
came, which is Christ in us.  We dare not strive about anything, nor have any 
strife.  Let each one practice how he may enter again into the love of God and of 
his brethren. 
[8.]3.   Christ’s testaments are throughout nothing other than a brotherly bond by 
which God in Christ binds Himself with us and we with Him.  All teaching 
should teach this [as should] all willing, living and doing.  What teaches or does 
otherwise is Babel and fable . . . .279 
 
 Böhme wrote these words in 1622—four years into the Thirty Years’ War.  Yet 
they speak not only to his antipathy towards the strife of his time, they also speak to his 
meaning for Christians:  That we love one another as Christ; that we know who we are 
through and in Christ as the branches of His tree—or, like the flowers of a meadow, each 
showing forth the wisdom and powers unique to each, each delighting in the gifts of the 
other.280  As he states it: 
[7.]7.   . . . Each grows according to its own essence and characteristic.  So it is 
also with the children of God.  They have many gifts and much knowledge, but 
all of one Spirit.  They rejoice with one another in the great wonders of God and 
thank the Highest in His wisdom.  Why should they argue long about Him in 
whom they live and are, and of whose being they themselves are?281 
 
 This meaning leads Böhme further to make what should be understood as a most 
radical claim for his time, and perhaps, still for our own: 
[7.]3.   The Christianity in Babel argues over knowledge, how man is to serve, 
honour and know God, what He is in being and will, teaching simply [that] he 
who is not one and the same piece with them in knowledge and thought is no 
Christian but a heretic. 
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[7.]4.   Now I eagerly wish to see how one is to bring all these sects together into 
one, which would call itself the Christian Church, because all of them now are 
despisers and each group denounces the other and decries it as false. 
[7.]5.   A Christian however has no sect.  He can dwell among the sects, even 
appear in their services, and yet hang on to none.  He has only a single 
knowledge and that is Christ in him.  He seeks only one way, which is the desire 
always eagerly to act and live correctly.  He puts all his knowing and willing 
into the life of Christ.282 
 
 Böhme’s Christianity and his “true Christian” are contrasted in this treatise with 
the Christianity of Babel, the church of stone, and the historical Christian.  That is, with 
those who argue and perpetuate violent strife through their intolerance; with those who 
just go through the motions to be thought well of by others; and with those who believe 
that in the aftermath of Jesus’ historical presence on the earth, there is nothing more for 
them to do beyond acknowledge or have faith in that bare fact.  Böhme’s “true 
Christian,” on the other hand—as we have seen—must be born anew.  Again, this is no 
simple task. 
 One begins this task through the gatherings.  When Böhme calls the practitioner 
to the series of considerations that begins with “consider man,” it can be said he calls that 
one to a gathering.  This first gathering is of the world of the work.  In the Fifth Treatise, 
Böhme himself calls one into this gathering by the retrieval of a question:  How is a 
human being, mortal and sinful, “capable of the Godhead”283 through the new birth that 
the Scripture itself proclaims and calls us to?  For Böhme, it is self-evident that the 
mortal remains mortal and sinful—which can be witnessed to by Scripture and the Saints 
who have been among us.  Yet, as it is also revealed by Scripture, our new birth is in and 
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of Christ who is “perfect” and without sin, who further has overcome death.  How can 
this be?  Hence, we are “to consider man”—who has both hell and heaven in him, yet 
dwells in the external world.284 
 Böhme carries the gathering considerations forward thus: 
[1.]12.   If we wish to consider this now, we must consider time and eternity, 
how they are in one another, light and darkness, good and evil, but especially the 
human origin and cause.285 
 
It is through this latest consideration that Böhme makes what I believe is both a startling 
and revealing declaration.  This is a declaration that resonates profoundly through what 
has gone before in this dissertation, and with what will come.  That is: 
[1.]15.   . . . Thus also man is created.  According to the external humanity he is 
the time, and in time, and time is the external world, which is also the external 
man; and the internal man is also eternity, [that is] spiritual time, and the 
[spiritual] world that also consists of light and darkness . . . . Whichever is 
revealed in him, in it his spirit dwells, either in darkness or in light (inserts and 
emphases mine).286 
 
 What Böhme gives us to understand here is profound.  It presages the 
Heideggerian understanding of temporality already addressed in Chapter Three:  That 
self-affectivity is temporality is the “transcendental” imagination as opening and 
gathering.  Here with Böhme, “man” and world make each other up as time.  Moreover, 
with this time of the “external man” and her world, there is the “spiritual time” of the 
“internal man” with its worlds—heaven and hell, revealed through the light and darkness. 
[1.]19   So also we are to consider man:  He stands and lives in three worlds.  
The first is the eternal dark-world, the centrum of eternal nature, which begets 
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the fire, the source of suffering; the second is the eternal light-world, which 
begets eternal joy and is the divine dwelling place in which the spirit of God 
dwells, in which the spirit of Christ takes on human being, and drives out the 
darkness so that it must be a cause of joy in the spirit of Christ to be in the light; 
the third world is the external visible [world], the four elements and visible stars.  
Each element has a star according to its own characteristic in itself out of which 
desire and characteristic rise, just as in a mind.287 
 
And lest we be confused, we also are told:  “Yet there are not three persons in one man, 
but only a single [one].”288 
 Therefore, what confronts the practitioner initially at the beginning of 
considerations in the Fifth Treatise is an understanding of rapidly unfolding complexities.  
They are complexities that, it may be said, confound and disrupt the world of the 
everyday, and that, further, only will become reconciled in “story”—as will be seen.  
Thus begins what I am characterizing as the gathering of world. 
 The importance of story, for the practitioner, in the gathering of world can be 
understood, I believe, in how story temporalizes and so gives body to considerations 
which otherwise could become sterile in their abstraction.  Story imaginally gathers the 
practitioner and her considerations into a from-whence, wherein, and whither-to as the 
empowering of world.  Even the world of contemporary science is storied in this way, if 
only as the from-whence of the big bang, and the where-in of the random effervescence 
of material processes in motion, and the whither-to of nowhere.  Be that as it may, 
Böhme mobilizes his theosophical rendition of the Christian story, according to this 
characterization, at this early stage of the series of considerations in order to disclose the 
world of this practice. 
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 The practitioner is given here to consider Adam’s creation in Paradise.  How 
humans were created in the image of God, out of “the verbo fiat, that is, in eternal desire, 
formed and created in an image out of time and eternity [spiritual time]” (insert mine).289  
The broad strokes of this story have been given in Chapter Three.  There however, the 
focus was on phenomenality.  Here, the focus is “the threefold life of man.”290 
 When God breathes life into Adam [original humanity of the story], as God’s 
image and likeness, God “breathes” this life as threefold—of dark-fire, light, and air.  
Adam’s single soul, as flame or fire spark, thus mirrors the three “Principles” of 
Godhead’s phenomenality.  Adam abides thereby, through the three “worlds” that express 
or show forth the “Principles” of Ungrund’s Desire to manifestation—the “external 
world,” as well as the worlds of fire and light.  Whereas Adam dwelt in the external 
world of Paradise to reveal God’s wonders therein, the dark-fire gave living nature to 
Adam’s particularity and the freedom of the light governed throughout. 
 There was no strife, at that time, between them as worlds.291  Until the Fall, when 
androgynous Adam brought her/his imagination, via desire, out of the Light and into the 
external world—having been seduced by the Devil’s own imagination through the 
influence of his hell in the darkness of the dark-fire.  Thereby, Adam became two and 
was lost to the world of Paradise and the worlds as worlds became a strife within him.  In 
other words, in Paradise, Adam and his world were one, and according to Böhme, he 
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knew no death.292  Further, Adam, while dwelling in the “external world,” also 
participated in and was governed by the freedom of the Light world of angels.  He did not 
know these worlds as different.  Neither did he know the world of the hell of the Devil 
and his angels in darkness, which, it can be said, was never even intended to be a 
“world.”  However, through the Fall, these worlds became, for lack of a better way to 
speak it, separate and a strife within him. 
 Thus, through the story, are we given the from-whence to understand the wherein 
of how humanity “stands and lives in three worlds.”  Our whither-to, which is our 
primary concern, is subsequently revealed in the treatise as the way to Christ, as will be 
witnessed.  First, however, two interrelated points of clarification need to be addressed. 
 For one, there is the question of “world,” and what this word seems to signify for 
Böhme, and whether or not this application corresponds in any way with how I have used 
“world” hitherto.  Concerning this question, it will certainly be recalled that I have 
followed Heidegger in understanding world—in its revealing/concealing “striving” with 
earth—as the wherein of Dasein’s dwelling.  Pursuing this understanding I have 
characterized imagination as the whereby of this wherein—as the temporal horizon 
opening that gathers self and beings together into a world of significant and free 
involvements within its clearing.293 
 Taking this a step further, one must recall Dasein’s ownmost throwness into such 
world of involvements, which includes the recognition of our being-historical and the 
forgotteness of our throwness as we fall into preoccupations with beings.  Yet our Being 
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remains an issue to ourselves, and even our preoccupations are disclosed as rooted in the 
pre-ontological understanding of such.  This much and more is disclosed in the 
Heideggerian considerations of world. 
 We find no such clear exposition of the term in Böhme’s The Way to Christ.  By 
apparently taking the meaning of world as self-evident, Böhme can be said to engender 
considerable confusion with his notion of three worlds—that, or to perpetuate an outworn 
cosmology.  However, are such interpretations the only options?  This question touches 
also the second point of clarification.  To pose the point as a question:  Is not what 
Böhme is expressing here onto-theological?  That is, is he not, ultimately, just using God 
as First Cause to ground his own “reasonable” speculations?  Certainly some would 
advance such a claim.  Yet I maintain that on both accounts, something other can be 
occurring. 
 What Böhme can be said to reveal, rather, through his theosophical rendition of 
the Christian story of human creation is a dynamic and fluid understanding of world 
rooted in and responsive to imagination, particularly, for my considerations, human 
imagination.  Granted, the context and traditional associations of Böhme’s use of the term 
may suggest fixed and static realms as dwelling places for different classes of beings:  
angels, devils, and men.  Yet, habitual tendencies aside, the story itself speaks differently.  
The Primordial world is the Light world—as described in Chapter Three.  However, hell 
and the postlapsarian “external world” are revealed as spontaneously manifest or created 
in direct response to events of angelic and human imagination and desire.  Further, the 
story tells of how we are historically affected, as “inheritors,” by such events.  This may 
be so since, as Böhme also reveals, “man” and world—external or spiritual—are time. 
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 At this point, it should be acknowledged that, following in Böhme’s wake, there is 
no reason to presume, having “fallen” into the “external world” and forgotten our 
ownmost home, which yet remains an issue for us, that the power of imagination and 
desire ceases to create and shape our worlds.  My premise is that it has not, and we 
continue to create (both consciously and unconsciously, in grounded and ungrounded 
ways) our historical worlds here among us wherein we dwell.  It thus becomes a short 
step to a Heideggerian interpretation. 
 Now, is this onto-theology?  No, certainly not when one recalls that with Böhme 
we are called to hear in the “other tonality.”  That is, in the tonality of ongoing creation as 
phenomenality—not the tonality of metaphysical cause.  Taking this a step further, it 
should also be recalled that, with Böhme, we are disclosed as of the sway of the twofold 
(borrowing Heidegger’s terminology), as Ungrund and Grund—that is, of a difference 
that perdures.  Which is to say, Böhme’s God is not the philosophical God of causa sui, 
which may be as something present-at-hand or which grounds beings, as Highest Being, 
in their totality.  He is, however, still a God of life before whom one is called to dance 
and sing—or stand in guilt—as imponderable as that may seem at this time.  And He is 
also a God of story.294 
 
 294 Ontotheology, as it is to be understood here, is characterized by Heidegger in his work, “The 
Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics.”  There, in “conversation” with Hegel, ontotheology is 
disclosed as that philosophical thought that, “as the free and spontaneous self-involvement with beings as 
such,” thinks Being metaphysically in terms of the wholeness of the whole of beings “that unifies as 
generative ground.”  This is an identity born of a passing over of the difference manifest in the thought of 
the “Being of beings,” which is a thought of metaphysics itself.  Through such thinking, according to 
Heidegger, God is allowed entry into its accounting and becomes thereby Highest self-grounding and 
ground-giving Being, which is ultimately understood metaphysically as First Cause and causa sui.  This is 
the metaphysical God before whom, according to Heidegger, it is impossible to dance and sing.  Following 
Heidegger further, such thinking can be seen as the outcome of an accounting of Being and beings that 
understands them in terms of their identity (pgs. 54-56).  Heidegger’s thinking, in contradistinction, attends 
to the difference—a difference that perdures—as what has been unthought in metaphysics and way to its 
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 Returning to the issue of story and world, I have been claiming here that Böhme 
weaves his story through the series of considerations in the Fifth Treatise as the way to 
the practitioner’s gathering of world.  Perhaps what is meant by this claim can now be 
better understood.  A practitioner is one who is already thrown and fallen into a world of 
involvements with beings.  That is, into the historical world of that one’s everyday.  As I 
also have claimed, this world is disclosed via the temporal horizon opening that gathers 
beings within its clearing—which world disclosure is imaginal.  Böhme’s story, as “true” 
story—even or perhaps especially with its three “worlds”—shocks the everyday world 
and calls the practitioner into the clearing of its work—into its world, as I have 
characterized the term. 
 What is masterful in Böhme’s work is how the world of his story not only shocks 
but also encompasses the world of the practitioner’s everyday, even while calling the 
practitioner to a radical transformation.  He accomplishes this by the communication of 
the story’s from-whence, wherein, and whither-to.  That is, the wherein of the story is 
ultimately understood to be the same wherein of the practitioner’s everyday.  The 
whither-to then speaks the radical transformation as opening into the Light world of 
angels and Saints—a world which has already also been disclosed as the ultimate from-
whence. 
 Thus, it can be understood that the gathering of world claimed here is not so much 
that of the practitioner into the Light world—at least not at this time.  Rather, it is that of 
the gathering of the practitioner’s world into the world of the involvements of the story 
 
“essential nature.”  It is also a thinking that may open to the Divine, by abandoning the god of metaphysics, 
with its “godless thought” (pg. 72).  See Martin Heidegger, “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of 
Metaphysics,” in Identity and Difference, trans., with an introduction by Joan Stambaugh (New York: 
Harper, 1969; reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 42-76. 
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that calls one finally into those of the Light “world.”  To enter the Light world requires 
not just the gathering of world through the story, but also the gathering of self through the 
practice—even unto death, as will be seen. 
 We have followed the story—at least as it is communicated in the Fifth Treatise—
only as far as the Fall of humanity into the external world and the beginning, for humans, 
of the strife between “worlds.”  For Böhme, this strife is between the dark (hell), light 
(heaven), and external worlds.  The external world, moreover, becomes characterized, 
quite suggestively, as the world of Babel.  The where-in of our dwelling, then, is 
primarily this “natural” world [or worlds] of suffering—as it is, no longer governed by 
the Light.  Rather, the stars, the elements, the darkness, and our own natural reason 
govern us.  We would be relegated completely to our own desire and imagination, in this 
state, but for, as Böhme tells us, God’s covenant, and the going of God’s imagination into 
the covenant.  This covenant was that whereby God “promised Himself” again to 
humanity that we should be restored “in the heavenly world’s being” and “in the holy, 
divine life.”295 
 The way of this restoration is accomplished, according to Böhme, by Jesus the 
Christ—the anointed who is our anointing.  Yet for Böhme, Jesus only opens the gates.  
Each one must pass through.296  We are given here to understand that all of humanity 
after the Fall is first the inheritor of the covenant and then inheritor of the 
anointing/opening.  We each—even “Jews, Turks, and heathens,” each in her own way—
must bring our imagination via desire into the promise of restoration and then imaginally 
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pass through the open gates into the living love of the Light world.  We accomplish this 
by following the way of Christ.  That is, by participating in His life of transfiguration, 
death, resurrection, and ascension.297  This is our new birth. 
 In Chapter Four of the Fifth Treatise, we thereby come to Böhme’s answer to the 
question of his own retrieval:  How is sinful man capable of the Godhead?  Böhme’s 
answer concerns the difference he discloses between the “external” and the “internal.”  
That is, between [external] time and eternity [spiritual time], which are yet in one another 
in human being.  Böhme states: 
[4.]1.   Here we now understand what our new birth properly is, how we can be 
and remain a temple of God and still, (this time) also according to the external 
humanity [be] sinful, mortal men.  Christ broke and opened in the human 
essence the gates of our internal, heavenly humanity that were locked in Adam.  
Nothing now lies in this except that the soul lead its will out of the vanity of the 
(corrupted) flesh and direct it into these open gates in the spirit of Christ.298 
 
Further, concerning how the soul should lead the will: 
[4.]2.   There must be great and mighty earnestness, not only a learning and 
knowing, but a hunger and thirst for Christ’s spirit.  Knowledge alone is no 
faith, but the hunger and thirst for that which the “I” desires, which I consider in 
myself, and take and grasp possessively with this consideration, that is faith.299 
 
 A most complex and interesting image of the human is being disclosed here.  That 
is one in which we are potentially in the sway of an interrelated twofold imaginal 
horizoning—of time and “eternity.”  Wherein time and “eternity” profoundly—and 
“historically”—impact one another, or even make each other up, and wherein human and 
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heavenly desire are intimately and mutually implicated, as well.  To help clarify and carry 
this understanding further, consider: 
[4.]13.   This is the cause that the fiery soul at this time cannot come to 
perfection, because it stands bound fast to the external bonds of vanity by which 
the devil continually shoots his poisonous beams on it, and sifts it, so that it 
often bites and poisons itself.  From this there rises up great sorrow and anguish, 
so that the noble Sophia hides Herself in Christ’s fountain in the heavenly 
humanity and cannot come near to vanity. 
[4.]14.   She knows how it went with Her in Adam when She lost Her pearl, 
which, out of grace, was given again to the internal man.  (Therefore she is 
called Sophia, as the bride of Christ.) 
[4.]15.   Then She faithfully calls to the fiery soul as to Her bridegroom, and 
admonishes it to repentance, and to an unburdening of and departure from the 
abomination of vanity.  Then strife begins in the whole man.  The external, 
fleshly man seethes against the internal, spiritual, and the spiritual against the 
fleshly, and so man stands in strife, full of difficulty, care, anguish and need.300 
 
 In the Fifth Treatise, the practitioner is introduced here for the first time to 
Sophia, revealed as the bride of the soul in Christ.  We are told she “hides” Herself in the 
practitioner’s heavenly humanity.  She “calls” to and “admonishes” the soul.  She Herself 
has a history with Adam, which she “knows.”  Further, as will be seen shortly, the soul 
herself longs for Sophia, who in turn longs for the soul.  The sway of the “twofold” 
horizoning thus becomes exponentially more personal.  More will be said of this later. 
 So, Sophia admonishes the soul to repentance.  This is Her call to the first 
movement of this practice’s transforming life.  Yet it is a call that also ultimately 
consoles the soul with the heavenly “sonship,”301 whereby the practitioner becomes “a 
true dwelling of the Holy Trinity,”302 even in the “threefold life of man.” 
 
 300 Ibid., 154-155. 
 
 301 Ibid., 158. 
 
 302 Ibid., 153. 
 
136 
[5.]10.   This consolation belongs to the repentant sinner who is in strife with sin 
and God’s wrath when the temptations come that the devil sets on the soul.  
Then the soul is to wrap itself completely in the suffering and death of Christ in 
His merit. 
[5.]11.   Christ alone has truly merited salvation for us, but He has not merited it 
as a merit that is given as a payment out of His merits so that He gives us the 
sonship out of His merit externally and thus takes us into the sonship.  No; He is 
Himself the merit.  He is the open gate through death, through which we must 
go.303 
 
And so we arrive, in this gathering of world, at the key issue of death—death (with its 
“strange” nature) through which the practitioner must go, and through the issue of which, 
in our considerations of repentance, we also must go. 
 
Repentance 
 We also now come to the gathering of the other series of considerations.  This 
series, as previously stated, is encountered by the practitioner in the preface to “The First 
Treatise on True Repentance.”  This, as I am characterizing it, is the gathering of self 
through the practice.  As entry to the series, the practitioner is asked, “before any prayer,” 
to “examine” her own mind.304  The series is presented then as a guide to such 
examination. 
 These considerations come in a list.  I will give them here in an abbreviated form.  
First, the practitioner is encouraged to consider how her mind is “completely and wholly 
turned from God; . . . how it is ordered only in the temporal, fragile, earthly life.”305  
Second, she should consider how, through Satan’s deceit, she has become an inheritor of 
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death.  Third, “[s]he is to consider the three abominable chains by which our souls are 
bound fast to the time of this earthly life.”  These are the chains:  1) “God’s stern wrath, 
the abyss and dark world that is the centrum and creaturely life of the soul;” 2) “the 
devil’s desire against the soul;” 3) one’s own flesh and blood with its “desires and 
inclinations.”  She is to consider here how these threefold chains keep her captive to sin 
and from perceiving God’s covenant and the reconciliation of Christ.  Fourth, she should 
consider death again, and how it “waits” in “every hour and moment.”  Fifth, she is to 
consider how the judgment with the shame of its accounting waits as well.  Sixth, she 
should consider how the godless lose the image of God and become “like a hellish 
worm.”  Seventh, she is then to consider “the eternal punishment and pain of the 
damned.”  How, “in their self-created abominations,” they “do not see the land of the 
saints.”  Further, how she was created in the “beautiful and majestic image” of God “in 
which He Himself wished to dwell,” “that [s]he might dwell with the holy angels, with 
God’s children,” “on the new crystalline earth.”  How this can be lost for vanity’s sake.  
How death can be an entrance to heaven or hell.  Then eighth, “he is to consider the 
course of this world, how everything is a plaything by which he spends his time in 
restlessness” and distraction.306 
 The stated intent of this series of considerations, as a guideline to the gathering of 
self, is to awaken and so open the practitioner’s heart to a genuine sorrow and desire for 
mercy in order to find “within himself a hunger”—thereby, ultimately to become a 
worker “in Christ’s vineyard.”  Having become so awakened and open, the practitioner 
need simply remember God’s promise in Christ, and then “wrap himself in Christ’s 
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suffering and death.”307  This is the short form for those capable of it.  However, most 
people are not so capable. 
 We are to bear in mind that there are different types of people who come to the 
practice.  Böhme elaborates this point through the Ninth Treatise wherein he deals with 
the traditional humours.  We need not concern ourselves with the humours at this time, as 
important as they may be.  Yet at this point, it is instructive to note, as illustration, 
something Böhme does say in Treatise Nine about the melancholic person.  That is, the 
melancholic should not “speculate about God’s wrath, nor be eager to be alone or with 
people who speak [about it].”308  The reason for this is that the melancholic is easily 
brought to “dread.”  The melancholic, then, could feed herself on the fantasy that God 
does not desire her—perhaps even that she is already hopelessly damned.309  Such 
fantasy is destructive to the practitioner.  It is also destructive of the practice. 
 The point of this brief illustration is to highlight, as we proceed into the 
“generalities” of the practice and the gathering of self, that in this practice each 
practitioner must attend to her ownmost self.  It thus requires an intimate and deep self-
understanding and honest self-disclosure.  This understanding and disclosure begins with 
the call to the practitioner to examine her own mind. 
 What most people will discover through such an honest self-examination is that 
they do not really “hunger” for God—at least, not that much.  It is to this type of person, 
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specifically, that Böhme writes in the First Treatise.310  The initial series of 
considerations in the preface, then, are intended as guidelines for just such a practitioner 
to follow in order to begin generating the deep desire or hunger for God.  As much as 
they may sound as such, they are not meant to be doctrinal or dogmatic statements of 
belief.  They do reflect, however, how desire can be mobilized from within the world of 
the practice into which the practitioner has been gathered. 
 The practitioner is first asked here to consider how she is “completely and wholly 
turned from God,” and how she is instead, “ordered only in the temporal, fragile, earthly 
life.”  A reorientation is called for here.  This reorientation demands the gathering of self.  
That is, the practitioner needs to withdraw herself from her ordinary way of involvements 
in order to redirect herself towards God—or, perhaps better stated, the God who is to be 
known in the world of this practice.  Moreover, as has been indicated, this reorientation 
calls for the redirection of desire. 
 In order to redirect the practitioner’s desire, this practice uses considerations 
meant to inspire the practitioner’s sorrow, shame, fear, and ultimately, guilt.  That is to 
say that an intellectual reorientation of belief is not enough here.  The intellectual 
reorientation, however, as a gathering of mind, can and should be used to generate—and 
gather oneself further through—those strong emotions which can, in turn, foster a 
working “mood” in this gathering of self.311  This mood begins as a sorrowful hunger for 
the redirection of one’s ownmost desire.  This is the preparation for repentance. 
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 The sorrowful hunger must be cultivated through practice.  Böhme makes this 
clear when he writes to “a man [who] finds within himself a hunger, so that he would 
eagerly repent, but finds in himself no proper sorrow for his past sins, and yet a hunger 
for sorrow.”312  When he encourages such a one “to make a powerful resolution” and “to 
gather [emphasis mine] sense, mind and all reason together into one and in that hour 
commence his first consideration.”  Through such resolution and gathering, he is further 
encouraged to “wish to lead his mind obediently away from the beauties and pleasures of 
this world into the sufferings and death of Christ.”313 
 Yet the practitioner is also instructed to maintain a balance of sorts through the 
considerations: 
14.   He [also] [insert mine] is strongly to consider, and completely wrap his 
soul [in the idea] [insert translator’s] that he has made the resolution to gain the 
love of God in Christ Jesus, and that according to His true promise God will 
give him the noble pledge of the Holy Spirit as a beginning so that in himself he 
might be reborn in Christ’s humanity, according to the heavenly divine being, 
and that the spirit of Christ might renew his mind in His love and power . . . .314 
 
Hereby, the practitioner, in the gathering of self, makes the whither-to of Christ her 
ownmost—by “wrapping” herself in the promise as “true.”  This is to say, by fixing 
herself as the very place of striving in the clearing/concealing of this work.  Such 
wrapping of oneself in the promise is critical to the sway of this practice.  Not only is it 
critical as a making of the whither-to one’s ownmost, it is also critical as the antidote to 
that morbid fantasy characteristic of the melancholic. 
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 Through this balance point in the considerations, the practitioner is further 
instructed “to consider fully the great love of God, that God does not wish the death of 
the sinner, but that he be converted and live;” “how Christ, in a friendly manner, calls 
poor sinners to Himself;” “that God in Christ Jesus will more readily hear [him] and 
receive him into grace than he himself wants to come to Him.”  Thereby, “he should 
firmly imagine at this hour and moment he stands in the presence of the Holy Trinity, and 
that God is truly present in him and outside of him” (emphasis mine).315 
18.   Thus, he is to know and believe for certain that he stands, with his soul, 
before the face of Jesus Christ, before the holy Godhead, and that his soul has 
turned from God’s face; and that he now, this hour, wishes to turn his soul’s 
eyes and desire to God, and, with the poor, prodigal and returning son [desires 
to] come to the Father.  With downcast eyes of soul and spirit, in fear and 
deepest humility, he is to begin to confess his sin and unworthiness.316 
 
 We return here, in the gathering of self, to the difficult issue of the differentiation 
of fantasy and imagination.  As I would characterize it—and of course by this point this 
should be no surprise for the reader—this is the key issue for the practitioner.  It is also 
an issue that must be wrestled with constantly in the context of the practice, insofar as it 
also can be said to vex this practice from top to bottom.  This issue further concerns the 
authenticity and inauthenticity of the practitioner. 
 I have characterized the differentiation of fantasy and imagination in previous 
chapters.  Yet in practice—as in life, in general—such differentiation is rarely clearly 
maintained or absolute.  This is so since, as was previously disclosed, the ordinary 
workings of our “everyday” experiences of imagination and fantasy are themselves both 
rooted in what was named in Chapter Three the transcendental power of imagination.  
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The issue, as it was suggested there, is how we allow beings, gathered in any opened 
horizon or clearing, to be or not to be.  To help clarify this notion, one should recall how 
it was suggested, in Chapter Three, that in fantasy, by subjecting beings to one’s own 
wishes, one strips them of being as living encounter of “other.”  Imagination, on the other 
hand, as I am characterizing it here, even in “ordinary” experience, allows beings to come 
to stand in their being, and so show themselves in their “strife” of revealing/concealment. 
 The “dynamic” of imagination then, can be said to be the same as that of “work.”  
Further, we can be said to be beings who work.  However, we are also clearly beings who 
abide in the self-deceptions of our fantasies—revealed and concealed, both consciously 
and unconsciously.  We take now a step further into the complexities of this hermeneutic.  
Not only, as was suggested through my interpretation of Heidegger in Chapter One, can 
the horizoning of imagination in the opening of any clearing be subject to a kind of 
fluctuation from near to far—so to speak.  We now also are called to recognize, as has 
been suggested through my interpretation of Böhme in this chapter, that we always 
already abide in the sway of multiple interrelating horizonings that may even blend, as it 
were, imagination and fantasy in any of our dealings. 
 This state of affairs is immediately disclosed within the context of a practice such 
as the one under present consideration.  As has been witnessed, this practice begins with 
a person fallen into external involvements.  One may even include fallen into what is 
commonly said concerning such involvements.  In addition, this hypothetical person can 
only be said to want a proper sorrowful hunger for God.  Yet we are instructed that 
proper hunger can be cultivated through the gathering of oneself out of one’s ordinary 
way of involvements in order to reorient oneself towards God.  The practitioner then, in 
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order to accomplish such cultivation, actually imagines herself into each consideration so 
to generate those strong emotions mentioned as the preliminary enactment of the 
gathering of self into that working mood which facilitates her redirection of desire. 
 However, this does not just manifest instantaneously or mechanically.  As with 
the melancholic, in the process of her imaginings, powerful fantasies often intrude which 
must be either abandoned or worked through.  Further, the case generally is such that, in 
the process, the fantasy cannot necessarily even be recognized as such when it shows 
itself in the imagining—as in the case of the melancholic who takes her hopelessness as 
true.  A critical component of this “deception” has to do with the “nature” of imagination.  
As it has been disclosed, imagination is not simply a static process of holding a being as 
an object clearly in mind.  Rather, it is that happening of throwing out a horizon wherein 
beings are gathered to be the beings they are in the dynamic concealing/revealing 
involvements of a world striving with earth.  Fantasy itself has just such a dynamic 
revealing/concealing character, being as it is, rooted in imagination.  Fantasy and 
imagination simply thereby arise together.  This speaks, indeed, a very dismal state of 
affairs concerning how one is to sort out fantasy from imagination.  However, practice 
has its fruit. 
 We are beings who work.  We are also beings for whom living being is an issue.  
Practice itself is work.  It is also a work at which one practices—and practices hopefully 
in a being-towards-the-future—as the disclosure of self and beings in their being.  The 
trend then, for the earnest practitioner who steadfastly “examines” her mind is towards 
“truth”—towards being.  That is, away from fantasy that strips being.  This is also to 
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suggest that when left to our own devices, our situation—in restlessness and distraction—
is indeed rather hopeless. 
 It must be acknowledged here that in this hermeneutic preservation, I continue to 
move in the world of this work.  That is, I am following Böhme’s “general assessment,” 
repeatedly disclosed, that “fallen” humanity—left to our own devices—are in a terrible 
fix; that we require help; that help is made—historically—available.  And finally, that to 
be helped, for our part, requires work—hopeful work—which is itself transformative. 
 That said, we have come, in our considerations of this practice, to the point where 
the practitioner, having begun to cultivate a true sorrowful hunger, in the gathering of 
self, imagines herself standing in the presence of God in order to confess her sin.  In light 
of the foregoing, it should be understood that this event of imagination will itself 
undoubtedly be mixed with fantasy.  Hence, it must be borne in mind that in this, as in all 
points of the practice, the practitioner is to know that she is to come again and again to 
this imaginal event.  The practitioner must practice it in conjunction with the examination 
of her own mind, thereby to cultivate not only the “truth” of her sorrowful hunger, but 
also the “truth” of the event itself.  That is to say, through earnest and resolute practice, 
she will come to stand in the presence of the living God of this practice.  This is a bold 
claim, but one that follows from what has already been disclosed. 
 Hence, Godhead, who is certainly beyond Being, as was discussed in Chapter 
Three, reveals/conceals Herself/Himself, in fulfillment of the promise, through the 
thrown projection of the practitioner’s imaginal horizon, wherein she herself is gathered, 
as—in this instance—being the Holy Trinity or, at least, the being of Jesus Christ.  
Hereby, God is “encountered” and “known.”  Certainly, this is not the only way God is to 
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be encountered and known—Böhme himself makes this clear.  Yet it is one way, and 
further, it is the specific way at this stage in the movement of repentance.  In any event, at 
the very least, according to Böhme, the practitioner can take comfort in the knowledge 
that God will send to her the Holy Spirit “as a beginning” of her transformation. 
 The practitioner then begins her prayer of confession.  At this point in the First 
Treatise, Böhme offers as a “short guide,” an example of a confessional prayer, 
encouraging the practitioner to change it “as the Holy Spirit teaches” and according to her 
own situation.317  Böhme offers such exemplary prayers throughout this treatise.  In 
addition, the Third Treatise of The Way to Christ is little more than a collection of 
exemplary prayers.  What is important to note at this time, concerning the collection of 
prayers in the Third Treatise, is how Böhme mobilizes prayer, through the gathering of 
self, for the turning of desire. 
 The unfinished Third Treatise is entitled “On Holy Prayer with an Order for Each 
Day of the Week.”  It begins, in abbreviated form, with this exhortation: 
    How a man is continually to examine the office, position and way of life in 
which God has placed him; and how he is to commit the beginning, middle, and 
end of all his activities to God and continually do all his works with God . . . . 
    Together with a heartfelt consideration of the suffering, death and resurrection 
of Jesus Christ; how a man is continually to lead his soul’s hunger and desire 
through Christ’s death into His resurrection in God and press forward to the new 
birth so that he might pray in spirit and in truth and present himself before 
God.318 
 
 The prayers suggested for Monday offer an example of this gathering.  There is a 
prayer for when one wakes; when one first rises; when one washes and dresses; and when 
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 318 Ibid., 71. 
 
146 
                                                
one goes to work.  There are prayers for when one is moved to prayer throughout the 
workday; a prayer for when one ends the work of the day; and one for when one 
undresses for sleep.319 
 Hereby, Böhme demonstrates for the practitioner how every act can become an 
opportunity of gathering herself from her ordinary world of involvements in order to turn 
her desire to God from within the world of this work of practice.  Again, what I consider 
masterful is how Böhme grounds the everyday world as the initial wherein of the world 
of the work.  The practitioner, then, gathers herself through the considerations and turns 
her desire in prayer without “going” anywhere.  That is to say, in this practice there is no 
need to withdraw oneself externally into a monastery or hermitage, or even a church, to 
accomplish the transformation.  The gatherings and fixing ourselves as the place of 
striving in the work are everything.  This is my claim. 
 Thereby, in this practice, we receive the direct aid and assistance of the Holy 
Spirit in fulfillment of God’s promise.  It is important to understand here that, according 
to Böhme, this means more than just help in formulating proper prayers.  The redirection 
of desire through our prayer is here disclosed as, ultimately, the work of the Holy Spirit.  
As Böhme states in another series of considerations, this time concerning prayer in the 
Third Treatise: 
8.   We are fifthly to consider that of our own power we are not able to pray 
correctly before God, as Christ says:  Without me you can do nothing (John 
15:5).  And Saint Paul says:  We do not know what we pray for [or] how it is 
fitting before God, but the Holy Spirit10 presents Himself for us before God with 
sighs too deep for words (Romans 8:26). 
9.   For this reason, if we wish to pray to God our heavenly Father, we are to call 
upon Him in the name of His dear Son, Jesus Christ, for the illumination of the 
Holy Spirit, so that He might forgive us our sins for the sake of His bitter 
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passion and death, and give us what is good and holy for us.  We are to place 
everything that is earthly in His knowledge and will, and not only come before 
God with naked breath and words if we want to pray correctly and be heard, but 
[we are to come] in proper earnest repentance and turn from our false way of 
life.11 
10.   And we [are to] wish to leave all pride, falsehood, wrath, envy and 
stubbornness and to give our whole heart and soul to God, the Holy Spirit, so 
that He might be our work of repentance and power in prayer; that He might 
grasp our will and desire in Himself, and lead them into God, and that we might 
put to death our false vanity and desire, which are inherited by us, in the death of 
Christ, and be born and rise up in the spirit of Christ with a new will, mind and 
obedience to God; and [that] hereafter we might walk [live] before God in our 
new will and birth in such a power of righteousness and purity, as His children, 
which He dearly bought12 through the blood and death of His dear Son, and be 
born again in His Spirit.320 
 
 Proper prayer, for this practice, thus begins with “naked breath and words.”  It 
also may begin with silence, as Böhme instructs us further: 
19.   If a man wants to pray correctly, he must turn from all creatures and come 
before God pure in will and mind.  He must be resolute and in earnest. . . . And 
if reason in flesh and blood speaks a pure “No, you will not be heard; your sins 
are too great,” . . . do not be mistaken; the power is in the internal ground, in the 
desire of the will and works with God.  Remain silent and wait for the Lord.  It 
will finally press through so that you will feel it in your heart and thank God.321 
 
 We hereby appropriately have come to repentance and its prayer of confession.  
“Proper earnest repentance,” it now may be said, is that working mood that the 
practitioner’s sorrowful hunger—as a beginning—is intended to realize.  That is, 
repentance is here the working mood of prayer as the first movement in the transforming 
life of the Böhmist Christian.  Returning again to the First Treatise, recall that the 
 
 320 Ibid., 73-74.  [Translator’s note 10: (alternate reading in Boehme’s manuscript) MS: He the 
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practitioner has been instructed to imagine herself standing “in the presence of the Holy 
Trinity.”  She then is to begin her prayer of confession, in true repentance, thus: 
19.   O great, unsearchable, holy God, Lord of all being, who in Christ Jesus, out 
of pure love for us, revealed your holy being in our humanity, I, a poor, 
unworthy, sinful man, come before your revealed face, in the humanity of Jesus 
Christ, even though I am unworthy to raise my eyes to You, and [I] implore 
You, and confess to You that I have been faithless and disloyal to Your great 
love and grace that You have given us. . . . [I] have led my desire into the vanity 
of this world, and defiled my soul thereby, and made it completely bestial and 
earthly, so that, because of the mire of the sin, my soul does not know itself, and 
sees itself wholly as a strange child before Your sight, unworthy to desire Your 
grace.  I lie as deep as my soul’s lips in the mire of sin and in the vanity of my 
corrupted flesh, and have only a small spark of breath in me that seeks Your 
grace.  In vanity I have thus become dead to myself so that, in this vanity, I dare 
not raise my eyes to You. 
    O God in Christ Jesus, who for the sake of poor sinners became man so that 
You could help them, to You I cry; I still have a spark of refuge for You in my 
soul.322 
 
 I am confident, as I begin my hermeneutic preservation of repentance, that it has 
become apparent through the presentation of these initial evocations in this confessional 
prayer, why it has taken so much preparation to arrive at this point in the dissertation.  
These evocations, on face value, are virtually indistinguishable from those found in 
nearly any traditional Christian prayer.  Yet to understand them appropriately—in the 
Böhmist sense—is already to be gathered into the Böhmist world.  One can certainly 
appreciate that this is no simple thing.  One must continue to keep this point in mind as I 
proceed. 
 What one immediately gleans through this prayer in its initial evocations, 
concerning repentance as the working mood of prayer for the turning of desire, is that the 
practitioner here is called to assume a sense of her ownmost being guilty.  This is 
certainly interesting in light of what has hitherto been disclosed of the Böhmist world 
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concerning the inherited “nature” of sinful being via the Fall.  Yet it may be said that, at 
this point in the confessional prayer, the “fact” of this inheritance is somewhat secondary 
to the gathering of self into the working mood.  Further, I propose that for the full turning 
of desire, the self-gathering must be complete.  All of one’s being must be authentically 
gathered here through guilt. 
 I believe one can begin to understand the full meaning of this proposal only in 
conversation with the Heideggerian hermeneutic of conscience.  That this is so is my 
hermeneutic wager, and its importance will itself be disclosed in what follows.  Suffice it 
to say, in the moment, the issue of concern here is that of one’s ownmost being guilty. 
 In the Heideggerian hermeneutic of conscience, as it is developed in Being and 
Time, the issue at stake is the authentic potentiality-for-Being of Dasein and how this 
might be attested in Dasein herself.  Such attestation, according to Heidegger, having its 
roots in Dasein will give to Dasein her “self” itself to understand.  This self, defined 
formally, is given as “a way of existing,” rather than as “something present-to-hand.”  
Yet, as a way of existing, the self of the “who,” who is Dasein, in her everydayness is 
generally that inauthentic Being of her falleness into the “they” (or the “one”) and what 
“they” say (what “one” says).  The authentic self must then be disclosed, according to 
Heidegger, through a “modification” of this inauthentic Being, which “is” as a possibility 
of Dasein.323 
 With inauthentic Dasein, Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being is already decided upon 
in advance by the “they.”  Dasein does not hereby take hold of her potentiality herself.  
As Heidegger would have it, it is even “hid” from her.  In order to take hold of her 
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ownmost potentiality-for-Being authentically, Dasein must bring herself back to herself 
from her lostness in the “they.”  However, in order to so bring herself back she must be 
“shown” herself in her possible authenticity.  This authenticity must be attested to.  Then 
Dasein can choose such a way of existing.324 
 The attestation of Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being is accomplished by 
the call of conscience.  This is Heidegger’s claim.  This call, he goes on to say, is 
manifest as a summoning of Dasein to her ownmost being guilty.  However, guilt, in the 
Heideggerian sense, must be understood through its existential-ontological disclosure.325 
 Heidegger begins his analysis from the finding that conscience gives Dasein 
something to understand.  It “thus belongs within the range of those existential 
phenomena which constitute the Being of the ‘there’ as disclosedness.”326  Heidegger 
goes on to state: 
    Through disclosedness, that entity which we call “Dasein” is in the possibility 
of being its “there.”  With its world, it is there for itself, and indeed—proximally 
and for the most part—in such a way that it has disclosed to itself its 
potentiality-for-Being in terms of the ‘world’ of its concern.  Dasein exists as a 
potentiality-for-Being which has, in each case, already abandoned itself to 
definite possibilities.1  And it has abandoned itself to these possibilities because 
it is an entity which has been thrown, and an entity whose throwness gets 
disclosed more or less plainly and impressively by its having a mood.  To any 
state-of-mind or mood, understanding belongs equiprimordially.  In this way 
Dasein ‘knows’ what it is itself capable of [woran es mit ihm selbst ist], 
inasmuch as it has either projected itself upon possibilities of its own or has been 
so absorbed in the “they” that it has let such possibilities be presented to it by 
the way in which the “they” has publicly interpreted things.327 
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 Dasein is able to heed the “they” and so fall since, as Dasein, she is a Being-with 
who understands.  As such, Dasein hears and listens to the idle chatter of the “they.”  
However, in so doing, Dasein does not hear herself.  The listening away from herself to 
what “they” say must be broken off for Dasein to return to her own authentic potentiality-
for-Being.  This listening away is broken off by the call of conscience. 
 To hear the call is not the heeding of any ordinary sort of utterance.  It is, rather, 
an “abrupt arousal” that gives understanding of oneself as Being-in-the-world.328  
According to Heidegger, this call comes from the uncanniness of Dasein’s own thrown 
individuation revealed in anxiety as fundamental mood.  It is also from such uncanniness 
and anxiety that Dasein flees into the “they,” as from the “nothing” of the world.329  
Hence the claim that conscience “calls us back in calling us forth” to one’s ownmost 
potentiality-for-being.330 
 Yet what, more specifically, is given us to understand in the saying of 
conscience?  Heidegger suggests that we find an answer in what is generally heard in the 
experience.  That is, ‘Guilty!’  However, our hearing of such ‘Guilty!’ has commonly 
been interpreted in terms of lack.  That is, of being responsible for a lack in another and 
thereby being indebted to that one.  Or my personal lack in not satisfying a moral or 
social obligation, although I am able, thereby being less than I ought to be.  This is also to 
say, according to Heidegger, that Dasein’s guilt is being understood in terms of a 
calculable or reckoned something present-at-hand. 
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 This, though, is to misunderstand Dasein’s Being.  Be that as it may, there is still 
a “not” character to guilt that is given us to understand in the saying of conscience.  And 
in light of guilt’s taking hold of responsibility, this becomes, for Heidegger, Dasein’s 
“Being-the-basis for a Being defined by a ‘not,’” or “Being-the-basis of a nullity.”331 
 However, Dasein herself is defined by the not (itself not a lack) of not Being-the-
basis of that throwness whereby she is delivered over to Being-the-basis for her 
potentiality-for-Being.  Hence, for Heidegger, Dasein’s Being-guilty becomes as the 
“null Being-the-basis of a nullity.”332  This discloses Dasein’s existential situation.  
Heidegger states it thus: 
The character of this “not” as a “not” may be defined existentially:  in being its 
Self, Dasein is, as a Self, the entity that has been thrown.  It has been released 
from its basis, not through itself but to itself, so as to be as this basis.  Dasein is 
not itself the basis of its Being, inasmuch as this basis first arises from its own 
projection; rather, as Being-its-Self, it is the Being of its basis.4  This basis is 
never anything but the basis for an entity whose Being has to take over Being-a-
basis.333 
 
He goes on to say: 
    Dasein is its basis existently—that is, in such a manner that it understands 
itself in terms of possibilities, and, as so understanding itself, is that entity which 
has been thrown.  But this implies that in having a potentiality-for-Being it 
always stands in one possibility or another:  it constantly is not other 
possibilities, and it has waived these in its existentiell projection.  Not only is the 
projection, as one that has been thrown, determined by the nullity of Being-a-
basis; as projection it is itself essentially null.  This does not mean that it has the 
ontical property of ‘inconsequentiality’ or ‘worthlessness;’ what we have here is 
rather something existentially constitutive for the structure of the Being of 
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projection.  The nullity we have in mind belongs to Dasein’s Being-free for its 
existentiell possibilities.  Freedom, however, is only in the choice of one 
possibility—that is, in tolerating one’s not having chosen the others and one’s 
not being able to choose them.334 
 
 Hereby, we are given to understand, in the Heideggerian hermeneutic of 
conscience, that Dasein—in its Existenz—is essentially guilty.335  To heed the call of 
conscience, then, brings one to this understanding as one’s ownmost authentic 
potentiality-for-Being.336  One may even say, in Being-guilty, one is gathered back to 
oneself.  The disclosure that goes along with such Being, Heidegger names 
“resoluteness,” as the primordial truth of Dasein.337 
 Heidegger develops this disclosure of guilt as Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-
Being further through his interpretation of “anticipatory resoluteness.”  Heidegger here 
gives us to understand that in anticipation, as a being-towards-death, Dasein is towards 
her ownmost and uttermost end in such a way that her authentic potentiality-for-Being, as 
the truth of Dasein, can be understood as a whole.  That is, in being towards death as that 
impossibility [or end] of possibility which is one’s ownmost, indefinite, and yet cannot be 
outstripped, one has revealed to oneself, in an immediate way, that nullity which so 
thoroughly dominates and defines one’s existence as Dasein.  Thus, anticipatory 
resoluteness is said to disclose the truth of Dasein authentically and as a whole.338  It may 
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also be said that it gathers Dasein to herself and for herself authentically and as a 
whole.339 
 Such gathering of self, authentically and as a whole, is what is at stake in 
Böhme’s confessional prayer of repentance.  This is my claim.  However, to understand 
properly what I am claiming, one must not assume here that I am equating Böhmist 
repentance with Heideggerian anticipatory resoluteness.  No.  There may be a 
“sameness,” but they are different in their sameness.  This difference is critical.  And it is 
not just the rather banal difference between a “mood” and a “disclosure.”  The difference 
is fundamental, as will be witnessed.  For the moment, let it be said that the Heideggerian 
concern is to be authentically in the world into which one is thrown.  He states: 
Thrown into its ‘there,’ every Dasein has been factically submitted to a definite 
‘world’—its ‘world.’  At the same time those factical projections which are 
closest to it, have been guided by its concernful lostness in the “they.”  To this 
lostness, one’s own Dasein can appeal, and this appeal can be understood in the 
way of resoluteness.  But in that case this authentic disclosedness modifies with 
equal primordiality both the way in which the ‘world’ is discovered (and this is 
founded upon that disclosedness) and the way in which the Dasein-with of 
Others is disclosed.  The ‘world’ which is ready-to-hand does not become 
another one ‘in its content,’ nor does the circle of Others get exchanged for a 
new one; but both one’s Being towards the ready-to-hand understandingly and 
concernfully, and one’s solicitous Being with Others, are now given a definite 
character in terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-Being-their-Selves.340 
 
 Böhme’s concern, as is known, is more radical.  It is new birth and being in the 
Light world, whereby the “content” of what or who one may encounter is potentially 
transformed.  This is the transformation of world accomplished through the death in 
Christ to which I now must turn. 
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 Böhme’s practice of the way to Christ begins, as I have characterized it, with 
gatherings.  These are, as has been presented here, the gathering of one’s world into the 
world of the practice and the gathering of one’s self into a working mood for the turning 
of one’s desire fully to God, as imaginally revealed through the practice.  This working 
mood is understood here as the movement of repentance. 
 As it has been witnessed through the initial evocations of Böhme’s exemplary 
confessional prayer, repentance, in this practice, calls the practitioner to her ownmost 
being-guilty.  As has also been witnessed by the Heideggerian hermeneutic of the call of 
conscience, such being-guilty can fundamentally gather the practitioner authentically and 
as a whole, through the practice, so to turn her desire.  This is roughly how the issue 
currently stands. 
 However, Böhme’s practice of the way to Christ, as he himself discloses it in this 
initial movement, demands of the practitioner a further step.  That is to die in Christ’s 
death.  Examples of how Böhme calls the practitioner to this step have already been 
presented.  It may also be claimed that it runs as a theme throughout Böhme’s work.  And 
one finds it yet again in the confessional prayer under consideration.  Picking up the 
prayer where it left off, and leaping forward through it, one reads: 
I have not regarded Your purchased inheritance that through Your bitter death 
You purchased for us, and I have shared the inheritance of vanity in Your 
Father’s wrath, in the curse of the earth, and am trapped by sin and half dead to 
Your kingdom.  I lie in weakness before your power, and angry death waits for 
me. . . .  
Although I am not worthy, take me into Your death and let me die Your death in 
my death.  Strike down my assumed “I” and destroy by Your death my “I,” so 
that I no longer live, since in myself I only sin.  Kill the evil beast full of false 
cunning and self-desire, and redeem the poor soul from its heavy bondage. 
    . . . I have no other road by which to come to You than [by] Your suffering 
and death, because You have made our death life by means of Your humanity 
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and have broken the chains of death.  Therefore I sink my soul’s desire into 
Your death, into the broken gates of Your death (emphasis mine). 
    O deepest Love of all, take my soul’s desire into You, and, by Your death, 
lead it into You out of death’s bonds through Your death into Your resurrection.  
Revive me in Your power so that my desire and will begin to grow anew. 
    . . . Lord, I wait on Your promise, for You have said, As I truly live, I have no 
desire in the death of the sinner, but that he turn and live [Ezekiel 33:11].  I sink 
myself into the death of my Saviour Jesus Christ, and wait on You, Your word is 
truth and life.  Amen.341 
 
 In the movement of Böhmist repentance, death must occur for the practitioner.  
Hereby, one understands the fundamental difference between Heideggerian “anticipatory 
resoluteness” and Böhmist “repentance.”  In anticipatory resoluteness, one is 
authentically being-towards-death.  In repentance, one authentically dies.  Yet how is one 
to understand such death? 
 To be perfectly clear, I must emphasize up front, in accordance with my 
hermeneutic preservation, that this occurrence of death for the practitioner is not just 
metaphorical.  Yet it also must be certainly self-apparent that the practitioner here is not 
dying in such a way that would meet or match any physical or biological criteria or 
definition.  Death then must signify in this practice something different—and yet be 
death.  One finds one’s direction forward in this through what has gone before in the 
developing conversation between Böhme and Heidegger. 
 Through this conversation, we have come to know imagination as the horizon 
opening that gathers self and beings together in a world within its existential clearing.  
Being primordial temporality, it is not only the whereby of my wherein; it is also that 
whereby I am and I am who I am.  Further, it is that whereby I encounter beings other 
than myself.  Therefore, my existential experience of myself as a finite being-in-a-world 
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who is freed to my ownmost possibilities is essentially imaginal.  Such possibilities 
include that indefinite possibility which cannot be outstripped—my death as the end of 
my ownmost possibilities in a world of involvements.  I propose that in this light, death 
very straightforwardly can be understood as the collapse or dissolution of my imaginal 
horizoning.  Hereby, I die. 
 Through the movement of repentance in the practice of the way to Christ, then, by 
sinking into the death of Jesus Christ, the practitioner who has gathered herself in this 
world authentically dies.  Such death comes when it comes, yet come it does.  It may 
happen suddenly, or over the course of years; however, one way or the other, it will 
happen.  This is the promise of the practice.  It is the further promise of this practice that 
the practitioner will be reborn or resurrected in Christ and to the Light world.  This is to 
say, that through such death one’s ownmost imaginal horizoning is rethrown whereby 
one is regathered as reborn in a new world of involvements. 
 I will take this a step further, alluding to what has been presented earlier in 
Chapter Three.  Through being gathered into the Böhmist world of practice, one is 
gathered into a world that announces this possibility of dying in Christ as a possibility.  
The practitioner then, in heeding the call of this announcement gathers herself wholly and 
completely, so to turn her desire fully, through her imagination, to God and into Christ’s 
death.  Thereby, dying in Christ, one dissolves in desire into Ungrund’s Desire—which is 
into the source from whence one is sprung—like “flame in fire.”  Such dying in Christ is 
fundamentally transformative. 
 Dissolving in the excessing of Ungrund’s primordial Desire to manifestation, one 
“is” thereby imaginally rethrown from [its] “Nothing” through the “Other” will of the 
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Word that one is then reunited with in Christ.  One thus is born or awakened to the Light 
world as a new world of encounters.  However, in this practice, one also is generally 
rethrown and reborn to the external world from whence one has died.  Hereby, one 
becomes alive to the threefold life discussed previously in this chapter.  That one may be 
thus reborn or resurrected to a “remembrance” of oneself, even though transformed—
albeit seemingly absurd—actually should not be considered “strange”.  All remembrance 
is of imagination—as is this.  Besides, we experience something comparable every 
morning upon awakening from sleep.  This death really is not so strange. 
 It is important to emphasize that the understanding of self being communicated 
here is not that of a strong reification.  That is, the self, in so dying, does not perdure as 
some kind of “thing”—whether caused, created, emergent, or self-existent—that moves 
through a process fundamentally unaltered.  The self, as I am trying to bring “it” to 
discourse, abides always in imaginal transformations.  Further, rooted in desire, “it” is 
imaginal transformations, whether witnessed in the “external” time of what naïvely may 
be called “this” world or in the “spiritual” time of the Light world. 
 Thus, dying in Christ, as I am characterizing it, one “is” dissolved into Ungrund’s 
Nothing—desire to Desire which gives desire’s excess as imagination’s opening and 
gathering in the sway of “Its” twofold.  The self, then, in this developing discourse should 
not be thought as a thing.  Rather, we are closer to workers in a work who are given to 
working.  Hereby, we perhaps may hear anew, “My Father worketh hitherto, and I work” 
(John 5:17 NRSV). 
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 Returning to the movement of repentance, it must be recognized that for the 
practitioner, this dying in Christ must be practiced.  Certainly, there will be many 
fantasies of dying that must be abandoned or worked through.  Yet this death 
authentically will come to one who is gathered and who gathers herself into this work.  
Again, that is the promise of the practice.  Moreover, as Böhme has also given us to 
know, each practitioner, in truth and in death, must find her ownmost way, with the help 
of the Holy Spirit.  As he states, upon concluding the confessional prayer under 
consideration: 
20.   In this, or a similar manner, as each one feels in his conscience what sins he 
led his soul into, may he confess.  Although [I say], if his resolution is truly 
earnest, he needs no formula, for the spirit of God who is soon in the will of the 
mind will make [one] for Himself, for it is He Himself who in true earnest desire 
works repentance and represents the soul before God through the death of 
Christ. 
21.   But I do not wish to hide from the dear reader, who stands in Christian 
resolution, how it usually goes with those who have such a firm resolution.  
Indeed, [it is] different with one than with another, according to how earnest and 
great his resolution is.  For the spirit of God is not bound and it customarily uses 
many methods as He knows each [person] individually.  It is just the same as 
when one who has been in battle can give an account of it and how it went with 
him [even though each account will be different].342 
 
 And so concludes my hermeneutic preservation of the movement of repentance in 
the Böhmist practice of the way to Christ, which has brought us through the death in 
Christ unto new birth in the Light world as a new world of involvements and encounters.  
This, however, does not conclude the practice.  My preservation must now enter the 
movement of “resignation.”  Through this movement, I will continue the developing  
  
 
 342 Ibid., 37-38. 
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“conversation” between Heidegger and Böhme.  This will include a discussion of the 
soul’s encounter with Holy Sophia, and how the soul’s relationship with Sophia itself 
develops through the practice of Böhme’s way to Christ, whereby the movement of 
contemplation dawns. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SOPHIA, RESIGNATION, AND CONTEMPLATION 
 
 My hermeneutic preservation of Böhme’s movement of repentance, as it was 
developed in the preceding chapter through the “conversation” between Böhme and 
Heidegger, has helped disclose a significant dynamic in the relation of imagination to 
religious practice relevant to a radical transformation of the practitioner’s world.  It has 
also struck upon a fundamental difference in Böhme’s and Heidegger’s respective 
discourses.  This difference was revealed as that between Heidegger’s being-towards-
death and Böhme’s dying in Christ’s death. 
 One may imagine, then, that an insurmountable abyss has opened between their 
respective discourses in such a way that further “conversation” becomes impossible.  
This would be to say their discourses have thus become incommensurable.  Yet is this 
absolutely the case?  True indeed, the abyss of death yawns between them.  Nevertheless, 
there still remain points of common discourse in Heidegger’s philosophy and Böhme’s 
theosophy. 
 One such point concerns the common root that helps name their respective 
“disciplines”:  Sophia.  Another such point, intimately related to the former, deals with 
that most fundamental of movements or disclosive “moods”—which they each converge 
upon while in independent pursuit of Sophia as practitioners in their own disciplines.  
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This “mood” is resignation (Gelassenheit).  I turn now to these interrelated points of 
mutual discourse—as well as Böhme’s movement of contemplation—in order to 
conclude my hermeneutic preservation of Böhme’s practice of the way to Christ. 
 
Sophia 
 Whether through the works of Jacob Böhme or through those of Martin 
Heidegger, Sophia presents a mystery.  As to Heidegger, one should bear in mind here 
that I take him at his word when he names Sophia “Being” at the end of Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics.  This is to say the question of Sophia—“the grounding question 
of philosophy,” as Heidegger himself names it—gathers the Heideggerian canon into its 
purview.343 
 That said, it is also to be acknowledged that this question remains an open 
question for Heidegger, as it does for me.  One can understand how this must be, in a 
manner of speaking, since the question of Being/Sophia is also the question of the 
Nothing.344  Concerning which question one may say in answer, as Heidegger does, 
Nothing and Being: the Same, or, tailoring such answer to the present discourse, Nothing 
and Sophia: the Same.345 
                                                 
 343 Heidegger, Kant, 173.  I am fully aware that Heidegger is ending this work with a rhetorical 
flourish.  However, as with jest, many a truth is spoken in such rhetoric. 
 
 344 Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?,” in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, trans. David 
Farrell Krell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 82-96. 
 
 345 Ibid., 91n. c. 
 
163 
                                                
 So, how is it in this discourse with the Nothing of Sophia?346  At present, it is 
with a “dropped stitch”—a stitch, which at this time, I must pick up.  It will be recalled 
from the previous chapter that in the practice of the way to Christ, as Böhme discloses it, 
Sophia “calls” the practitioner to repentance.  Not only does She “call,” but one will also 
remember that She “hides,” She “admonishes,” and She “knows.”  We are hereby 
confronted with a seeming absurdity.  However, before one judges too quickly or 
harshly—thereby dismissing what may be of value here—I would like to return to the 
practice so that it can begin to disclose its own meaning through its preservation. 
 In “The First Treatise on True Repentance,” Böhme very characteristically 
concerns himself and the practitioner with much more than just the movement of 
repentance.  In this Treatise, as he often does in any particular work, Böhme attempts to 
gather the whole in his exposition of its stated part.  Thus, as the First Treatise continues 
to unfold beyond the issue of death and new birth (disclosed in my previous chapter), we 
are already introduced to resignation and what transpires in its movement ahead of it’s 
stated exposition in “The Fourth Treatise on True Resignation.” 
 The case is the same with contemplation, which, albeit announced as the topic of 
the unfinished “Seventh Treatise, The Precious Gate on Divine Contemplation,” is 
nonetheless presented here in the First Treatise, as well.  The way the practitioner is 
specifically introduced to these movements is through Böhme’s treatment of the soul’s 
relationship to Sophia—as the bride of Christ—and through how this relationship is 
developed.  Böhme includes the following warning as an essential part of his treatment: 
52.   Dear reader, do not treat this an uncertain story.  This is the true ground and 
contains the whole Holy Scripture for in this book is the life of Jesus Christ 
 
 346 This is an overt allusion to “What is Metaphysics?.” 
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clearly depicted, even as it is known by the author himself, for this was his way.  
He gives you the best that he has.  May God give the increase.  There is known 
to be a heavy judgment on the one who scorns this.  Let him be warned.347 
 
 We are so cautioned.  I include this warning not simply because the “dear reader” 
needs to be aware of a certain risk involved here, but rather to highlight how vital for 
Böhme is the soul’s relationship to Sophia.  It is as stated, “the best that he has.”  This 
should not be taken as hyperbole. 
 As depicted in The Way to Christ, the unfolding drama of the relationship 
between the soul and Sophia begins with the new birth—as does Böhme’s movement of 
resignation—although “technically” speaking, that the relationship begins here, is clearly 
not the case.  Nevertheless, the new birth in the life of the Böhmist Christian changes 
everything in a most fundamental way.  This fact should be clear from my previous 
chapter.  Therefore, to use the new birth in this way as a milestone has significant 
heuristic value for the practitioner. 
 The event of the new birth, as disclosed, heralds the practitioner’s union with 
Christ and corresponding awakening to—or horizoning in—the Light world.  This should 
also be understood as the radical transformation whereby the practitioner is actually born 
to the Böhmist Christian life and the inner Church.  And certainly, as stated, it is no 
simple thing.  It follows, then, that such a life only begins here.  In a manner of speaking, 
one is only a babe in Christ at this time.  This is also, or perhaps even especially, the case 
for one who is reborn or rethrown to “self” remembrance in the “external world” of the 
threefold life.  It is with such a practitioner that we will concerns ourselves now. 
 
 347 Boehme, Way to Christ, 62. 
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 Böhme gives us to witness in the First Treatise that, through the new birth, the 
practitioner immediately encounters “noble Sophia.”  In this encounter, among other 
things, Sophia “kisses” the practitioner, bestows upon her a victor’s crown, and promises 
Herself to marriage with her soul in Christ.  She then withdraws with the crown, leaving 
the soul to mature and be tested, with the additional promise that She will revisit the soul 
in the external world from time to time.  Such is the short form of the encounter.  The 
practitioner after Sophia’s withdrawal, among other things, must come to abide in true 
resignation and stand the tests of temptation, all the while walking the way revealed by 
the Holy Spirit and the Gospels of Jesus Christ’s life among us.  Thus, it is witnessed for 
the soul in the new birth. 
 It is instructive to communicate somewhat more specifically what Böhme 
discloses in the First Treatise concerning this encounter, and further, how he comes to 
disclose it.348  From the outset however, it must be acknowledged again that this 
practice—particularly at this very point of encounter with Sophia—may, of course, be 
subject to a critical hermeneutic.  It is a given that such a critique would and should 
include a multitude of varying feminist perspectives.  Nonetheless, it is also important to 
remember that such a critique is not my task in this hermeneutic preservation. 
 Yet for those who are called to the critique, I would recommend Elliot Wolfson’s 
Language, Eros, Being as a source for an appropriate critical beginning in just such a 
 
 348 I would like to note for the reader that what follows will incorporate several long quotations in 
fairly rapid succession.  Rather than force an abbreviated summary or restatement, it is necessary to retain 
portions of the full text in order to communicate the practice appropriately without doing significant 
violence to it. 
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vein.349  I indicate this text as an appropriate beginning since it is still relatively rare to 
discover a critical hermeneut with the requisite background in esoteric studies.  Wolfson 
has this background, and more.  For my part and purposes, I must instead return to my 
own task of hermeneutic preservation. 
 Böhme introduces Sophia in the First Treatise very shortly after the confessional 
prayer discussed in my previous chapter.  In the section entitled “A Short Suggestion,” he 
makes this introduction: 
26.   Dear soul, for this [undertaking] earnestness is required.  There must not 
simply be a repetition of such words.  An earnest, resolute will must pursue this 
or it will not be attained, for if the soul wishes to obtain Christ’s conqueror’s 
crown from the noble Virgin Sophia, [it] must court Her with great love-desire.  
It must pray for it to Her in Her holiest of Names and must come before Her in 
highly chaste humility, not as a lustful bull or wanton Venus.  As long as it is 
such, it ought not to desire such [things], nor will it receive them.  And although 
something may be received during this time, it is only a ray compared to such 
[things]. 
27.   But a chaste mind may well attain to it, so that the soul in its noble image, 
which died in Adam, might be alive.  [This is to be] understood in the heavenly 
corporeality, according to the inner ground, so that She sets a victory-crown on 
[it] which, if done, is again taken away from the soul and as a crown laid aside, 
as one crowns a king and afterwards the crown is secured.  Thus it also happens 
to the soul since it is still surrounded with the house of sin, so that if it should 
fall again, its crown would not be dirtied.  To the children who have known and 
experienced this it is said clearly enough.  A godless (pig-man) is not worthy to 
know more about this.350 
 
 The specific context of the practice under discussion in the above text is that of 
the new birth.  There are several points in this “suggestion” that I would like to highlight 
at this time.  The first is that leading to the new birth, one must engage or gather one’s 
will.  This issue was disclosed in the previous chapter, and it is reflected again in the 
 
 349 See Elliot R. Wolfson, Language, Eros, Being:  Kabbalistic Hermeneutics and Poetic 
Imagination (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). 
 
 350 Boehme, Way to Christ, 39-40. 
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above quotation.  However, as will be witnessed shortly, after the new birth, the 
practitioner’s relationship to the will shall change.  One must bear this in mind.  The next 
point, related to the first, is that Böhme now gives us to understand that in the act of 
turning one’s desire to God, such turning to must include Sophia.  Not only must the 
practitioner include Her, one “must court Her with great love-desire.”  Further, the 
practitioner must pray to Her for the victor’s crown that is of the new birth.  The final 
point I would like to highlight here is that in such turning and praying to Sophia, the 
practitioner must be chaste and humble before Her. 
 What is disclosed here of the human-Divine drama is that Sophia gives the new 
birth.  Further, although “She wishes to crown you more than you want [to be crowned],” 
She nonetheless cannot be willed or coerced.351  Even though the practitioner who is 
gathered into the Böhmist world must gather herself—thereby self-willing such gathering 
unto Christ’s death—self-willing before Sophia is to no avail.  Yet Sophia responds to the 
soul.  More specifically, She responds to the living-Word in the soul and Ungrund’s 
Desire to manifestation.  Ultimately, it also may be said, Sophia gives the Divine Life. 
 Lest I leap too far ahead, I must return again to the practice and to what more it 
reveals.  After Sophia’s introduction in the First Treatise, Böhme offers a prayer as an 
exemplar to be uttered at the new birth.  Hereby, one sees directly expressed the 
transformation being claimed.  Böhme prays: 
30.   . . . Therefore my soul wraps itself now with its desires in the Word that 
became man, that became flesh and blood, that broke sin and death in my 
humanity, that transformed wrath into love in my soul, that took the power from 
death and the victory from hell in soul and body, and that made an open gate to 
the clear presence of Your power for my soul.  I have directed my soul’s hunger 
 
 351 Ibid., 44-45. 
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and desire into this most holy Word O great, most holy God, and I come now 
before You and cry in my hunger through the Word that was made flesh and 
blood.  O living Source, because Your Word has become the life in our flesh, I 
grasp it, in my soul’s desire, as my own life and I press it to You in my soul’s 
desire by Your Word in Christ’s flesh . . . . 
    O life of my flesh and soul, in Christ my brother, I cry to You in my soul’s 
hunger and pray to You with all my powers, although they are weak.  Give me 
what You have granted and promised me in my Saviour Jesus Christ . . . . 
    . . . I call through Your holy blood and death within me.352 
 
 As claimed, one enters thereby the new life in Christ.  Böhme subsequently 
discloses this new life in the following section of the First Treatise that is simply called 
“Guide”: 
34.   Christ was tempted in the wilderness.  If you wish to clothe yourself in 
Him, you must follow His whole way from His incarnation to His ascension.  
Even though you cannot nor dare not do this as He did, you must nevertheless 
enter His way completely, and ever die to the soul’s vanity, for in this way the 
Virgin Sophia weds Herself to the soul only by this characteristic that sprouts in 
the soul through Christ’s death as a new growth that is [rooted] in heaven.353 
 
 Böhme thus leads the practitioner in the First Treatise along the way she must 
traverse.  The way is revealed as both the way to Christ and the way of Christ.  Further, 
we now also come to understand this is the way to marriage with Sophia—“the marriage 
of the lamb”: 
38.   If the soul remains firm here and conquers the devil in all his attacks, and 
pays no attention to temporal things for the love of the noble Sophia, the 
precious conqueror’s crown will be given to it as a sign of victory.  Then the 
Virgin [Sophia] will come to the soul.  She has revealed Herself in the precious 
Name JESUS as Christ the serpent-treader, as the anointed of God.  She kisses 
[the soul] completely inwardly with her sweet love and presses love into its 
desire as a sign of victory.  Here Adam according to his heavenly part is 
resurrected from the dead in Christ.  Of this I cannot write; there is no pen in the 
world with which to do it for this is the marriage of the lamb when the noble 
 
 352 Ibid., 41-42. 
 
 353 Ibid., 44. 
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pearl is sown with great triumph, although it is first but small, like a mustard 
seed, as Christ says [Matthew 17:20].354 
 
Hereby, the practitioner is given to understand that this is ultimately where her practice 
leads.  Having become Christ, she is then to marry her bride Sophia—of which no more 
may be said. 
 Although one may speak no more of the marriage of the lamb, more certainly may 
be said concerning the practice and Sophia, and Böhme does just that in the First 
Treatise.  Before closing this Treatise with a short Morning and then an Evening Prayer 
(for the practitioner’s edification), Böhme offers what I believe is a most radical 
disclosure.  This occurs in the section entitled “A Little Prayer, or Conversation.”  Böhme 
introduces it with the following: 
45.   When Christ the cornerstone moves in the corrupted image of man in his 
deep conversion and repentance, the Virgin Sophia appears in the movement of 
Christ’s spirit in the corrupted image in Her Virginal clothing before the soul.  
Before Her the soul is frightened in its impurity so that all its sins are first 
awakened and before Her they are horrified and trembling.  Then judgement 
[sic] comes over the sins of the soul so that it turns back in its unworthiness 
ashamed of its beautiful lover [ashamed of itself before its beautiful lover] 
[insert mine]; it turns into itself and rejects itself as altogether unworthy to 
receive such a treasure.  We who have tasted this heavenly treasure understand 
this but no one else does.  But the noble Sophia draws Herself near to the soul’s 
being and kisses it in a friendly manner and tinctures the dark fire of the soul 
with Her love beams and penetrates the soul with Her loving kiss.  Then the soul 
leaps in its body for great joy in the power of this virginal love.  It triumphs and 
praises the great God, by virtue of the noble Sophia. 
    I will now present a short introduction as to what happens when the bride 
takes the bridegroom to the heart.  [It is presented] to the reader who may not 
yet have arrived at this place for his consideration if he desires to travel after us 
and to tread the paths where one plays with Sophia. 
    If this happens, as is described above, the soul rejoices in its body and says:355 
 
 
 354 Ibid., 45. 
 
 355 Ibid., 56-57. 
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Then the little prayer begins as a conversation between the soul and Sophia.  I offer it 
here in an abbreviated form: 
Soul:   O great God, now may my praise, thanks, strength, glory and honour be 
to You . . . because You have redeemed me from the instigator of anguish.  O 
beautiful Love, my heart grasps You.  Where have You been so long? . . . I give 
myself unto Your love.  Ah, before You I am dark.  Make me light.  O noble 
Love, give me but Your sweet pearl.  Lay it in me. 
    O great God in Christ Jesus . . . You have forgiven me my sins and have filled 
me with Your power. . . . My bones rejoice in Your power; my heart plays in 
Your love.  Eternal thanks be to You because You have redeemed me from hell 
and made death in me to be life. . . . O sweet Love.  Let me not bend from You 
gain.  Give unto me Your crown of pearls and stay with me. a 
Then the Virgin Sophia Speaks to the Soul:   My noble bridegroom, my strength 
and might, be always welcome to me.  How have you forgotten me so long that 
I, in great sorrow, had to stand before your door and knock? . . . you turned your 
face from me; your ears had left my land. . . . You had taken the devil as a lover, 
. . . you have broken my marriage, and have had a strange love affair, and lost 
me, your God-given bride, [and caused me] to stand, a crushed being, without 
the strength of your fire’s might.  Without your fire’s might I have not been able 
to be happy, for you are my husband; by you my own brightness is revealed.  
You are able to reveal my hidden miracles in your fire-life . . . . Apart from me 
you are a dark house in which is only anguish and pain and an enemy’s torment. 
    . . . Lead your desire into me, and ignite me.  By my meekness, I shall then 
change your fire-beams into a white-light, and direct my love through your fire-
beams into your fire’s essence . . . . 
    . . . Kiss me, then, with your desire . . . . Then will I show you all my beauty . 
. . . All holy angels rejoice with us now . . . . remain faithful . . . . Work your 
iracles in my love, for which God awakened you. m 
Soul:   . . . In You I see God’s mercy that earlier my foreign love had hidden. . . . 
h gracious Love, give me Your pearl so that I may remain in such joy forever. A 
Sophia:   My dear lover and great treasure, your beginning gives me the greatest 
joy.  Through the deep gates of God, through God’s wrath, through hell and 
death I have broken into the house of your misery, and I have given you my love 
out of grace, and released you . . . . I have kept my faith with you, but you beg 
me now for a serious thing, which I do not eagerly wish to risk with you. . . . 
think how you previously lost it . . . . 
    I shall keep my pearl to myself and shall dwell in your corrupted humanity 
now again made alive in me in the heaven within you . . . . 
    . . . You must work and beget in this time. . . . I press through your branches 
into the sap and bear fruit on your boughs, and you do not know it. 
    . . . I shall often visit you . . . . But my pearl I will not give you at this time as 
your own.  You must remain in resignation and hear what the Lord plays in your 
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harmony.  Moreover, you must give Him the sound and essence of your tone by 
my power, for now you are a messenger of His mouth . . . . 
    . . . Work in your fiery characteristic . . . . We wish to build Christ’s vineyard. 
. . . We shall bring about in this world what God has foreordained for us [to do]; 
we shall serve Him in His temple which we ourselves are.  Amen.356 
 
 Böhme thus brings the practitioner, who has been gathered into this world and 
who has gathered herself within it—even unto death and the new birth in the threefold 
life—to witness the farthest reaches of what may be said concerning the practitioner’s 
course in this “external” world.  It is interesting to note in this context that this farthest 
reach of the practice is disclosed through prayer as conversation—moreover, a 
conversation with Sophia. 
 Having followed the course of this hermeneutic preservation to this point, it 
should be no surprise that I now claim to understand this conversation as an “actual” 
event of prayer.  Furthermore, I also claim that we are introduced here directly to the fruit 
of contemplation.  More will be said of that later.  For now, let me clarify my first claim. 
 In “A Little Prayer, or Conversation,” according to my interpretation in this 
preservation, Böhme is not merely creating a stylized medium for communicating certain 
“truths” of this practice that otherwise would be problematic in terms of bringing them to 
voice.  Neither is it a simple sublimation of his infantile fantasies nor a psychotic 
hallucination.  Rather, this conversation is more a transcription of a conversational event 
that has occurred in Böhme’s life of prayer.  This is an event that the practitioner, who 
follows the way disclosed by Böhme, may herself, in her own way and voice, come to 
experience.  This interpretation is not only supported by my particular hermeneutic 
 
 356 Ibid., 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62.  [For purposes of readability, verse numbers have been removed, 
and original text headings have been reformatted and reproduced as above.] 
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preservation presented here.  It is also supported by the text of The Way to Christ.  But 
how can one come to understand how such an event may be? 
 Succinctly, and in terms of what has gone before, via the collapse and recasting of 
the practitioner’s ownmost ontological/imaginal horizoning, new possibilities of ontic 
encounter have become actual through its nascent gathering.  Hereby, Sophia (as well as 
Saints and angels) may appear to the practitioner.357  This is not through the ontic casting 
of “my” imagination, but it is rather within that imaginal ontological horizoning whereby 
I am as Being-with.  Thus, the earlier claim that Sophia will not be willed or coerced—
clearly demonstrated in the conversation—can also be understood in a deeper way.  
Nonetheless, this is only part of the answer regarding how one can come to understand 
how such a prayer event may be. 
 Not for the last time, I must ask the question again:  How is it in this discourse 
with the Nothing of Sophia?  I would say in answer for the practitioner, it is 
progressively more personal in intimacy and meaning.  As absurd as this may seem as an 
answer, it can suffice for the practitioner who lives this practice.  However, for the 
theosophist—or the philosopher, for that matter—such an answer most likely will not be 
satisfying without further clarification.  Therefore, I must turn again to Böhme’s more 
particularly theosophical discourse. 
 It will be recalled from Chapter Three of this dissertation that in Böhme’s 
Theosophical disclosure of phenomenality, Sophia is first understood as Ungrund’s 
“Other.”  She is that Nothing of excessing Desire’s originary “contraction” that shows, or 
perhaps better, opens a clearing for showing.  As such, She is often characterized as a 
 
 357 Ibid., 30. 
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mirror—a “clear brightness.”358  Or, as one can characterize Her further, She is the empty 
luminosity of the Nothing mirroring Ungrund’s primordial wakefulness as well as what is 
then separated of the Word through the Anguished Wheel of Essences in the 
subsequently disclosed Will359—which further mirroring, gives the Being of 
manifestation as phenomenality.  One finds a ready example of just such a 
characterization of Sophia as mirror in the First of Böhme’s Six Theosophic Points.360 
 What may follow from this is an understanding of Sophia as first “Other” who 
“is” as othering.  As such, She does not create, but She “gives” being-as-other.  Further, I 
propose that this mirroring othering be understood in terms of giving semblance as the 
same, which one should hear now as “image and likeness” given to be free excessing 
desire ultimately as beings.  Hereby, it may be said, the play of phenomenality is manifest 
of and as the sway of the twofold as Ungrund and Grund—even in imaginal opening and 
gathering to revealing concealment. 
 Still harkening back to Chapter Three, it will also be recalled that understanding 
the Nothing of Ungrund as Excessing Desire further discloses Ungrund as “Pure” Person.  
“Pure” Person though, not to be misunderstood as a person, can still be addressed most 
appropriately as “who.”  The Nothing of Sophia, as Ungrund’s “Other” that gives 
semblance as the same, even as Ungrund’s semblance and same, is likewise most 
appropriately addressed as “who”—even as She who gives beings to their being. 
 
 358 Boehme, “First Point” in “Six Theosophic Points,” 7. 
 
 359 See the “Source Spirits” in Chapter Three above. 
 
 360 Boehme, “First Point” in “Six Theosophic Points,” 5-22. 
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 However, if we approach Sophia from the other side of her mirroring, according 
to Böhme, we witness (as we have seen), a difference—even in the sameness.  Sophia can 
then show Herself as semblance of our sameness.  That is, as a being who, into the new 
born horizoning in the Light world, can come to the practitioner in the threefold life to 
kiss her and speak to her and, ultimately, to “marry” Herself to her. 
 Thus, we have an intimation of Sophia as the Bride of Christ.  That is, even as the 
Nothing of the Word—the Heart of Ungrund’s Will to manifestation—manifests in 
Christ as a being through the mystery of the Incarnation, so we see it here with Sophia, 
who “incarnates” in the Light world to be His bride.  Furthermore, as we are given to 
understand this by Böhme, She is to be the bride of every soul who becomes a branch of 
His vine through the new birth. 
 However, it must also be acknowledged that attempting to grasp Sophia as a mere 
being is altogether to miss Her mark.  Similarly, as claimed in traditional or orthodox 
Christianity, to understand Jesus as a mere man is altogether to miss His mark.  Thus, as 
we continue to struggle to bring His Incarnation to “reasonable” language, so it is also 
with Sophia.  Perhaps in Her case, the most appropriate way of bringing Her to discourse 
is through each one’s ownmost encounter with Her—whether as Being or as seemingly 
being.361 
 Now I ask the question again:  How is it in this discourse with the Nothing of 
Sophia?  I am hopeful this question will resonate in a new way when I answer again—
that it is progressively more personal in intimacy and meaning.  This intimacy only 
deepens when one considers again Böhme’s “Little Prayer, or Conversation.”  Through 
 
 361 What I am attempting to give voice to is Sophia’s kenosis as a radical abasement of Being.  
One should be hearing an extension of Vattimo’s weakening ontology in this. 
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this prayer’s conversation, Sophia tells the soul that She will dwell in the soul’s corrupted 
humanity now made alive in Her.  She will dwell in the soul in the heaven imaginally 
opened to the soul via the new birth in the threefold life.  Thus, it is Sophia in the soul 
and the soul in Sophia, yet each face-to-face, lovingly addressing the other. 
 Further, we witness here in this mutual indwelling that there is also great mutual 
longing.  Setting aside for a moment the soul’s longing, which it may be said is for the 
soul’s ownmost being-with, Sophia here directly reveals the source of her longing.  She 
desires and needs the soul—as fire-source of desire—in order to reveal fully Herself.  
Without such revealing, She cannot be happy.  This is to say that we are the source of 
Sophia’s ownmost self-revelation and, thereby, happiness—even as She is the source of 
our being, and Her revelation is through our being as beings in the play of the Divine life.  
This is intimate, indeed.  However, before Sophia will reveal the fullness of all Her 
beauty, She instructs the soul that she (the soul) must remain in resignation.  Therefore, it 
is to resignation that I must now turn. 
 
Böhme’s Resignation 
 I have characterized resignation, the second movement of Böhme’s practice of the 
way to Christ, earlier in this preservation as the fundamental “mood” of the practitioner 
in this world.  I would like here to clarify this characterization.  In the previous chapter 
regarding the movement of repentance, through my hermeneutic preservation, repentance 
was disclosed as the “mood” whereby the practitioner—in appropriating her ownmost 
being-guilty—could gather herself authentically and as a whole unto her death in Christ’s 
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death.  Through this death, the practitioner and her threefold worlds are fundamentally 
transformed in the new birth. 
 It should be clear from Heidegger’s analytic of conscience—which was engaged 
to help clarify this movement—that such new birth in no way absolves the practitioner 
from her ownmost being-guilty.  To be as Dasein, according to this analytic, is to be 
guilty as the null basis of a nullity.  This situation has not changed.  Neither, as I would 
have it, has changed the importance for the practitioner of being gathered authentically 
and as a whole into the world of the practice. 
 However, through death, the new birth, and the practitioner’s transformation—as 
opening and being gathered into the Light world in the threefold life—the dynamics of 
the practice do change.  This change has been characterized as an alteration of the 
practitioner’s relationship to her will as the whereby of her ownmost giving direction to 
her imagination and desire.  As will be seen, this alteration further gives rise to a 
transformation of understanding, and ultimately, of discourse. 
 Böhme discusses the movement of resignation in “The Fourth Treatise on True 
Resignation.”  He begins this Treatise with what may be considered a cautionary tale.  
That is, he reminds the practitioner how things went with the devil and Adam, and how it 
was that they fell from “resignation” in the Divine life.362  He cautions the practitioner 
that the same has occurred to many who are new born to the threefold life.363  Further, he 
informs the practitioner just how this occurs.  Succinctly, this occurs because one allows 
 
 362 Boehme, Way to Christ, 114-115. 
 
 363 Ibid., 121. 
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“the light of understanding to shine in the self.”364  To understand this appropriately, one 
must consider Böhme’s image of the human as he gives it to us here in the Fourth 
Treatise. 
 This image of the human begins with the assumption of the interpenetration of 
Böhme’s three “worlds” in the threefold life.  As characterized in my previous chapter, 
the practitioner abides in multiple interpenetrating horizonings.  Building on this 
assumption, Böhme discloses the “danger” concerning one who falls.  It is that when such 
a practitioner is born to the Light world, and “the sun of the great look of God’s holiness 
shines . . . reason mirrors itself in it and the will enters into self, that is, into its own 
search, and wishes to probe the centrum out of which the light shines and to overcome it 
in its self.”365  This is to say that the Light of the Light world enters the practitioner’s 
reason in the external world. 
 Hereby, according to Böhme, reason elevates itself in the self of the practitioner 
who, in a manner of speaking, misappropriates the reflected light of reason and mistakes 
it for the source of the Light in the Divine life.  The self then takes up its own will in the 
external world to seek out its own center in its “natural” life according to what its reason 
reveals.  Then pride grows in the practitioner, whereby the devil in the darkness of the 
dark-fire world gains access to her.366 
 
 364 Ibid., 115. 
 
 365 Ibid., 115-116. 
 
 366 Ibid., 116-117. 
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 According to Böhme, the difficulties for such a practitioner in the threefold life of 
interpenetrating worlds do not end here.  When the light of reason is thus ignited, its light 
draws even the stars.  Böhme explains it thus: 
13.   And when the willing spirit of the creature swings up with the rational light 
into the centrum, as into the self, and enters its own delusion, it once again 
leaves God’s light.  Now the devil finds an open door into it [the will], and8 a 
beautifully decorated house, rational light, as a dwelling, and he takes the seven 
forms of the life characteristics,367 which have gone out from God into the self 
like a hypocrite.  Then he [the practitioner] [insert mine] turns inward and sets 
his desire to the trust of his self and into a false imagination.  When the willing 
spirit sees itself in the forms of the life characteristics in the external light, then 
it sinks into it as if it were drunk and then the stars grasp it and lead their mighty 
constellation into it to search out the wonders of God in it and to be able to 
reveal themselves in them.  All creatures long for God, and even if the stars are 
not able to grasp God’s spirit, they would much rather have a house of light in 
which they can find pleasure than a locked house in which there is no stability. 
14.   Thus this man goes on as if he had become drunk with the constellation.  
He conceives great wonderful things and has a continual leader in the 
constellations.  The devil always notes where a gate is open for him, by which 
he may ignite the life centrum so that the willing spirit in its pride, in its 
presumption (or even in greed), may travel to the heights. 
15.   Out of this, one’s own honour stands forth so that the rational will wishes 
to be honoured.  For he thinks that he has the meat of salvation since he has a 
rational light, and that he can set in order the locked house, which God easily 
can unlock.  He thinks that honour belongs to him since he has reached rational 
understanding.368 
 
 Through the above, Böhme provides the practitioner with an understanding of 
how things can go wrong in the new birth.  He also, hereby, provides an example of how 
reason—at the birth of modernity—was critiqued by the “other tonality.”  Reason, though 
an “eye of time” or “mirror of the external,”369 never escapes the horizoning in the 
 
 367 These are of the Seven Source Spirits [Quellgeister].  See Chapter Three above. 
 
 368 Boehme, Way to Christ, 117-118.  [Translator’s note 8: (alternate reading in Boehme’s 
manuscript) MS: and finds.] 
 
 369 Ibid., 119 and 116. 
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external world.  Moreover, its tendency is to elevate itself, which draws not only the 
stars, but also the will, desire, and imagination into its ordering. 
 Thereby, the practitioner falls back to the state of her being as before the new 
birth.  Only now, with reason having been so ignited, it becomes more difficult for the 
practitioner to attain the Light of the Divine life, since reason now weaves the wonders 
revealed by the stars and the processes of the “natural” world, which then hold the 
practitioner in her pride of such rational understanding to the “external” world.370 
 Böhme continues “The Fourth Treatise” by disclosing another way.  Rather 
tellingly, he begins the section entitled, “A True Christian’s Processus, How He Is To 
Go” with the following: 
19.   Reason stops me and says, “It is proper and good that a man reach God’s 
light as well as the light of external nature and reason, so that he might order his 
life wisely, according to Holy Scripture.”371 
 
To this, Böhme replies, “Yes, it is proper . . . . But listen to how you are to use it [the 
light].”372  Böhme continues by instructing the practitioner that when reason is illumined 
in the new birth and one comes to know oneself “immediately in the self that is good and 
useful,” in that moment: 
23.   The will of the creature with all reason and desire should completely sink 
into itself, like an unworthy child that is not worthy of this high grace, taking to 
itself no knowledge or understanding, nor praying for nor desiring any 
knowledge from God in the creaturely self.  Rather, it is only to sink itself 
unaffected and simply into the love and grace of God in Christ Jesus, and 
[being] dead to its desires, give itself completely to the life of God in love, so 
 
 370 Ibid., 116. 
 
 371 Ibid., 118. 
 
 372 Ibid., 118-119.  This is not the only time Böhme engages in “conversation” with Reason.  “The 
Seventh Treatise, The Precious Gate on Divine Contemplation” includes an extended version of just such a 
“conversation,” in which one can see exactly how reasonable Böhme’s Reason can be. 
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that He might use it as His instrument in whatever way or however He 
wishes.373 
 
If reason attempts to raise itself up, “the will of the desire must bow to earth, and bring 
itself into the deepest humility and most absurd ignorance.”374  This is the practitioner’s 
introduction to resignation. 
 The practitioner hereby begins to develop resignation as fundamental “mood.”  In 
true resignation, as Böhme further discloses it, the practitioner must perpetually “sink” 
her will “into the nothing.”375  By thus dissolving her self-will, the practitioner then does 
not enter into reason’s elevation with its pride and delusions in a self-willed life.376  She 
abides rather in the nothing of humility whereby God can move her as His instrument—
even to the study of the “natural arts,” as incongruous as that may sound.377 
 Through perhaps years or decades of practice378—enduring temptations and 
maturing in Christ’s life—by abiding in the deepening development of the nothing of 
self-will and most absurd ignorance, the practitioner may awaken to that true 
understanding which is the dawning of contemplation.  According to Böhme, this occurs 
as an event or activity of the Holy Spirit, by which “He ignites the life-forms with His 
love-flames.”379 
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 374 Ibid., 119-120. 
 
 375 Ibid., 121. 
 
 376 Ibid. 
 
 377 Ibid., 122. 
 
 378 Ibid., 49. 
 
 379 Ibid., 120. 
 
181 
                                                
 In one of Böhme’s characterizations of this activity, he states: 
36.   The more reason sinks into absurd humility before God, and the more 
unworthy it holds itself [to be] before God, [so much] more it dies to its own 
desire; and [so much] more it is pierced through by God’s Spirit, who brings it 
to the highest knowledge, so that it may see the great wonders of God.  God’s 
Spirit acts only in resigned humility, which neither seeks nor desires itself, 
which in itself desires to be simple before God.  This [it is] that God’s Spirit 
grasps and leads into His wonders. 
37.   God has not created us for self-dominion but as instruments of His wonder 
by which He Himself wishes to reveal His wonders.  The resigned will trusts 
God and hopes for all good from Him, but self-will orders itself for it has broken 
off from God.380 
 
Thus, Reason is redeemed—but as we see, only in true resignation.  This is Böhme’s 
claim.  In “The Fourth Treatise,” he thereby lays the ground for the practitioner’s 
understanding of resignation.  This understanding, it may be said, develops through one’s 
being of the sway of the twofold.  It also develops—or is achieved—through practice.  
This latter point cannot be overemphasized. 
 I will elaborate these points further.  It has already been witnessed from the 
Fourth Treatise that, in Böhme’s discourse, both the devil and Adam fell from 
resignation.381  What this clearly expresses is that resignation is acknowledged as the 
fundamental “mood” of beings vis-à-vis the Divine.  It is the prelapsarian state.  As such, 
on the basis of all that has gone before, resignation can be characterized as an originary 
abiding—or “dwelling”—in the wherein of one’s ownmost Divine self-revelation as the 
being one is called to be.  Or better yet, as suggested by Sophia in Her conversation with 
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the soul, one is hereby to be “the sound and essence” of one’s ownmost “tone” offered in 
harmony with the Divine Life as the Being-with of phenomenality.382 
 With regard to phenomenality, we see again in the Fourth Treatise, as we did in 
the First Treatise (there concerning Sophia), that the soul is to be a manifest center or 
fire-source of Divine desire, whose being is given to reveal Divine wonders in and as the 
play of phenomenality.  This is to say, we are to abide in resignation in and as the sway 
of the twofold of Ungrund and Grund. 
 Nonetheless, such abiding proves to be difficult.  As already disclosed, even in the 
new birth, reason tends to self-elevation.  That is, we tend toward self-grounding.  
Thereby, we fall from the sway.  Certainly, one never escapes it.  All phenomenality, 
according to this hermeneutic, is of the sway.  Yet our fall can be said to be into an 
assumption of Ground as absolute, and into a life self-willed on the presumption of such 
Ground—particularly in terms of what “one” says concerning it.  Taking this a bit further, 
we also tend hereby to reify the horizoning of the “external” world and our being in it.  
This reification, then, obscures—or even initially hinders—our opening or being born to 
the Light world. 
 The practice of “resignation”, leading to true resignation counteracts these trends.  
When the practitioner brings herself into “most absurd ignorance,” reason’s elevation is 
frustrated, as has been disclosed.  However, as important, or even more important, to the 
practitioner is the sinking of her will “into the nothing.”  In so doing, the practitioner 
comes to abide in the sway by rooting her will in the nothing of Ungrund’s Desire to 
 
 382 Ibid., 61. 
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being.  Thereby the practitioner ultimately becomes the instrument of God’s wonders in 
the threefold life. 
 This occurs in its fullest sense when the practice attains to true resignation as the 
originary abiding and fundamental “mood.”  When true resignation is thus achieved, the 
Holy Spirit “ignites the life-forms” of the Seven Source Spirits “with His love-flames” 
and brings the practitioner to “highest knowledge.”  The practitioner then is made ready 
for the marriage to Sophia.  The practitioner also thereby attains the movement of 
contemplation.  It may now be said that contemplation is better typified here as 
understanding and discourse than as “mood.” 
 
Contemplation 
 The movement of contemplation is less “defined” than it is “demonstrated” [or 
performed] through the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Treatises of Böhme’s The Way to 
Christ.  This demonstration, along with what was disclosed concerning true resignation as 
fundamental “mood,” constitute the basis of my claim that contemplation is better 
characterized in this practice as understanding and discourse than as “mood.”383 
 Contemplation is demonstrated and so disclosed in each of these Treatises, quite 
tellingly, through the discourse of conversation.  These conversations are specifically 
intended to illumine the understanding of different types of readers.  In the Sixth Treatise, 
there is a conversation between a Teacher and a Student.384  The Seventh Treatise 
                                                 
 383 It is to be noted that, according to this characterization of the movement of contemplation in the 
practice of the way to Christ, contemplation is the fruit of practice, per se.  It does not then, as one might 
presume, entail a specific injunction to practice. 
 
 384 Ibid., 171-193. 
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includes an edifying conversation between Böhme and Reason.385  And in the Eighth is a 
conversation between an Enlightened Soul and an Unenlightened Soul.386 
 At the outset of this brief section on contemplation, it should be noted that the 
specific illuminating content of these conversations will not be the focus in this 
preservation.  To engage this content would take me far from the stated task of this 
dissertation.  My task has been to retrieve the question of imagination and its relation to 
religious practice through the preservation of Böhme’s practice of the way to Christ in 
conversation with Heidegger. 
 Having arrived at the movement of contemplation—the culmination and limit of 
the practice as presented in The Way to Christ—this preservation is complete.  
Nonetheless, it is also important to acknowledge that in characterizing contemplation as 
understanding and discourse, I have struck upon a particularly complex problem.  I will 
elaborate this point. 
 In attaining contemplation, the practitioner in true resignation is brought to 
“highest knowledge” by the Holy Spirit.  This constitutes an illumination or 
transformation of the practitioner’s understanding, which initiates the practitioner’s own 
particular apprehension of the deep workings of the Divine in the threefold life.387  This 
includes the sounding of one’s ownmost tone in harmony with the tone of others.  It 
includes “hearing” and “seeing” God with the same “hearing” and “seeing” with which 
 
 385 Ibid., 194-212.  It should be acknowledged that “The Seventh Treatise, The Precious Gate on 
Divine Contemplation” is not composed in its entirety as a conversation.  Yet the conversation does initiate 
the developing illuminative discourse of this Treatise’s monologue. 
 
 386 Ibid., 227-244. 
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God hears and sees oneself.388  Further, as has been seen, it includes entering into 
intimate conversation with Sophia, as well as with others, in the multiple imaginal 
horizonings of worlds. 
 What one witnesses here is a profound transformation from the practice of 
“resignation” (with its most “absurd ignorance” and associated silence) to true 
resignation (with its illumined understanding), which can, and often does, come to 
language in a flood.  One may recall the flood of works composed by Böhme in the final 
years of his life.  Thus, we come to the problem.  It is the problem of the question of 
language.389  This is certainly a problem and a question that have captivated 
contemporary discourse with their complexities. 
 Herewith I arrive at a limit as well.  To move beyond this limit, I must retrieve the 
question of language relative to a preservation of Böhme’s discourse on language and its 
“relation to” Being, in conversation with Heidegger.  Such a retrieval, preservation, and 
conversation require a separate work altogether.  This is certainly so, since there is much 
that Böhme can offer in terms of opening a radically different direction for our discourse 
on language—just as he has done, in my estimation, for our discourse on imagination and 
its relation to religious practice. 
 Nevertheless, having acknowledged said limit does not mean that I have 
exhausted what may be said in this dissertation.  There is yet one small task.  I see this 
task as important, not necessarily for its strong evidentiary potential at this time, but 
 
 388 Boehme, Way to Christ, 171. 
 
 389 A curiosity concerning the “strange” nature of this preservation of Böhme’s practice should be 
brought to light at this point.  That is, it would seem that in tracking the practitioner’s transformation we 
move here from “mirroring” to “symbolization,” thus “recapitulating” stages of development well known to 
psychoanalytic discourse.  This “sameness” notwithstanding, I am hopeful that the rather radical “nature” 
of the transformation Böhme is articulating is not thereby obscured. 
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rather for its strong suggestive potential.  I am referring of course to the continuation of 
the “conversation” with Heidegger. 
 Throughout this dissertation, Heidegger has been engaged to help clarify obscured 
dynamics in Böhme’s practice, so to further and deepen this dissertation’s discourse.  
Such remains the case here.  The present issue at hand concerns the bare possibility of a 
different type of understanding and discourse—or, if I may state it thus, the possibility of 
a different way of “thinking”—achieved as contemplation.  Heidegger can help disclose 
this possibility. 
 Heidegger addresses this issue in his short “Conversation on a Country Path 
About Thinking” (the “Conversation”).390  Of course, this is not the only work of his that 
addresses the issue.  However, this specific work resonates deeply with Böhme’s 
discourse, in that through this work, Heidegger discusses a radical possibility of thinking 
in relation to “resignation,” or “releasement.”  Discourse on Thinking (of which the 
“Conversation” is a part), is John M. Anderson’s and E. Hans Freund’s translation of 
Heidegger’s short work titled Gelassenheit.  The term “Gelassenheit” is translated and 
understood in their work as “releasement.” 
 Further background concerning the “Conversation” is in order here.  It should be 
acknowledged that I follow Anderson’s assessment of this work as he presents it in his 
introduction to Discourse on Thinking.  Anderson proposes that the “Conversation” be 
understood in relation to the sweep of Heidegger’s work concerning the question of 
Being.  That is, to understand that although Heidegger does not name Being in the 
 
 390 See Martin Heidegger, “Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking,” in Discourse on 
Thinking, A Translation of Gelassenheit, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, with an 
introduction by John M. Anderson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966). 
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“Conversation,” the question of Being is nonetheless at issue.391  Understanding the 
“Conversation” in this light allows Anderson to characterize this work in a specific way. 
 Briefly, as Anderson portrays it, Heidegger’s project in Being and Time of 
moving from Dasein’s temporality to Being, is fundamentally frustrated by the very 
horizon of human experience itself.  Rather simplistically, this is to say that 
representational thinking, which is understood as arising in relation to the horizon, 
imposes a limit whereby discourse concerning apprehension or understanding of the 
beyond-the-horizon becomes highly problematic.392 
 Therefore, in the “Conversation” and other later works, Heidegger turns to the 
articulation of the understanding of another type of thinking.  This is “meditative” or 
“mindful” thinking—besinnliches Denken.  This then, is differentiated from 
representational or “calculative” thinking—rechnendes Denken.  Whereas calculative 
thinking relates in a specific way to beings within the horizon, mindful thinking could be 
said to include “an awareness of the horizon.”393  One witnesses then, through the 
“Conversation,” how this differentiation can open the way to Being. 
 This work is as it is titled, a conversation about thinking among a “Scientist,” a 
“Teacher,” and a “Scholar.”  It is constructed in a way such that the reader enters the 
conversation seemingly in midstream.  Further, it appears that these three “protagonists” 
 
 391 John M. Anderson, introduction to Discourse on Thinking, A Translation of Gelassenheit, by 
Martin Heidegger, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), 
19-20. 
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have been in conversation before.  One finds oneself therefore feeling somewhat at a 
disadvantage. 
 Be that as it may, as this conversation unfolds, one quickly comes to one of the 
principle ways that mindful thinking is differentiated from representational thinking.  The 
Scholar tells us that, “understood in the traditional way, . . . To think is to will, and to will 
is to think.”394  The Scientist then proposes to the Scholar, “You want a non-willing in 
the sense of a renouncing of willing, so that through this we may release, or at least 
prepare to release, ourselves to the sought-for essence of a thinking that is not a 
willing.”395 
 We hereby strike upon a point of deep co-resonance between Heidegger and 
Böhme concerning the issue of resignation or “releasement.”  That is, for either, will 
must be renounced.  Further, I believe it is fair to say that for both, Sophia/Being has 
called them to it.  Affirming that, Heidegger continues in the “Conversation”: 
Scholar:   So far as we can wean ourselves from willing, we contribute to the 
wakening of releasement. a 
T eacher:   Say rather, to keeping awake for releasement. 
S cholar:   Why not, to the awakening? 
T eacher:   Because on our own we do not awaken releasement in ourselves. 
S cientist:   Thus releasement is effected from somewhere else. 
Teacher:   Not effected, but let in.396 
 
 Heidegger then sets up the way to Being through pointing out a pivotal sameness: 
Teacher:   We say that we look into the horizon.  Therefore the field of vision is 
omething open, but its openness is not due to our looking. s 
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Scholar:   Likewise we do not place the appearance of objects, which the view 
ithin a field of vision offers us, into this openness . . .  w 
S cientist:   . . . rather that comes out of this to meet us. 
Teacher:   What is evident of the horizon, then, is but the side facing us of an 
openness which surrounds us; an openness which is filled with views of the 
ppearances of what to our re-presenting are objects. a 
Scientist:   In consequence the horizon is still something else besides a horizon.  
Yet after what has been said this something else is the other side of itself, and so 
the same as itself.  You say that the horizon is the openness which surrounds us.  
But what is this openness as such, if we disregard that it can also appear as the 
orizon of our representing? h 
Teacher:   It strikes me as something like a region, an enchanted region where 
everything belonging there returns to that in which it rests.397 
 
We see then that the other side of our horizoning is the openness of the regioning, “as that 
which comes to meet us,” which regioning it may be said, then withdraws in the 
appearance of things as objects.398 
 Further, of the region, it is also disclosed: 
Teacher:   The region gathers, just as if nothing were happening, each to each 
and each to all into an abiding, while resting in itself.  Regioning is a gathering 
nd re-sheltering for an expanded resting in an abiding. a 
Scholar:   So the region itself is at once an expanse and an abiding.  It abides 
into the expanse of resting.399  It expands into the abiding of what has freely 
turned toward itself.  In view of this usage of the word, we may also say “that-
hich-regions” in place of the familiar “region.”w 
1 
Teacher:   That-which-regions is an abiding expanse which, gathering all, opens 
itself, so that in it openness is halted and held, letting everything merge in its 
own resting.400 
 
 397 Ibid., 64-65. 
 
 398 Ibid., 65. 
 
 399 The curious “fact” that “Rest” is Böhme’s seventh Source Spirit should be noted in this. 
 
 400 Heidegger, “Conversation,” 66.  [Translator’s note 1: The German word for region is Gegend.  
What is in question here, however, is not region in general, but as Heidegger says, “the region of all 
regions” (“die Gegend aller Gegenden”) or the region.  Heidegger uses an old variant of Gegend as the 
word for the region:  die Gegnet—a word that still occurs in spoken German although only in South 
German dialects.  Since an analogous variant is not available for the English counterpart, die Gegnet has 
been rendered in the text by the phrase that-which-regions.  That-which-regions reflects a movement 
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 Thereby, in the “Conversation,” a new characterization of things that appear is 
achieved.  Showing forth in “that-which-regions,” they “no longer have the character of 
objects.”  That is, they “no longer stand opposite us” for our representing.  Rather, as the 
Teacher states, “They rest in the return to the abiding of the expanse of their self-
belonging.”401 
 Yet it must still be questioned how has this new characterization—or better, this 
new thinking—been achieved?  One may answer that it is through non-willing and a non-
representing that nonetheless names.  One may also answer that it is through a 
conversation that “waits” in remaining open to the openness of that-which-regions.  
Thereby, resignation can be achieved as releasement into the openness of Being that 
gathers beings into the abiding of belonging-together.402 
 However, as it is also disclosed, we “belong to” that-which-regions as well as the 
other side of our horizoning.  Thus, it may be claimed: 
Scientist:   But if heretofore the reigning essence of thinking has been that 
transcendental-horizonal re-presenting from which releasement, because of its 
belonging to that-which-regions, releases itself; then thinking changes in 
eleasement from such a re-presenting to waiting upon that-which-regions. r 
Teacher:   Yet the nature of this waiting is releasement to that-which-regions.  
But because it is that-which-regions which then lets releasement belong to it, 
since resting in it, the nature of thinking lies, if I may say so, in the regioning of 
eleasement by that-which-regions. r 
Scholar:   Thinking is releasement to that-which-regions because its nature lies 
n the regioning of releasement. i 
 
attributed by Heidegger to die Gegnet and further emphasized by his use of the verb gegnen (to region).  
(Tr.)] 
 
 401 Ibid., 67. 
 
 402 Ibid., 67-70. 
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Teacher:   But by this you say that the nature of thinking is not determined 
through thinking and so not through waiting as such, but through the other-than-
itself, that is, through that-which-regions which as regioning first brings forth 
this nature.403 
 
 Thereby, we are led ultimately to an essential admission—insofar as “thinking is 
what distinguishes man’s nature”:404 
Scholar:   Evidently the nature of man is released to that-which-regions because 
this belongs to it so essentially, that without man that-which-regions can not be a 
coming forth of all natures, as it is.405 
 
Or, as it may be restated, Sophia/Being “needs” human nature.  It is then naught but a 
small step to the claim that Sophia “needs” the practitioner of resignation for Her 
ownmost self-revelation in contemplation or mindful thinking. 
 I herewith will conclude my developing “conversation” between Heidegger and 
Böhme in this dissertation.  Here at the end, Heidegger has clarified and so opened the 
possibility of a transformed understanding and discourse in relation to “true 
resignation”—at least insofar as it concerns Sophia/Being.  This is not to say that 
Heidegger would have “approved” of Böhme’s characterization of the encounter with 
Sophia—or mine, for that matter.  Our characterizations may be altogether too 
“barbaric,” in that they are so “sensually personified.”  However, to this type of 
criticism—though in my words—Böhme certainly could have countered, “You have not 
gone far enough.  You have received only the little ‘something’ I referred to in my 
 
 403 Ibid., 74. 
 
 404 Ibid., 58. 
 
 405 Ibid., 83. 
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introduction of Sophia.  You must press on further into Christ’s death and life to win Her 
pearl in marriage.”406 
 Jacob Böhme and Martin Heidegger—the theosophist and the philosopher—in the 
end may continue to dwell in different worlds of discourse and of practice.  Nevertheless, 
this does not preclude what I believe to be worthwhile “conversation.”  Furthermore, as 
has been stated, I believe their continuing conversation in relation to language will prove 
fruitful as well.  But that is for another day. 
 To conclude this chapter, I would like to offer one final selection from each of 
their texts—lest someone here too quickly be left as “barbaric.”  First, consider how 
Heidegger finishes the “Conversation”—overtly referring to “that-which-regions” 
through the rapidly enveloping night near the end of their walk: 
T eacher:   Ever to the child in man, night neighbors the stars. 
S cholar:   She binds together without seam or edge or thread. 
S cientist:   She neighbors; because she works only with nearness. 
S cholar:   If she ever works rather than rests . . .  
T eacher:   . . . while wondering upon the depths of the height. 
S cholar:   Then wonder can open what is locked? 
S cientist:   By way of waiting . . .  
T eacher:   . . . if this is released . . .  
S cholar:   . . . and human nature remains appropriated to that . . .  
Teacher:   . . . from whence we are called.407 
 
Apparently, Heidegger also cannot resist Person. 
 Now consider the beginning to Böhme’s Sixth Treatise that concerns 
contemplation: 
 
 406 Boehme, Way to Christ, 40. 
 
 407 Heidegger, “Conversation,” 89-90. 
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1.   The student said to the master:  “How may I come to the supersensual life so 
that I can see God and hear Him speak?”  The master said:  “If you can sweep 
up for a moment into that in which no creature dwells, you can hear what God 
speaks.” 
2.   The student said:  “Is that near or far?”  The master said:  “It is in you.  If 
you could be silent from all willing and thinking for one hour you would hear 
God’s inexpressible words.” 
3.   The student said:  “How can I hear when I remain silent in thinking and 
willing?”  The master said:  “When you remain silent from the thinking and 
willing of self, the eternal hearing, seeing and speaking will be revealed in you, 
and God will see and hear through you.  Your own hearing, willing and seeing 
hinders you so that you do not see and hear God.” 
4.   The student said:  “With what shall I see and hear God, since He is above 
nature and creature?”  The master said:  “When you move silently then you are 
that which God was before nature and creature, [that] out of which He created 
your nature and creature.  Then you will hear and see with that with which God 
saw and heard in you before your own willing, seeing and hearing began.”408 
 
Perhaps thus, we may sweep up beyond the “barbaric,” truly to who is the Divine, 
through our person. 
  
 
 408 Boehme, Way to Christ, 171. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
 It was stated in the Introduction that, according to the characterization by Don S. 
Browning, Religion and Psychological Studies (RPS) is an interdisciplinary and 
hermeneutic enterprise which focuses its discourse on images of the human in dynamic 
encounter—which discourse further finds its center of gravity in the concern and care for 
the religious person.  It follows that this dissertation, offered as a work of original 
scholarship in the field of RPS, has attempted to stay true to the spirit of this 
characterization. 
 Hence, the theosophical hermeneutic of Jacob Böhme and the philosophical 
hermeneutic of Martin Heidegger have been engaged in “conversation.”  Through this 
conversation, in the context of a preservation of Böhme’s transformative practice as it is 
articulated in The Way to Christ, I have attempted to retrieve the question of 
imagination’s relation to religious practice—specifically in light of the potential for 
world transformations. 
 As it was also stated in the Introduction, this retrieval has been deemed necessary 
due to the apparent dearth of hermeneutic options for the interpretation of the dynamics 
of imagination and desire in religious practice.  To date, psychoanalytically oriented 
hermeneutics have been not just the preferred choices, but certainly among the only 
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viable choices, for the disclosure of such dynamics available to the RPS hermeneut.  I am 
hopeful that with the offering of this dissertation a new option is now available. 
 Imagination, as it has been presented here, is understood as rooted in, and 
equiprimordial with, desire characterized by the excessing of phenomenality.  Being so 
understood, imagination can be said to “show forth” both “ontologically” and “ontically.”  
 Ontologically speaking, I have characterized imagination as the whereby of our 
wherein.  That is, following in the wake of Heidegger, imagination has been said to open 
the horizon—or better, be the horizoning—that gathers beings in their belonging-together 
to be the beings that they are, and so are in mutual involvements and encounter.  That is, 
imagination opens the horizons of the worlds wherein we dwell.  Being primordial 
temporality, as the clearing opening, imagination (ontologically characterized) can 
further be said to gather beings in and as their finitude. 
 However, as I also have attempted to show, such understanding can disclose the 
possibility of multiple horizonings, and thereby worlds.  Worlds which, following in the 
wake of Böhme, can be said to be dynamic in their ongoing ontological and historical 
interactions or “inter-Being.”409  Hence, the possibility opens for the understanding and 
discourse of radically transformative and transforming worlds. 
 Ontically speaking, imagination opens for desireful Dasein a space for gathering 
within any given world.  Again, this is not due to any lack, but rather to desire’s ownmost 
excessing.  Further, as I have characterized it—engaging however briefly and in 
embedded fashion in “conversation” with psychoanalysis—such imagination can also be 
 
 409 I am “borrowing” [and then ontologizing the textuality of] Tich Nhat Hanh’s term “interbeing” 
here.  For an understanding of Tich Nhat Hanh’s specific usage of this term, see Tich Nhat Hanh, 
Interbeing:  Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism, ed., with an introduction by Fred Eppsteiner, 3d 
ed. (Berkeley: Parallax, 1998). 
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seen to be subject to the influences of one’s own willful wishing, whether consciously or 
unconsciously manifest.  Hereby, such ontically imaginative gathering can become 
“fantasy.”  Thus, in the development of this hermeneutic—as I have struggled in good 
faith to bring it to voice—this hermeneutic is not only differentiated from psychoanalytic 
hermeneutics of imagination and desire, but the way also becomes open for the inclusion 
of various psychoanalytic discourses within it. 
 The understanding of imagination so articulated was developed through the 
opening of the “conversation” between Böhme and Heidegger.  The same can be said to 
be the case with the understanding of world as the wherein of one’s dwelling, even 
through the acknowledgment of Böhme’s and Heidegger’s different elaborations of this 
term.  Be that as it may, the understanding of imagination was here also tracked and 
deepened in its development through the preservation of Böhme’s practice of the way to 
Christ which helped to disclose, through its working context, a fuller spectrum of the 
dynamics of imagination and desire manifest in practice. 
 This led to the additional disclosure of a radical transformative possibility for the 
practitioner of Böhme’s “way,” and in particular, her worlds through the “movement” of 
repentance, death, and the “new birth.”  This in turn, disclosed a radical possibility of 
encounter between such a practitioner and Sophia, as well as further transformative 
possibilities through the movements of resignation and contemplation. 
 For the sake of full disclosure, it must also be recognized here that by developing 
this hermeneutic within the context of a preservation of Jacob Böhme’s way to Christ, 
this hermeneutic is revealed as springing from, and so further developing, a discourse that 
understands the Nothing—whether of Ungrund or Sophia/Being—as “who.”  For 
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many—whether they are of a modern or a post-metaphysical discourse—this will be a 
hard pill to swallow.  This is understandable. 
 Yet it must also be acknowledged and emphasized that such is the outcome of this 
particular preservation.  I must question then, what if a different work of practice from a 
different world of belonging-together had been engaged as the starting point for the 
development.  Would this outcome of ultimate origin—of necessity—be the same?  This 
is a question that remains open.  I can only hope that an other will take up the call 
through the preservation of another practice to see if such is indeed the case. 
 In the end then, this work is still a mere beginning.  Nevertheless, I propose that 
enough of the way has been cleared to justify its use as a hermeneutic option.  As an 
example, one might consider how this hermeneutic could open new possibilities for our 
academic discourse when brought into conversation with—or applied to—the Deity Yoga 
of Vajrayana Buddhism.  How then might we understand Buddha realms?  This question 
speaks directly to a transformative possibility for our academic world.  This, in part, is 
what is at stake here. 
 Concerning our transformative possibilities, it must also be questioned, what if—
as this dissertation has attempted—we were to continue to open our discourse to the 
“esoteric” traditions in a serious way?  I propose that, among other things, it would 
become progressively more difficult to maintain the common narratives, with their 
attending discourses, that rather naïvely and rigidly set religion into varying bipolar 
relations to science in a closed or dialectical system as the story of our history and 
background for certain contemporary debates. 
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 If we were so to continue (bracketing for the moment other voices marginalized 
through our common discourses), it may perhaps again be affirmed—as I tried to affirm 
in Chapter Two of this dissertation—that the esoteric traditions have been and still are a 
third voice in our “western” historical transformations.  Further, they remain a voice of 
the “other tonality.”  This issue is also, in part, what is at stake in this dissertation.  That 
is, so to open—even by a little bit—the boundaries of legitimate, and legitimizing, 
discourse. 
 Returning to a more practical concern, it was also noted in the Introduction that 
there have been curiously few works in the field of RPS that focus specifically, and in a 
sustained way, on the practitioner in practice.  Again, what seems strange in this is that 
such works have a profound potential in helping to disclose the “who” of the religious 
person.  I am hopeful that in some small way this potential has been demonstrated 
through this dissertation. 
 Concerning the “who” of Böhme’s particular practice, it may justifiably be asked, 
who now practices his “way?”  Is not the “who” disclosed here a “who” that no longer 
exists?  This is a valid question.  Surely, one can assume there are very few today who 
preserve Böhme’s practice as it is specifically given in The Way to Christ. 
 However, it should also be acknowledged that we—particularly in the United 
States—are not far removed from the influence of this practice.  Our nation is rooted in 
the discourses and practices of Protestant Pietism.  This Pietism—as was disclosed—in 
its inception was profoundly influenced by Böhme’s The Way to Christ, at least in some 
circles. 
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 Currently, we are witnessing a resurgence of “pietist” interest and expression 
through the evangelism of certain “born-again” Christians.  It would seem that many, in 
their thirst for a deep and personal spiritual connection, still gravitate to the “familiar”—
whether this is in their best interest or not.  It may be said then, that we are somewhat 
primed for a return to this practice of the way to Christ.  One clear benefit of such a 
return, I believe, would manifest through an increase in pietists of a heightened and 
heartfelt tolerance—even acceptance—of practitioners in other traditions.  This would 
certainly include more open and friendly conversation.  A return to this practice then, 
could bear good fruit. 
 It will be recalled that the Böhmist Christian, understanding herself as of the 
community of the “inner church,” can move among the sects, and even participate in their 
services.  She is not afraid to study respectfully the works and practices of other 
traditions—including those of science or the “natural arts.”  And rather than “argue” with 
others or proselytize them, she sinks herself into the loving life of Christ.  Thus, she 
becomes just and generous in charity. 
 Along with Sophia—with whom she becomes personally and intimately 
connected—she is a true worker in God’s vineyard.  Further, she knows that she is in 
transformation, and so resigns herself in true humility.  Yet she is also strong in her 
independence, for she knows that she must find her particular way—and that it is 
ultimately for herself alone.  Thus, she can respect the ways and “gifts” of others. 
 Certainly, there is much in the Böhmist Christian that expresses the mythos of 
what have long been familiar and cherished Protestant American “ideals.”  This practice, 
although—like the ideals—certainly not for all, nonetheless truly is near in its apparent 
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distance.  It can offer a viable alternative to some with pietist leanings who otherwise 
might feel they have no other option for their practice than the unexamined emotional 
effusiveness and intolerant Biblical literalism which, in my estimation, have become the 
“customary” fare—or ways of “gathering”—for much of the contemporary evangelical 
world.  This issue is also, in part, what is at stake in this dissertation. 
 I am hopeful then, that this dissertation will spark some interest in Jacob Böhme 
and his practice of the way to Christ.  I believe that Böhme and this practice are still 
relevant and have much yet to offer.  This includes, as stated in Chapter Five, my hoped-
for retrieval of the question of language, through a preservation of Jacob Böhme’s 
discourse on this issue—yet again, in “conversation” with the work of Martin Heidegger.  
Thereby, I believe a radical and a “new” way forward in our discourse concerning this 
critical issue also may ultimately be attained. 
  
201 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Anderson, John M. Introduction to Discourse on Thinking, by Martin Heidegger. A 
Translation of Gelassenheit. Translated by John M. Anderson and E. Hans 
Freund. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966. 
 
Berdyaev, Nicholas. “Unground and Freedom,” introduction to Six Theosophic Points, 
by Jacob Boehme. Translated by John Rolleston Earle. New York: Knopf, 1920. 
Reprint, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. 
 
Boehme, Jacob. The Aurora:  That is, the Day-Spring. Translated by John Sparrow. 
London, 1656. Edited by C.J. Barker and D.S. Hehner. London: John M. Watkins, 
1914. Reprint, Cambridge, England: James Clarke, 1960; Edmonds, WA: Sure 
Fire/Holmes, 1992. 
 
________. Concerning the Three Principles of Divine Essence. Translated by John 
Sparrow. London, 1648. Reprint, C.J. Barker. London: John M. Watkins, 1910; 
Kila, MT: Kessinger, 1997. 
 
________. The Incarnation of Jesus Christ. (1659). Translated by John Rolleston Earle. 
London: Constable, 1934. 
 
________. “Mysterium Pansophicum” or “On the Earthly and Heavenly Mystery.” In Six 
Theosophic Points and Other Writings. (1661). Translated by John Rolleston 
Earle. With an introduction by Nicholas Berdyaev, 141-162. New York: Knopf, 
1920. Reprint, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. 
 
________. Sämtliche Schriften. Edited by Will-Erich Peuckert and August Faust. Vol. 1, 
Morgenröthe im Aufgang (1612). 11 Vols. Stuttgart: Frommanns Verlag, 1955-
1961. Facsimile reprint of 1730 edition: Theosophia Revelata. Das ist:  Alle 
Göttliche Schriften des Gottseligen und Hocherleuchteten Deutschen Theosophi 
Jacob Böhmens, Edited by Johann Georg Gichtel and Johann Wilhelm Ueberfeld. 
Amsterdam, 1730. 
 
________. “Six Mystical Points.” In Six Theosophic Points and Other Writings. (1661). 
Translated by John Rolleston Earle. With an introduction by Nicholas Berdyaev, 
115-137. New York: Knopf, 1920. Reprint, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1958. 
 
202 
________. “Six Theosophic Points.” In Six Theosophic Points and Other Writings. 
(1661).Translated by John Rolleston Earle. With an introduction by Nicholas 
Berdyaev, 3-112. New York: Knopf, 1920. Reprint, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1958. 
 
________. Six Theosophic Points and Other Writings. (1661). Translated by John 
Rolleston Earle. New York: Knopf, 1920. Reprint, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1958. With an introduction, “Unground and Freedom” by 
Nicholas Berdyaev. 
 
________. The Threefold Life of Man. Translated by John Sparrow. London, 1650. 
Reprint, C.J. Barker. London: John W. Watkins, 1909. 
 
________. The Way to Christ. (1648). Translated by Peter Erb. With a foreword and an 
introduction by Peter Erb. With a preface by Winfried Zeller. Classics of Western 
Spirituality. New York: Paulist, 1978. 
 
Browning, Don S. “The Past and Possible Future of Religion and Psychological Studies.” 
In Religion and Psychology:  Mapping the Terrain, Contemporary Dialogues, 
Future Prospects, ed. Diane Jonte-Pace and William B. Parsons, 165-180. New 
York: Routledge, 2001. 
 
Burckhardt, Titus. Alchemy:  Science of the Cosmos, Science of the Soul. Translated by 
William Stoddart. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. “A Critique of Psychoanalysis.” Seminar in Paris, [2004]. European 
Graduate School EGS. From egsvideo. Website. http://www.youtube.com/ 
user/egsvideo or http://www.egs.edu/. Internet; accessed 14 October 2009. 
 
________. Of Spirit:  Heidegger and the Question. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington 
and Rachel Bowlby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. 
 
Erb, Peter. Introduction to The Way to Christ, by Jacob Boehme. Translated by Peter Erb. 
With a foreword by Peter Erb. With a preface by Winfried Zeller. Classics of 
Western Spirituality. New York: Paulist, 1978. 
 
European Graduate School EGS. From egsvideo. Website. http://www.youtube.com/ 
user/egsvideo or http://www.egs.edu/. Internet; accessed 14 October 2009. 
 
Faivre, Antoine. Access to Western Esotericism. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1996. 
 
________. Theosophy, Imagination, Tradition:  Studies in Western Esotericism. 
Translated by Christine Rhone. Studies in Western Esoteric Traditions. Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2000. 
203 
 
Flory, Mark. “Transforming Practices:  Hesychastic Correctives to Postmodern 
Apophatic Theology.” Ph.D. diss., University of Denver/Iliff School of Theology, 
2005. 
 
Garber, Marjorie. “Our Genius Problem.” The Atlantic Monthly, December 2002, 65-72. 
 
Hegel, Georg W.F. Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated by E.S. 
Haldane and Frances H. Simson, Vol. 3. New York: Humanities, 1955. 
 
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. (1927). Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward 
Robinson. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1962. 
 
________. “Building Dwelling Thinking.” (1954). In Poetry, Language, Thought. 
Translated by Albert Hofstadter. With an introduction by Albert Hofstadter, 141-
159. New York: Harper, 1971. Reprint, New York: Perennial Classics, 2001. 
 
________. “Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking.” (1959). In Discourse on 
Thinking. A Translation of Gelassenheit. Translated by John M. Anderson and E. 
Hans Freund. With an introduction by John M. Anderson, 58-90. New York: 
Harper Torchbooks, 1966. 
 
________. “A Dialogue on Language.” (1959). In On the Way to Language. Translated 
by Peter D. Hertz, 1-54. San Francisco: HarperSan Francisco, 1982. 
 
________. Discourse on Thinking. (1959). A Translation of Gelassenheit. Translated by 
John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. With an introduction by John M. 
Anderson. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966. 
 
________. Identity and Difference. (1957). Translated by Joan Stambaugh. With an 
introduction by Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper, 1969. Reprint, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002. 
 
________. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. (1929). 5th ed., enl. Translated by 
Richard Taft. Studies in Continental Thought. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1997. 
 
________. “Language in the Poem: A Discussion on Georg Trakl’s Poetic Work.” 
(1959). In On the Way to Language. Translated by Peter D. Hertz, 159-198. San 
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1982. 
 
________. “‘Letter on Humanism’.” (1967). In Pathmarks. Edited by William McNeill. 
Translated by Frank A. Capuzzi, 239-276. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998. 
 
204 
________. On the Way to Language. (1959). Translated by Peter D. Hertz. San 
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1982. 
 
________. “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics.” (1957). In Identity 
and Difference. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. With an introduction by Joan 
Stambaugh, 42-76. New York: Harper, 1969. Reprint, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002. 
 
________. “The Origin of the Work of Art.” (1960). In Poetry, Language, Thought. 
Translated by Albert Hofstadter. With an introduction by Albert Hofstadter, 15-
86. New York: Harper, 1971. Reprint, New York: Perennial Classics, 2001. 
 
________. Pathmarks. (1967). Edited by William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998. 
 
________. Poetry, Language, Thought. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. With an 
introduction by Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper, 1971. Reprint, New York: 
Perennial Classics, 2001. 
 
________. The Principle of Reason. (1957). Translated by Reginald Lilly. Studies in 
Continental Thought. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. 
 
________. Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom. Translated by Joan 
Stambaugh. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1985. 
 
________. “What is Metaphysics?” (1967) In Pathmarks. Edited by William McNeill. 
Translated by David Farrell Krell, 82-96. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998. 
 
Henry, Michel. The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis. Translated by Douglas Brick. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. 
 
________. Incarnation:  Une philosophie de la chair (Incarnation:  A philosophy of the 
flesh). Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2000. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. London: 
Macmillan, 1929. 
 
________. Immanuel Kants Werke. Edited by Ernst Cassirer, Hermann Cohen, Artur 
Buchenau, Otto Buck, Albert Görland, and B. Kellermann. Vol. 8, 
Logikvorlesung (Lecture on logic). Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1912. Reprint, 1922; 
Reissue, Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1973. 
 
 
 
205 
________. Kritik der reiner Vernunft:  Nach der Ersten und Zweite Auflage (Critique of 
pure reason:  First and second edition). Edited by Raymund Schmidt. Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner, 1926. 
 
Kearney, Richard. Poetics of Imagining:  Modern to Post-Modern. Perspectives in 
Continental Philosophy. New York: Fordham University Press, 1998. 
 
________. Poetics of Modernity:  Toward a Hermeneutic Imagination. New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1995. 
 
________. Poétique du Possible. Paris: Beauchesne, 1984. 
 
________. Transitions. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987. 
 
________. The Wake of Imagination:  Toward a Postmodern Culture. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 
 
Magee, Glenn Alexander. Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2001. 
 
Martensen, Hans L. Jacob Boehme:  Studies in His Life and Teaching, rev. ed. Translated 
by T. Rhys Evans. New York: Harper, 1949. 
 
Mayer, Paola. “Reinventing the Sacred:  The Romantic Myth of Jacob Böhme.” The 
German Quarterly 69 (Summer 1996): 247-259. 
 
McGinn, Bernard, Frank Tobin, and Elvira Borgstadt, eds. Meister Eckhart:  Teacher and 
Preacher. With a preface by Kenneth Northcott. Classics of Western Spirituality. 
Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist, 1986. 
 
Olson, Roger E. The Story of Christian Theology:  Twenty Centuries of Tradition and 
Reform. Downer’s Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1999. 
 
O’Regan, Cyril. Gnostic Apocalypse:  Jacob Boehme’s Haunted Narrative. Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2002. 
 
________. Gnostic Return in Modernity. Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2001. 
 
Pruett, Gordon E. “Will and Freedom: Psychoanalytic Themes in the Work of Jacob 
Boehme.” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 6, no. 3 (1976-1977): 241-251. 
 
Randolph, Paschal Beverly, ed. Hermes Mercurius Trismegistus:  His Divine Pymander. 
Rosicrucian Publishing, 1871. Reprint, Des Plaines, Ill. Yogi Publishing Society, 
n.d. 
206 
 
Ricoeur, Paul. Freud and Philosophy:  An Essay on Interpretation. Translated by Denis 
Savage. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. 
 
Scholem, Gershom. Kabbalah:  A Definitive History of the Evolution, Ideas, Leading 
Figures, and Extraordinary Influences of Jewish Mysticism. New York: Meridian, 
1978. 
 
________. Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism. With a foreword by Robert Alter. New 
York: Schocken, 1974. 
 
Tanabe Hajime. Philosophy as Metanoetics. Translated by Takeuchi Yoshinori, Valdo 
Viglielmo, and James W. Heisig. Nazan Studies in Religion and Culture. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. 
 
Tich Nhat Hanh. Interbeing:  Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism, 3d ed. Edited 
by Fred Eppsteiner. With an introduction by Fred Eppsteiner. Berkeley: Parallax, 
1998. 
 
Vattimo, Gianni. After Christianity. Translated by Luca D’ Isanto. Italian Academy 
Lectures. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. 
 
________. Belief. Translated by Luca D’ Isanto and David Webb. With an introduction 
by Luca D’ Isanto. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. 
 
________. Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy. 
Translated by David Webb. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. 
 
________. The Transparent Society. Translated by David Webb. Parallax Re-Visions of 
Culture and Society. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. 
 
Walsh, David. The Mysticism of Innerworldly Fulfillment:  A Study of Jacob Boehme. 
Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1983. 
 
Weeks, Andrew. Boehme:  An Intellectual Biography of the Seventeenth-Century 
Philosopher and Mystic. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. 
 
________. German Mysticism from Hildegard of Bingen to Ludwig Wittgenstein:  A 
Literary and Intellectual History. Studies in Western Esoteric Traditions. Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1993. 
 
Wolfson, Elliott R. Language, Eros, Being:  Kabbalistic Hermeneutics and Poetic 
Imagination. New York: Fordham University Press, 2005. 
 
 
207 
Zeller, Winfried. Preface to The Way to Christ, by Jacob Boehme. Translated by Peter 
Erb. With a foreword and an introduction by Peter Erb. Classics of Western 
Spirituality. New York: Paulist, 1978. 
 
Žižeck, Slavoj. “Materialism and Theology.” Seminar at the European Graduate School, 
[2007]. European Graduate School EGS. From egsvideo. Website. http://www 
.youtube.com/user/egsvideo or http://www.egs.edu/. Internet; accessed 14 
October 2009. 
 
